Islamist radicalisation the challenge for euro-mediterranean relations

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“concern” of Israel, even though the victims were Turkish rather than 
Israeli citizens. Similarly, attacks against the British Consulate and HSBC 
Bank have been dismissed as attacks upon the UK, although again, most of 
those killed were actually Turks. 
2.2
 
The re-emergence of Hizbullah in Turkey 
The emergence, rise and fall of the movement 
The Turkish Hizbullah – not to be confused with the Lebanon-based Shiite 
Hizbullah – is a militant, Islamist Sunni group based in south-east Turkey 
where a conservative understanding of Islam is predominantly embraced. 
A handful of Kurdish youngsters initiated the movement at the end of the 
1970s, and it was institutionalised immediately after the military coup of 12 
September 1980.  
Between 1988 and 1990, Hizbullah laid the foundations of jihad. It 
was influenced by the Iranian revolution and it received both financial and 
logistical support from Iran.
39
 During this period, its leader Hüseyin 
Velioğlu reportedly summarised his strategy as follows: “There should be 
no other movements opposing the regime besides ours. Being the only 
alternative to the regime is a must in order to consolidate people’s 
opposition to the regime in one alternative. After becoming the only 
alternative, the reckoning will be between the regime and this one 
alternative.”
40
 In line with this strategy, the main target of the organisation 
was initially not the state, but the PKK, which was a strong competitor for 
people’s allegiances in the region. Hizbullah turned increasingly violent in 
its efforts to defeat the PKK and draw public support by appearing more 
hard line than the PKK. The conflict between the two, which raged between 
1993 and 1995, led to heavy losses on the part of the PKK. It was finally 
brought to an end through the mediation efforts of the leaders of the 
Kurdistan Islamic Movement in Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdish Revolutionary 
Hizbullah party. Soon after, an internecine conflict emerged between two 
 
                                                      
39
 See R. Çakır, Derin Hizbullah [Hizbullah Goes Deeper], Istanbul: Metis, 2001. 
40
 Quoted in R. Çakır, The Reemergence of Hizbullah in Turkey, Policy Focus No. 74, 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., September 2007, p. 6.  

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factions within the organisation: the more moderate Menzil group argued 
for gradualism and the Ilimcis for imminent jihad, resulting in the success 
of the latter. 
In the 1990s, the organisation began to expand its activities into 
western Turkey by carrying out a number of assassinations, which also 
paved the way to its decline. On 17 January 2000, the police raided a house 
in Istanbul, killing the organisation’s leader Velioğlu and leading to a major 
clampdown of the organisation by the Turkish security forces. 
Approximately one year after this first operation, the organisation 
assassinated Diyarbakir’s chief of police, Gaffar Okkan, as revenge for its 
leader’s death. This resulted in a second crackdown against Hizbullah, 
where both the perpetrators of the assassination and the majority of the 
organisation’s top leadership were caught. Some members fled abroad to 
Europe, Syria, Iran and Northern Iraq. 
It is often argued that the Turkish security forces overlooked 
Hizbullah atrocities when the organisation was fighting the PKK in the 
1990s, but there is no strong empirical proof to substantiate this claim. The 
data published by Turkey’s semi-official news source, the Anatolia Agency, 
suggests that the security forces countered Hizbullah during the years the 
latter was working to eliminate its adversaries, despite the organisation’s 
ability to establish strong control over the streets in many of south-eastern 
Turkey’s towns and provinces.
41
 Still, it was only after the organisation had 
ended its operations against the PKK that the security forces went after it 
more aggressively. As one police report states, “[a]s activities declined, the 
number of operations increased…The most important factor in this case 
was that the security forces were too busy with the PKK, which was 
operating in the region and was more of a serious threat than Hizbullah in 
the years when Hizbullah was founded.”
42
 That Hizbullah’s operational 
strategy was more covert than the PKK’s was another factor that 
contributed to Hizbullah’s growth. 
After the intensive crackdown, Hizbullah stopped its armed attacks 
(at least temporarily) and entered a phase of serious internal strife. The US-
led, post-11 September ‘global war on terror’ also contributed to this 
                                                      
41
 Ibid., p. 9. 
42
 Quoted in ibid., p. 10. 

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process, as Hizbullah did not want to be another target of international 
powers seeking to fight terrorist groups. Furthermore, after 2002, Hizbullah 
escaped critical attention owing to Turkey’s preoccupation with the PKK. 
Hizbullah’s ideology 
The movement’s leader, Velioğlu, identified three main stages culminating 
in the establishment of an Islamic state. The first one is ‘propaganda’, in 
which the Islamists would try to convince people to live in accordance with 
Islam and to establish an Islamic state. The next stage is ‘community’, in 
which the local communities would be reorganised in accordance with 
Islamic rules. The third and the final stage is ‘jihad’, in which armed 
struggle would be used to establish and defend the Islamic state. Party 
politics is considered a great sin that is strictly forbidden since it is 
perceived as recognition of the present establishment.
43
  
The movement is primarily centred on Turkey’s Kurdish-populated 
regions. Nonetheless, its aims are universalist, in the sense that it aspires to 
emancipate the entire Islamic society by seeking to “establish an Islamic 
system on earth that will demolish tyranny, injustice, segregation and 
exploitation”.
44
 Hence, although most of its members are Kurdish, it does 
not pursue a Kurdish nationalist agenda. 
For Hizbullah, ‘jihad’ and ‘martyrdom’ are inevitable. Martyrdom is 
valued very highly since it is considered the “greatest benefit for the 
Muslim  ummah and the greatest investment for the ummah’s future”.
45
 
Contrary to most radical movements in the region, Hizbullah is not critical 
of tradition. Instead, it often praises traditional religious orders and sects in 
its propaganda material to gain popular support.  
                                                      
43
 M. Kürsad Atalar, “Hizbullah of Turkey: A Pseudo-Threat to the Secular Order”, 
Turkish Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2006, p. 327.  
44
 I. Bagasi, Kendi Dilinden Hizbullah ve Mücadeleden Kesitler [Hizbullah in Its Words 
and Important Aspects of the History of the Struggle] (unknown publisher), 2004, 
p. 56. 
45
 F. Hamza, “Sehadet bir Ruhtur”, Inzar Dergisi, Vol. 17, February 2006, quoted in 
Bagasi (2004), supra. 

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