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programmes to expose the violation of journalists’ rights and helped
establish the website “Maidan”, which provided information to help
Ukrainian voters make informed political choices.
The experiences of Spain, Georgia and Ukraine offer a wealth of
lessons for external policies of engagement through training and capacity
building. These lessons should by no means be applied to Islamist
movements alone – but should rather concern all opposition actors with an
interest in and commitment to reform and with genuine roots in society. By
contrast, externally breeding reform actors with little domestic standing is a
waste of resources at best or a cause for popular resentment and frustration
at worst.
Three principal lessons from Western capacity-building and training
initiatives in our three case countries can be extrapolated and applied to the
question of external engagement with political Islam. First is the need to
deepen the degree of training and capacity-building support to opposition
political parties. We have already noted how the NDI and the IRI have
been active in this field. Yet the Spanish precedent especially suggests the
necessity of a critical mass of support, whereby the PSOE received
campaigning, strategy and party development training and funds from the
SI, the German and French socialists, the British Labour Party and the
German foundations. Likewise, opposition parties in Georgia and Ukraine
were supported by a wide range of European and American foundations,
universities and private philanthropists. It is high time that European
actors build on the efforts made by American organisations, not least given
their somewhat better reputation in the region compared with the US.
28
Yet party training is feasible only in those countries – such as
Morocco, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon – in which Islamist actors are
legally recognised and allowed to operate. In other countries, this is not the
case, making it difficult if not outright impossible for Western actors,
including non-state ones, to engage in training and capacity building of
‘illegal’ parties. In cases such as Palestine and Lebanon, Western actors
might be reluctant to engage in capacity-building activities with parties
viewed as radical or ‘terrorist’. Nonetheless, the second critical lesson
drawn is the need for capacity-building efforts to concentrate on wider
28
Emerson and Youngs (2008), op. cit.
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OW CAN
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sectors of society. This would allow Western actors to engage with Islamist
actors even in those contexts that are viewed as most politically radical.
Georgian and Ukrainian liberals, like Islamists in the Middle East, are not
confined to the elites and the rank and file of parties, but are spread across
different spheres, including NGOs, professional associations, charities,
media, youth organisations and student groups. Hence, there is a need to
tailor capacity-building and training activities to these actors as well. When
applied to the Middle East this entails a shift of focus away from urban,
Westernised and elite-based NGOs, which receive the bulk of Western
funds and attention, and concentrating on Islamic and non-Islamic youth
groups, student associations, charities and other welfare organisations. In
so far as over three-quarters of civil society in the Middle East is service-
based, any well-meaning policy of external engagement aimed at change
and reform cannot ignore this sector. The Spanish precedent highlights the
importance of including within the scope of civil society development,
support for trade unions and professional associations, as key actors in any
country’s associational life.
Third, the experiences of Spain, Georgia and Ukraine (and to this one
could also add countries such as Greece or Portugal as well as the Eastern
European countries), while certainly distinct from the Middle East, could
certainly be of substantial value to reform-minded opposition actors in the
region, including Islamist movements. Thus, a lesson and suggestion in this
respect would be that of organising meetings for representatives of Islamist
political parties and civil society organisations in Europe to discuss, explore
and learn from the experiences of former opposition groups in
authoritarian states. Not only could this have a positive impact in terms of
socialisation and learning, but it could also help build trust and
understanding between Islamists and the West.
Political pressure: A sine qua non for effective engagement
Beyond the external engagement with opposition parties and civil society,
Western policies played a role in the democratisation processes in Spain,
Ukraine and Georgia by exerting credible pressure and conditionality on
authoritarian regimes. Without pressure at the top, engagement with
opposition actors alone is futile. In other words, engagement with
opposition actors in authoritarian contexts must necessarily go hand in
hand with conditional engagement and pressure on their regimes.
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Opposition actors in Spain used their European links effectively to
apply pressure on the regime. In 1962, a Congress of the European
Movement in Munich drew up a declaration outlining the political
conditions the European Community (EC) should demand before signing
any agreement with Spain, a declaration that strengthened the anti-Franco
lobby in Europe.
29
Earlier, in 1961, the SI had adopted these
recommendations in order to exert pressure on foreign governments to
stop cooperating with Franco. In 1966, the SI adopted a resolution that
condemned the referendum on the Organic Law, which gave full powers to
Franco and guaranteed the loyalty of state institutions to the regime. The SI
also opposed Spain’s membership in NATO, the Council of Europe and the
European Economic Community (EEC). It vocally protested against the
arrests of members of the socialist opposition and the death sentences
passed during the dictatorship, attracting international attention to Spanish
affairs. After Franco’s death in 1975, the SI called for restoring full
democracy in Spain, freeing all political prisoners, providing freedom of
speech and association and freedom for all political parties and trade
unions.
30
Earlier, in Germany the SPD had opposed the entry of Spain into the
EEC. In 1972, Chancellor Willy Brandt declared that there was no
possibility of Spain entering the EEC, because only democratic countries
could become members of the Community. In France, the General
Confederation of Labour Workers’ Force brought pressure on the French
government to halt relations with Franco’s regime.
31
The trade union
movement was also active in mobilising pressure on the Spanish regime. In
1961, a delegation of the ICFTU met with members of the US
administration in order to persuade them to change their policy towards
Franco’s regime and exercise pressure on the government. The ICFTU
additionally put pressure on the regime by inducing local governments,
national governments and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to
protest against Franco’s rule and its violation of labour rights. In the UK,
the TUC adopted a resolution that opposed the establishment of NATO
military bases in Spain and rejected Spain’s entry into the alliance. The TUC
29
Pridham (1991), op. cit., p. 218.
30
Ibid., p. 85
31
Anaya Ortuno (2002), op. cit., pp. 22-40.
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