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process.
12
Opportunities for de-radicalisation are also to be found in a
statement by a senior member of Hamas in Damascus: “Hamas cannot be
narrowed down to suicide bombers; that is only one aspect of resistance.”
13
It is easy to derive from such a statement a conclusion that members are
encouraged to seek alternative ways of resistance, hopefully non-violent
ones.
The social level
At times of war and occupation, recruitment into the ranks of militant
groups becomes a relatively simple task. Prior to winning the elections,
Hamas had already filled the void where the Palestinian leadership had
been unable or unwilling to act. Through its Islamic charity network, the
group provides education, health care and security. It is an important
employer but also a religious organisation deeply entrenched in Palestinian
society. As such, it succeeds in recruiting those who want to be inspired
religiously and politically. Hamas’s unique position in society as well as its
social–political–religious–military structure allows it quickly to adapt to the
situation on the ground. At the same time, however, Hamas’s unchallenged
role as an Islamic organisation places it in a position of defender of not only
Palestine as a territory, but also Palestine as a holy Islamic land. Equating
the resistance against occupation with defence of Islam on behalf of the
entire Islamic umma introduces a new component into the pattern of
radicalisation. The genuine belief that not only is Palestine under threat but
also Islam as a whole makes it the responsibility of those on the front line to
act on behalf of the entire Islamic umma, and Hamas is ready to undertake
that responsibility.
12
Being vastly outnumbered, Khaled Bin Walid ordered his army to retreat and
head back home. When they returned home, people called Khaled Bin Walid a
coward and a traitor, and they wanted to punish him. The Prophet Muhammad
intervened, however, and called him a hero, because he saved 3,000 lives from a
certain but futile death without accomplishing anything. This same story was used
by the leadership of Egypt’s Jamaa Islamia when they renounced violence in 1997.
For more on that, see Alli Mohamed Alli Al-Sharif et al., Tasslit al-Addwaa ala ma
Waqaa fi al-Jihad min al-Akhtaa, Cairo: Islamic Turath Book Shop, 2002, p. 11.
13
Author interview, Hamas member, 2008.
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Arguing that religion is under threat, recruitment and resistance
become justified and accepted within Palestinian society no matter the cost.
An emphasis on the importance of land, and above all Jerusalem, becomes
tantamount to connecting religious identity to an obligation of every
Palestinian to resist the occupation. The more extreme elements within
Hamas and in the Islamic world often cite radical scholars like Abdur-
Rahman Abdul-Khaliq to explain why accepting the Oslo treaty is un-
Islamic. Abdul-Khaliq says accordingly “that there is no doubt that these
treaties do not bind any Muslim in the world; because these have been
concluded in the names of regional nationalisms that are basically invalid
because these create divisions among the members of one [ u] mmah”.
14
A
junior member of Hamas in Syria also explains why his group cannot back
down on its core principles: “Our issue with Jews is one of existence, and
not borders.”
15
Land is existence. In the simplest terms, defending land
equates to defending Islam, and as mentioned previously, according to
certain interpretations of the Quran it is the duty of every Muslim to stand
up and resist when Islam and the umma are under threat. Following
Hamas’s electoral victory in 2006, its leaders felt vindicated, because the
Palestinian people chose resistance rather than a settlement based on the
Oslo accords. Apart from being seen as disadvantageous, the Oslo accords
are also considered un-Islamic. They must be revoked because they deprive
Palestinians of their ancestral land, and that land represents what and who
they are: “Land to us is part of our origin, our religion. We cannot negotiate
about our identity. We cannot negotiate about our principles. We
absolutely cannot negotiate about the rights of Palestinian people, which
are land, holy places, the right of return, the right of resistance.”
16
Even though the views of many Islamists throughout the world vis-à-
vis Palestine, Israel, Jews and Zionism vary, there is a common uniting
factor upon which all agree: the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine
is an act of aggression and a direct threat against Muslims and Islam.
17
Hamas capitalises on the theological reasoning and sympathies it receives
14
See Abdur-Rahman Abdul-Khaliq, Peace treaties with the Jews according to the
Shariah, Birmingham: Makktabah (undated)
.
15
Author interview, Hamas member in Homs, 2008.
16
Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008.
17
See Jansen (1997), op. cit.
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from a number of prominent figures in the Muslim world. And when
religion is perceived to be under threat, theological reasoning is utilised for
the recruitment of new members and growing popular support. Until the
status of Jews living in Muslim lands is brought into compliance with the
holy book, jihad becomes a duty of every able Palestinian man and woman.
The interaction of religion and politics at the level of Palestinian
society shows how land and identity are utilised as catalysts for
radicalisation. Through its all-reaching social network, Hamas manages
directly to communicate its agenda to a large segment of the Palestinian
population. The impression that the loss of Palestine would spell the
beginning of the end for Islam is a powerful mobilising tool that eventually
creates one collective identity: Muslims under threat. The outcome is that
from then on, every role, whether private or public, is geared towards
resistance. “I have eleven children, and will do all in my power to have
them join the movement,”
18
a Hamas spokesperson told this author in
Damascus. “Clearly, I am a religious man, I am a political man, and I am a
resistance man,”
19
was a reply by another senior member. It is apparent
that the whole mindset within the Hamas membership is calibrated
towards recruiting more resistance members from all strata of Palestinian
society until everyone is part of the struggle. That task is made easier if war
against Israel is presented as a war between those willing to destroy Islam
and those defending it.
The common line of argument in most interviews carried out for this
chapter for continuing the violence was that Palestinians have suffered for
decades, so a few more years do not make much difference. In spite of
Hamas’s stance towards Israel and the subsequent consequences, support
for the group seems unaffected. “People are used to suffering. [A] few days
without water or electricity make no difference any longer. If liberation
takes place tomorrow or in one hundred years [it] is not too important. But
it will happen. After all, Prophet Muhammad returned to Mecca from exile
after many years.”
But just as the language of religion is used to instigate violence, the
language of religion can also offer a face-saving exit strategy and a
18
Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008.
19
Author interview, Hamas member in Damascus, 2008.
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