Lexstat 18 usc section 1001 united states code service

160.--Currency transaction reports

Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendants had knowledge of Reporting Act (31 USCS § 53130) and that they had intent to violate it where there was direct evidence of such knowledge and where jury could infer from evidence that only purpose accomplished by scheme was for defendants to disassociate themselves from cash, and launder it out of United States while avoiding any required CTR's. United States v Hernando Ospina (1986, CA11 Fla) 798 F2d 1570, 21 Fed Rules Evid Serv 878.

Attorney acted willfully under 18 USCS § 2(b) with knowledge of currency transaction reporting (CTR) requirement and with intent to cause bank to fail to file currency transaction report, where (1) attorney at time of transaction had requisite knowledge under 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 2 of CTR requirements, and (2) there is reasonable inference that attorney directed people in her office and acted herself to take large amounts of cash and break it into amounts of less than $ 10,000 and engaged in transactions at different banks and in names of different payees in order to hide that money originated from single source and identity of source. United States v Perlmutter (1987, SD NY) 656 F Supp 782, affd without op (1987, CA2 NY) 835 F2d 1430, cert den (1988) 485 US 935, 99 L Ed 2d 271, 108 S Ct 1110.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Where defendant, upon boarding flight to Europe with his wife, falsely stated to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents that his wife was carrying $ 6,500 and he had only $ 356, government established that defendant knowingly and willfully lied to DHS agents, required element to support conviction for violating 18 USCS § 1001, because there was ample evidence that defendant, non-native English speaker, but U.S. citizen educated in U.S., knowingly and willfully lied. United States v Odunze (2008, CA6 Tenn) 2008 FED App 278N.

161.--Customs matters

In prosecution for causing false and fraudulent statements to be made in application for export license, letters and other papers taken from person of defendant, which indicated that he knew that ultimate destination of oil storage tanks he was exporting was not purported one, were not instrumentalities for commission of crime but were mere evidences of criminal intent of defendant. Takahashi v United States (1944, CA9 Wash) 143 F2d 118.

Defendant's concealment of diamond and emerald ring and fact that 7 unset diamonds and diamond ring were found on person of his traveling companion showed awareness that customs officials would be interested in gems and allowed jury reasonably to infer that defendant had notice Customs would consider passage of valuable gems into United States "material"; customs declaration form which clearly stated "all your baggage, including hand bags and hand-carried parcels, may be examined" was sufficient to establish that defendant, international traveler, had notice that his possession of gems was material to Customs, even though gems were acquired in United States. United States v Masters (1979, CA9 Cal) 612 F2d 1117, cert den (1980) 449 US 847, 66 L Ed 2d 57, 101 S Ct 134.

Evidence was sufficient to establish specific intent of defendants to defraud United States where evidence established that defendants submitted statement to United States Customs falsely designating 1,150 cases of bonded scotch whiskey as "vessel supplies"; inference that 25-man crew on 14-day voyage could not ingest great amount of scotch was sufficient for jury on issue. United States v Lichenstein (1980, CA5 Ga) 610 F2d 1272, cert den (1980) 447 US 907, 64 L Ed 2d 856, 100 S Ct 2991.

Evidence is sufficient to sustain defendant's knowledge that she carried in excess of $ 5,000 while making statement on customs declaration that she did not, where money found in defendant's purse consisted of 2 large bundles of $ 100 bills, not concealed in wrapping material, bound only by rubber bands, with each bundle of currency being approximately 1 1/2 inches thick. United States v Silva (1983, CA2 NY) 715 F2d 43.

Defendant's forgery of name on false charter form submitted to United States Customs is fully sufficient to convict defendant of submitting false documents in attempt to regain sailboat seized by customs as part of marijuana smuggling scheme, regardless of defendant's defense that he had signed false name to form to appease his secretary, who had asked him to sign false charter. United States v Cross (1984, CA11 Ga) 742 F2d 1279.

Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant had specific intent required to prove violation of 18 USCS § 1001 by clandestinely importing and exporting cigarettes, where jury could infer from facts such as--that defendants had been in export business for number of years--that they knew that false shipping export declarations would be created and submitted to United States Customs Service. United States v Gafyczk (1988, CA11 Fla) 847 F2d 685.

Evidence of importer's intent to misclassify plywood as "softwood" rather than "hardwood" with Customs so as to avoid paying duties was sufficient, even though in exporting countries such woods were considered "soft," where, after obtaining knowledge about correct classification, he directed suppliers to use term "softwood" on invoices to avoid import duties. United States v Godinez (1991, CA11 Fla) 922 F2d 752, 13 BNA Intl Trade Rep 1142.

Sufficient evidence for conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 exists where Dominican Republic businessman could reasonably have been found to have had knowledge of falsity of statements to U.S. Customs Service regarding sum of money he was carrying into Puerto Rico, given his business sophistication and previous transporting of large sums of money into Puerto Rico. United States v Urena Guzman (1986, DC Puerto Rico) 637 F Supp 48.

162.--Tax matters

Where several of defendant's acquaintances testified that defendant had approached them with request that they claim he had large loans outstanding during years being scrutinized by Internal Revenue Service audit, evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 for knowingly and willfully presenting United States agency with materially false statements. United States v Lake (1979, CA5 Ga) 592 F2d 260.

Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant meant to submit false statements and documents to Internal Revenue Service as part of money-laundering scheme where FBI agents who has posed as crime figures testified that defendant had described scheme to them in which he and co-conspirator would receive tainted money from organized crime members, commingle it with trust accounts he claimed to manage, invest commingled funds in commodities transactions and return half illegal moneys to organized crime figure's nominees through sham salaries and commissions which would appear to come from legitimate trading and commodities, negotiations among parties continued over 5-month period and culminated in meeting at which government agents handed defendant suitcase containing large sum of money to be "laundered". United States v Freedson (1979, CA9 Cal) 608 F2d 739, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 627.

Evidence was sufficient that defendant acted willfully by making false statements on his son's college financial aid application and on his tax returns, where he admitted he understood his tax returns were not truthful and that he had substantial unreported income, and had asked tax preparer not to turn over accurate records to IRS, since sheer magnitude of concealed income and assets evidenced deliberate and intentional fraud. United States v Hoover (1999, CA7 Ind) 175 F3d 564, 83 AFTR 2d 2214, subsequent app (2001, CA7 Ind) 240 F3d 593, 87 AFTR 2d 871 and post-conviction relief den (2001, CA7 Ind) 6 Fed Appx 414, 87 AFTR 2d 1918.

Evidence was sufficient from which jury could infer that defendant's attorney violated 18 USCS § 1001(a)(3), where, on offer to compromise he submitted to IRS, he failed to list defendant's possible ownership interest in newly-purchased home as potential community property and made false statement that defendant and his wife could only afford to rent. United States v Wright (2000, CA5 Tex) 211 F3d 233, 2000-1 USTC P 50438, 85 AFTR 2d 1791, reh den (2000, CA5 Tex) 2000 US App LEXIS 14955 and cert den (2000) 531 US 916, 148 L Ed 2d 199, 121 S Ct 274 and cert den (2000) 531 US 916, 148 L Ed 2d 199, 121 S Ct 274.

163.--Miscellaneous

Where defendant caused false representations in accountant's financial statement and actively participated in falsification of corporate records, jurors could reasonably decide that misrepresentations in accountant's financial statement were intended and necessary result of defendant's deliberate action of falsifying sales records. United States v Markee (1970, CA9 Or) 425 F2d 1043, cert den (1970) 400 US 847, 27 L Ed 2d 84, 91 S Ct 93.

Where owner of employment agency was convicted for filing false information with Department of Labor and Immigration and Naturalization Service concerning qualifications of aliens for positions as hospital orderlies, conviction was reversed because government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the owner had actual knowledge of the aliens' lack of qualifications for the orderly positions. United States v Glantzman (1971, CA3 NJ) 447 F2d 199.

Defendant's conviction of willfully and knowingly making a false statement to an agency of the United States in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was affirmed, since evidence was sufficient to permit the District Court to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that defendant knew market value of property he offered to secure bonds for release of certain persons incarcerated while awaiting trial was less than $ 85,000 and that he willfully and knowingly represented to the contrary to the court in the bail transaction. United States v Burkley (1975, CA4 Va) 511 F2d 47.

Defendant's conviction under 18 USCS § 1001 for willfully making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, was affirmed, since evidence as to each of three financial transactions sufficed for jury to find that defendant had knowledge that his personal expenses and those not of the hospital were included within the general hospital accounts as transcribed to Medicare forms signed by him as president of the hospital. United States v Smith (1975, CA5 Fla) 523 F2d 771, cert den (1976) 429 US 817, 50 L Ed 2d 76, 97 S Ct 59, reh den (1976) 429 US 987, 50 L Ed 2d 599, 97 S Ct 509.

In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1001, sales invoices received by defendant were not considered outstanding bills, so that defendant's affidavit as to bills paid could not be considered intentionally false for not including invoices. United States v Lange (1976, CA5 La) 528 F2d 1280.

Sufficient evidence existed to find intent in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 for defrauding cooperative of profits from sale of fertilizer through use of 2 corporations where there was evidence of contract between cooperative and government which allowed cooperative to store grain pledged to producers for price support loans, contract called for warehouse's records to be on hand, federal examiners were assured by defendant that grains in storage at elevator belonged to cooperative and were not store grain belonging to others, when in fact elevator did not have on hand sufficient grain to cover all of its agreements with farmers. United States v Gilbertson (1978, CA8 Minn) 588 F2d 584.

There was sufficient evidence from which jury in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 could infer that filing of false statements by operator of hospital supply house was done "willfully"; there was plenty of evidence that from outset defendant was familiar with government hospital funding programs and such funding was essential to prosperity of defendant's ongoing fraudulent business activities. United States v Huber (1979, CA2 NY) 603 F2d 387, cert den (1980) 445 US 927, 63 L Ed 2d 759, 100 S Ct 1312 and (criticized in Lockheed Martin Corp. v Boeing Co. (2005, MD Fla) 2005 US Dist LEXIS 3948).

In prosecution for aiding and abetting in false identification and marketing of flue-cured tobacco in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, to prove that defendant knew third parties and intended to enter illegal agreement with such, government had to produce evidence that defendant knew both location of third party's farm on account of which marketing card was issued and that defendant knew farm on which they grew tobacco they offered for sale; jury could find that defendant had knowledge of third party's criminal intent only if there was evidence that defendant knew that their tobacco was grown in different county from that from which farm was located and card was issued. United States v Winstead (1983, CA4 NC) 708 F2d 925.

There was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to deceive HUD, where defendant falsified signatures on list of purported beneficiaries of HUD community grant money, since jury could infer intent, at least 2 people listed had not received aid, and since desire to forestall insistence by HUD for repayment would have been motivating factor for deception. United States v Corsino (1987, CA1 Puerto Rico) 812 F2d 26 (criticized in United States v McGuire (1996, CA5 Miss) 96-1 USTC P 50163).

It was at least jury issue whether contractor, minority contractor, or bank had specific intent required to violate 18 USCS § 1001 by minority contractor's assignment of proceeds from contracts to contractor in establishing mentor relationship, since parties were pursuing valid objective, no harm to government was intended and none occurred, and no regulation or policy was violated, whether or not assignments violated assignment statutes, 31 USCS § 3727 and 41 USCS § 15. Arthur Pew Constr. Co. v Lipscomb (1992, CA11 Ga) 965 F2d 1559, 23 FR Serv 3d 445, 6 FLW Fed C 802.

Evidence was sufficient that president of company with contract to provide plastic bags for GSA willfully caused false certification statements to be filed with government concerning compliance with contract, where, although he personally refused to sign such statements, he instructed employees to produce bags that could not meet contract specifications and to pack them by weight, resulting in shortages, even after he knew that false certificates were being signed and supplied to GSA. United States v Fairchild (1993, CA9 Cal) 990 F2d 1139, 93 CDOS 2602, 93 Daily Journal DAR 4441, 38 CCF P 76513, cert den (1993) 510 US 898, 126 L Ed 2d 217, 114 S Ct 266.

Evidence was sufficient to support sheriff's conviction for false statements under 18 USCS § 1001, where, as part of his ownership and operation of for-profit food service for inmates at local jail, he ordered county sheriffs to use county vehicles to purchase federal surplus food supplies with county checks, since reasonable jury could have found that he knowingly deceived federal surplus food program. United States v Hawkey (1998, CA8 SD) 148 F3d 920, 82 AFTR 2d 5058.

Evidence was sufficient to convict firearms dealer of causing to be made and used false statements on Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms forms and false Acquisition and Disposition Book entries under 18 USCS §§ 2, 1001, where he created sales receipts from which book entries would be made in names of undercover officers with knowledge they were not actual buyers. United States v Inglese (2002, CA7 Ill) 282 F3d 528.

Evidence linked defendant, immigration lawyer, to forgery of I-589 asylum application where client testified that she had neither signed form nor given authority to anyone to sign for her, and former law firm employee testified that applicant-signature on form was in defendant's handwriting; such evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for making false statement to federal agency under 18 USCS § 1001 and of immigration fraud under 18 USCS § 1546(a) (although court reversed § 1546 convictions on other grounds). United States v Phillips (2008, CA10 Kan) 543 F3d 1197.

Lawyer's convictions were affimred for knowingly and willfully making false statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 when she affirmed that she intended to, and would, abide by "Special Administrative Measures" (SAMs) imposed on her client who was serving life sentence in maximum security prison for terrorism-related crimes to restrict his ability to communicate with persons outside of prison so as to prevent him from continuing to lead terrorist organizations; in light of her repeated and flagrant violation of SAMs, reasonable factfinder could conclude that lawyer's representations that she intended to and would abide by SAMs were knowingly false when made. United States v Stewart (2009, CA2 NY) 590 F3d 93.

Acquittal was denied where knowingly false promise made by attorney for terrorist inmate to abide by special administrative measures (SAMs), which severely restricted inmate's communications with third persons, constituted false statement within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001, and jury was properly instructed that in order to find violation of statute, Government was required to prove that statements were untrue when made and that defendant acted knowingly and willfully in failing to abide by SAMs. United States v Sattar (2005, SD NY) 395 F Supp 2d 79.

Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished: Where jury convicted defendant of making false statements in matter within jurisdiction of Veterans Administration (VA), defendant's employer, when he denied owning or having owned off-duty weapon after being asked directly by investigator for VA, evidence showing that defendant made same false statement twice when asked directly and that he knew that what he was saying was false supported jury's determination that defendant acted willfully. United States v Carrasquillo (2007, CA2 NY) 2007 US App LEXIS 15471.

Unpublished: In case in which defendants were convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1001(a)(2), they argued unsuccessfully that evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; evidence that they knowingly made false statements was sufficient to support their convictions; while evidence showing defendant's knowledge of their lack of ownership was partially circumstantial and inferential, knowledge could be shown by such evidence. United States v Miller (2008, CA5 Tex) 2008 US App LEXIS 25317.

Unpublished: Jury heard extensive testimony that defendant was part of identity theft conspiracy both before and at time of his citizenship application process, and testimony showed that if defendant had acknowledged his wrongdoings, he would not have been granted citizenship; thus, rational jury could have concluded that defendant violated 18 USCS §§ 1001 and 1425. United States v Popa (2010, CA9 Nev) 2010 US App LEXIS 464.

164. Materiality

Argument of defendant in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1001 that his false statement to federal examiners was not material in that victim cooperative had sufficient stock of grain on hand at various storage facilities to satisfy maximum number of bushels which at any time could be converted into warehouse receipts had every farmer demanded warehouse receipt was without merit since parties stipulated that amount of corn on storage agreements with cooperative exceeded amount on hand and primary concern of federal examiners was to make sure that elevator in fact had sufficient grain on hand to cover what was storage obligation to someone else and had to rely on accuracy of records produced by defendants. United States v Gilbertson (1978, CA8 Minn) 588 F2d 584.

Evidence was insufficient to support contention that statements were material within meaning of 18 USCS § 1001 where there was no evidence that statements were capable of affecting exercise of governmental functions in that there was no requirement that directors of exempt co-operatives be farmers nor was there evidence to prove that lying about names of directors would affect functions of Interstate Commerce Commission when ICC Form BOp 102 was filed. United States v Talkington (1978, CA9 Cal) 589 F2d 415.

Falsification of test report needed for approval of chemical codings in nuclear power plant is falsification of material official statement supporting conviction. United States v Green (1984, CA9 Cal) 745 F2d 1205, cert den (1985) 474 US 925, 88 L Ed 2d 266, 106 S Ct 259 and (criticized in United States v Falkowitz (2002, SD NY) 214 F Supp 2d 365).

There was sufficient evidence for jury to find that false statements in eligibility questionnaires were material, where defendant indicated on questionnaire that he was not recovered sufficiently to resume duty and that he was not employed, since statements affected or influenced exercise of governmental functions, or had natural tendency to influence or were capable of influencing agency decision. United States v De Rosa (1986, CA9 Cal) 783 F2d 1401, cert den (1986) 477 US 908, 91 L Ed 2d 571, 106 S Ct 3282.

Evidence was sufficient to prove materiality of false monthly water monitoring reports which water treatment plant supervisor caused to be filed with EPA, even though plant technician's personal diary reflected true levels of pollutants to be below falsely recorded levels, where diary covered only 2-month period, and expert testimony to contrary covered 18-month period, since statements could have influenced EPA enforcement decision. United States v Brittain (1991, CA10 Okla) 931 F2d 1413, 32 Envt Rep Cas 2084, 21 ELR 21092.

Contractor's responsive statements as to quantity of windows which formed integral part of indictment under 18 USCS § 1001, alleging that he submitted false and inflated price list, were not material allegations, since number of windows provided in price could not have influenced government in accepting his bid, where government had specified quantity. United States v Johnson (1991, CA8 ND) 937 F2d 392, 37 CCF P 76193.

Evidence was sufficient that defendant's false written answer to Department of Labor (DOL) that he was not employed, when he was in fact self-employed, was material to DOL, since it was capable of influencing that agency to continue his full benefits. United States v Harrod (1992, CA10 Okla) 981 F2d 1171, cert den (1993) 508 US 913, 124 L Ed 2d 259, 113 S Ct 2350.

Testimony of expert witnesses that reduction of bottom-line profits for year as result of fraudulent restatement of financial statements was sufficient to prove that restatement was capable of influencing, and did in fact influence, Securities Exchange Commission to take remedial action against defendant. United States v Wiles (1997, CA10 Colo) 106 F3d 1516.

Evidence sufficiently supported defendant's conviction for lying to federal officer, as defendant's false statements made to federal officer regarding incident in which defendant pointed gun at another person, were material to government inquiry since false statements had natural tendency to influence course of investigation. United States v Robertson (2003, CA8 ND) 324 F3d 1028, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2003, CA8) 2003 US App LEXIS 9439.

Conviction for making false statement in violation of 18 USCS § 1001 was affirmed because defendant's false statement concerning entering country two months prior to filing asylum application had natural tendency to produce conclusion that, because defendant had entered within year, defendant was qualified to seek asylum, and false statements were material because they could have affected investigation of illegal alien smuggling; government did not have burden to establish that defendant entered United States more than year before application date, and thus, to show that government would have denied application had it known actual date. United States v Chen (2003, CA9) 324 F3d 1103, 2003 CDOS 2973, 2003 Daily Journal DAR 3834.

Government presented sufficient evidence to support jury's finding that false statements that defendant made to federal investigators were "material" for purposes of 18 USCS § 1001: to be material, defendant's false statements did not have to actually influence investigators, it was sufficient if statements were of type that would be capable of influencing reasonable investigator; defendant admitted that he had falsely told investigators that he had not sold any firearms and that two firearms had remained in his physical custody at police station at all times; and defendant's false statements were type that, under different circumstances, might convince investigators to drop or refocus their investigation, which was what defendant admitted he was attempting to do when he made statements. United States v McBane (2005, CA3 Pa) 433 F3d 344.

In case in which defendant repeatedly made false statements while testifying before grand jury and while talking to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)special agent about important issue of when defendant first knew about property owner's illegal fill activity in violation of Clean Water Act (CWA), evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for violating 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1623, and 1001; by falsely claiming to have not known about owner's illegal fill activity until after he was contacted by employee from United States Army Corps of Engineers, defendant disrupted and interfered with investigation into owner's violations of CWA; specifically defendant's false statements denied both EPA agent and grand jury access to witness, i.e., defendant, who had detailed, firsthand knowledge of owner's pre-March 2002 activities, including owner's preparations, plans, and rationale for his filling project. United States v Johnson (2007, CA11 Fla) 485 F3d 1264, 20 FLW Fed C 599.

Sufficient evidence supported conviction of defendant, former official of Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), for making false claims and statements in violation of 18 USCS § 1001, which arose from her promotion of use of software from company for which her husband worked as salesman and from her participation in decision-making process to implement further use of software at BPA; evidence showed that defendant made false statement as to her husband's employment dates in BPA recusal memorandum, and statement was material to BPA's analysis regarding scope and length of conflict of interest. United States v Selby (2009, CA9 Or) 557 F3d 968.

Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was granted because evidence was insufficient to convict him of making false statements where (1) government failed to offer evidence from which reasonable jury could find beyond reasonable doubt that defendant made false statements about his date and place of last entry into United States; and (2) no reasonable jury could find that government proved that defendant's alleged false statements on AR-11 Alien's Change of Address Card change of address form was material to any decision; there was no evidence identifying any "decision" for which form was used. United States v Khellil (2009, ND Ill) 678 F Supp 2d 713.