Marx believed that the polity favored by the Southern slave-
owners was very diff erent from the republic aspired to by Northerners.
He did not spell out all his reasons, but he was essentially right about
this. Southern slaveholders wished to see a Federal state that would
uphold slave property; that would return and deter slave runaways,
as laid down in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850; and that would
allow slaveholding Southerners access to Federal territories. Th
e
planters were happy that the antebellum state was modest in size
and competence, since this meant low taxes and little or no inter-
ference with their “peculiar institution.”
16
Th
ey did not favor either
high tariff s or expensive internal improvements. But this restricted
view of the state was accompanied by provisions that aff ected the
lives of Northerners in quite intimate ways. Th
e fugitive slave law
of 1850 required all citizens to cooperate with the Federal mar-
shals in apprehending runaways. In the Southern view, slaveholders
should be free to bring slaves to Federal territories, an importation
seen as an unwelcome and unfair intrusion by migrants from the
Northern states, whether they were antislavery or simply antiblack.
Southerners had favored censorship of the Federal mail, to prevent
its use for abolitionist literature. Th
ey supported a foreign policy that
pursued future acquisitions suitable for plantation development. But
they did not want a state that had the power to intervene in the
special internal arrangements of the slave states themselves. For
them, a Republican president with the power to appoint thousands
of Federal offi
cials in the Southern states and with no intention of
suppressing radical abolitionists spelled great danger.
Marx did not support the North because he believed that its vic-
tory would directly lead to socialism. Rather, he saw in South and
North two species of capitalism—one allowing slavery, the other
not. Th
e then existing regime of American society and economy
embraced the enslavement of four million people whose enforced
toil produced the republic’s most valuable export, cotton, as well as
much tobacco, sugar, rice, and turpentine. Defeating the slave power
was going to be diffi
cult. Th
e wealth and pride of the 300,000 sla-
veholders (there were actually 395,000 slave owners, according to
the 1860 Census, but at the time Marx was writing this had not yet
16 Robin
Einhorn,
American Slavery, American Taxation, Berkeley 2008.
12 an unfinished revolution
been published) was at stake. Th
ese slaveholders were able to cor-
rupt or intimidate many of the poor Southern whites, and they had
rich and infl uential supporters among the merchants, bankers and
textile manufacturers of New York, London and Paris. Defeating
the slave power and freeing the slaves would not destroy capitalism,
but it would create conditions far more favorable to organizing and
elevating labor, whether white or black. Marx portrayed the wealthy
slave owners as akin to Europe’s aristocrats, and their removal as
a task for the sort of democratic revolution he had advocated in
the Communist Manifesto as the immediate aim for German
revolutionaries.
LINCOLN ON MOB VIOLENCE AND
THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION
Lincoln, as a Whig brought up in Kentucky and southern Illinois,
was quite familiar with the tensions created by slavery in the bor-
derlands between South and North. His wife’s close relatives were
slaveholders; one of his great uncles owned forty slaves. As a mod-
erate Whig and, later, moderate Republican, Lincoln was ready to
uphold the legal and constitutional rights of slaveholders. But he
worried about the nation’s coherence and integrity. Th
e earliest state-
ment of his political philosophy, his speech “On the Perpetuation
of Our Political Institutions,” delivered at the Young Men’s Lyceum
in Springfi eld in 1838, gives expression to his pride in US politi-
cal institutions. But it also expresses deep dismay at the growing
streak of lawlessness he sees in American life. He was alarmed at
rising antagonism stemming from race, slavery and abolition, citing
the summary execution of blacks believed to be plotting rebellion;
the wanton killing of a mulatto; and attacks on law-abiding abo-
litionists by violent mobs, leading to the death of Elijah Lovejoy,
editor of an antislavery paper. Th
ese events violated the rule of law
that should be every citizen’s “political religion.”
17
As he will have
17 Lincoln,
“Th
e Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions,” in Abraham
Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, Roy Basler, ed., New York 1946, pp. 76–84,
81. See also Eric Foner, Th e Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery,
New York 2010, pp. 26–30.
introduction 13
been aware, such mob actions were orchestrated by self-described
“men of property and standing,” the supposedly patriotic allies of
Southern politicians—at this point all parties were cross-sectional
in their support. Th
e rioters portrayed the Abolitionists as the pawns
of a foreign—specifi cally British—plot against America.
18
Here
were disturbing signs that the republic’s institutions were infected
by an uncontrollable and deep-seated malady. Lincoln feared for a
future in which some aspiring tyrant would establish his personal
rule “at the expense of emancipating slaves or enslaving free men.”
19
Th
e lawless threat might come either from slaveholders or from
abolitionists.
Lincoln’s stress on the republic of laws and due process was
accompanied by a defense of the need for a National Bank to collect
and disburse the public revenues and by his consequent hostility to
Van Buren’s proposal that revenues should instead be entrusted to
local “sub-treasuries.” In a major speech he gave as a member of the
Illinois state legislature Lincoln attacked this scheme. In Lincoln’s
view the Bank, run as a privately-owned public corporation, had
two decisive advantages. Firstly, it put the money deposited with it
to work, earning interest and furnishing credit, where the unspent
revenue would simply rust away in the network of sub-treasury lock
boxes. Secondly the National Bank better served align the “duty”
and the “interest” of Bank offi
cials than would a dispersed chain
of sub-treasuries. As a permanent corporation the Bank knew that
it would only continue to be entrusted with the public revenues if
it proved a faithful custodian. Th
e shifting personnel of a scattered
network of sub-treasury offi
cials in each state would be far more
vulnerable to individual frailty or fecklessness (leading to the wry
comment: “it may not be improper here to add, that Judas carried
the bag, was the Sub-Treasurer of the Savior and his disciples”
20
).
18 Leonard
Richards,
Gentlemen of Property and Standing: Anti-Abolition
Mobs in Jacksonian America, New York 1971. See also David Grimstead,
American Mobbing, 1828–61: Towards Civil War, Oxford 1998, pp. 11–2.
Several of the riots were directed at the lecture tour of George Th
ompson, a
British abolitionist.
19 “Th
e Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions”, p. 83.
20 Lincoln,
“Th
e Sub-Treasury,” 26 December 1839, in Basler, Abraham
Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, pp. 90–112, 98.
14 an unfinished revolution
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