quite broadly among farmers, artisans, and small businessmen, in
contrast to the South, where the cotton boom enriched a narrower
circle of slave owners and their hangers-on.
25
Lincoln believed that
the broad prosperity of the North and the Northwest was rooted
in its free labor system, a view shared by Marx. Republican pride
in the progress of the free states repelled the Southern mainstream.
Lincoln won 40 percent of the popular vote in 1860, but all of these
votes came from the free states.
Th
at Lincoln detested slavery was clear from his speeches and
writings, and it is not surprising that he sketched half a dozen dif-
ferent key arguments on the topic in his notebooks.
26
He was also
willing to talk about complex and gradual schemes of compensated
emancipation. But as a national leader, what he off ered was not an
attack on slavery but implacable resistance to its territorial expan-
sion. Th
e puzzle here can only be resolved by identifying what else
it was about his outlook and deepest convictions that restrained
his evidently sincere opposition to slavery. Th
e answer is probably
his profound attachment to the Constitution and his awareness
that within that Constitution it would be extraordinarily diffi
-
cult to change the historic compromise the document represented
between North and South, slavery and freedom. Lincoln’s patriot-
ism was even stronger than his dislike of slavery and obliged him,
he believed, to accommodate to the latter out of due regard for a
nation established by, and catering to, Southern slaveholders.
RIVAL NATIONALISMS?
Th
e Republican Party was founded to defend the rights of “free
labor” and to fi ght for a ban on slavery in Federal territories. Th
e
Republicans also adopted the “agrarian” stakeholder view, a semi-
socialist idea that any man wishing to become a farmer should be
given land for a homestead in the Federal territories, a proposal
Stephen Conway, eds., Th e Market Revolution in America: Social, Political and
Religious Expressions, Charlottesville 1996.
25 Gavin
Wright,
Slavery and American Economic Development, London
2004.
26 For example, those in Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings, Basler,
pp. 278–9, 427, 477–8, and 513.
18 an unfinished revolution
that was to be translated into legislation in 1862. Lincoln had
worked hard, educated himself, and become a prominent attorney
and political fi gure. Th
is background reinforced his belief that the
free labor system allowed a man to make his way in the world. Th
e
Republicans also supported a system of public education for all
and the foundation of a chain of “land grant” colleges, namely col-
leges endowed with revenue from the sale of public land. Lincoln
believed that the pacts that had made the United States must be
respected, but he also held that in the long run the nation could not
remain half slave and half free.
Marx did not directly compare the claims of North and South as
competing nationalisms. Instead he questioned whether the South
was a nation, writing, “ ‘Th
e South,’ however, is neither a territory
strictly detached from the North geographically, nor a moral unity.
It is not a country at all, but a battle slogan.” Many who were much
closer to the situation than Marx entered the same judgment in the
years before 1861, yet soon had to acknowledge that the Confederacy
did rapidly acquire many of the ideological trappings of a nation,
complete with a claimed “moral unity” based on exaltation of the
racial conceits and values of a slave society and of the conviction
that white Southerners were the true Americans. Th
eir values were
a strange mixture of traditional patriotism and paternalism and—
for whites alone—libertarianism. Hundreds of thousands of white
Southerners who owned no slaves nevertheless fought and died for
the rebellion, seeing the Confederacy as the embodiment of their
racial privileges and rural civilization. Th
e rebels were fi ghting for
a cause that embodied a way of life, one that embraced minimal
taxation and extensive “states’ rights.” Th
e mass of slaveless whites
not only had the vote but also enjoyed the “freedom of the range,”
which is to say that they could graze their animals on vast tracts
of public land and on uncultivated private land. Th
ey also enjoyed
signifi cant hunting rights. Such privileges allowed them to live, as
they put it, “high on the hog.” Engels pointed out to Marx that the
secession movement had backing from the generality of whites in
the more developed and populous parts of the South.
27
27 Engels to Marx, July 3, 1861, from Marx and Engels, Th e Civil War in the
United States, p. 326.
introduction 19
Southern nationalism itself responded to, and stimulated, Unionist
or Yankee nationalism.
28
Whereas patriotism was about the past,
the new nationalist idea, a refl ection of modernity, was about the
future. Even at a time when truly industrial methods only aff ected
a few branches of society, “print capitalism” and the “market revo-
lution” were already transforming public space and time. Th
e new
steam presses poured out a torrent of newspapers, magazines, and
novels, all of them summoning up rival “imagined communities.”
29
Rail and cable further accelerated the dynamics of agreement and
contradiction. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin appeared
fi rst as serial installments in a newspaper, then as a book. It moved
the Northern reader to tears, but seemed a grotesque libel to
Southerners. Th
e North’s imagined community could not embrace
the slaveholder, let alone the degraded slave traders, and the South’s
drew the line at the abolitionist and the radical newspaper editor.
Th
at incompatible national imaginings played a part in precipi-
tating the confl ict by no means takes away from the underlying
discrepancy between the two social formations.
Th
at the Civil War was an “irrepressible confl ict,” that its roots
lay in the diff erent labor regimes of the two sections, and that these
diff erences crystallized in opposing images of the good society are
not novel propositions. Diff erent versions of them have been enter-
tained by, among many others, such notable historians as David
Potter, Don Fehrenbacker, Eric Foner, Eugene Genovese, John
Ashworth and Bruce Levine.
30
Th
e idea that rival nationalisms
28 Many historians reject out of hand, as Marx did, the idea that there was a
Southern nationalism. Often they do so because they do not wish in any way
to endorse the Confederacy or the later cult of Dixie. Th
is is understandable,
but wrong, as Drew Gilpin Faust has argued in an important study of the
topic. Nationalism can be fl awed and self-destructive, and it can change for
better or worse. See Faust’s Th e Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology
and Identity in the Civil War South, Baton Rouge 1989. See also Manisha
Sinha’s Th e Counter-Revolution of Slavery, Chapel Hill 2000, pp. 63–94. For
the general argument, see Tom Nairn, Faces of Nationalism, London 1995.
29 Th
e classic study is, of course, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities,
second ed., London 1993.
30 David
Potter,
Th
e Impending Confl ict, Don Fehrenbacker, ed., New York
1976; Eugene Genovese, Th e Political Economy of Slavery, New York 1967; Eric
Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, New York 1970 and Foner, “Causes of
20 an unfinished revolution
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