Masaryk university faculty of social studies

doubun doushu (same Chinese characters, same race).”

64^ See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html, for overall Japan-China relations since 1972, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/China/index.html

65^ See http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html

66^ Berger (2007, 235) points out three major loan packages: ¥330 billion for 1979-1983, ¥470 billion for 1984-1988, ¥810 billion for 1989-1993

67^ See on-line text, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN017527.pdf

68^ Over 10 year’s period since the Tiananmen incident, the budget grew by over 60%, in real terms.

69^ See http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html

70^ The colonization issues is probably the major one, but there are also many other important historical problems in effect even now - for instance the abductions of Japanese citizens (to teach Japanese language in DPRK), which was finally and shockingly admitted in 2002. Another important issue is the question of comfort women in Korea and China. See Kawashima (2003), Wan (2001) etc.

71^ However, this program started during the 1980s. See Kawashima (2003, 78)

72^ Another reason for Japanese worries was the 1994 speech of the DPRK’s ambassador to North Korea, in which he indirectly admitted the possession of nuclear weapons and directly stated, that “our nuclear arms, if developed, would be primarily designed to contain Japan” (Meyer 1996, 56)

73^ Interesting fact is that even right after the missile test, DPRK still exacerbated Japan’s occupation of Korea as a historical injustice in bilateral relations, making it very difficult for any reasonable conclusion to be reached. See Perry Report (1999)

74^ However, there is no firm consensus on the actual shape of the threat. Some authors downplay the DPRK’s military role, saying it is based on an ages-old technology with only a little chance of success; Korean missiles definitely are threats, but their reliability, accuracy and actual capabilities are highly questionable. Thus even some Japanese foreign policy analysts exert some confidence over the North Korean nuclear program, arguing DPRK is still far from mastering its missiles and from creating an actual warhead. See Hughes (2009, 299)

75^ For the strategies of abandonment and entrapment, see Cha (2000)

76^ For instance, Japan’s continuation of contributions even after the 1998 test-launch of another Taepodong missile

77^ For instance right after the 1997 South Korea currency crisis, Japan donated a huge financial assistance, facilitating already warm inclination of Kim Dae Jung (ROK President) to promote greater cooperation with Japan. The result was a 1998 Kim-Obuchi memorandum of understanding between Japan’s export-import bank and Korea’s Ministry of Finance to provide an additional $3 billion in untied loans for small to medium-size South Korean firms. See Green (2003, 138-139)

78^ The 1994 nuclear crisis, 1998 Taepodong launch and 2006 second nuclear crisis

79^ Michael Green in this context cites an interview with MOFA official from 2000. See Green (2003, 194)

80^ ASEAN was founded on August 8, 1967 comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Now it comprises also Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. See Japan-ASEAN relations http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/

81^ Regional and global institutions for instance, are becoming important in Japan’s China policy, because they shape Chinese norms of international behavior and increase Tokyo’s leverage on Beijing (Green 2003, 194).

82^ Sandra Leavitt (2005, 219) specifies these threats for ASEAN-Japan security cooperation: problems with drugs such as methamphetamines, environmental challenges such as the Sumatran forest fires in the late 1990s, illegal labor migration and refugee flow from South and Central Asia, Indonesia and Cambodia. These are however, only side reasons, which do not have significant impact on the international system.

83^ As this policy would be a supplemental to the pacific sentiment between Japan and the region

84^ Japan’s ASEAN policy was the core of Fukuda Doctrine, specifying Japan’s role as “bridge building” between ASEAN and Indochina. See LDP: Fukuda period http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/history/chap8.html, compare Yuzawa (2005)

85^ Compare Ikenberry, Mastanduno (2003)

86^ This constitution was created under a great pressure from the United States, in the atmosphere of deep self-reflection. Some of its parts were even so remote from Japan’s tradition that even new Kanji characters had to be created to embrace the meaning. See Wakamyia (2002)

87^ In 1958, Prime Minister Kinshi actually claimed that possession of nuclear weapons would not violate the constitution, but this was never an official explanation. See Grimes in Ikenberry, Mastanduno (2003, 380)

88^ Armitage report is a United States unofficial foreign policy review, stating that Japan’s constraints on collective defense is a setback for Japan-U.S. bilateral relations. Even though this report was not an official government outcome, the Armitage committee (members of the two U.S. government parties under Richard L. Armitage) later became high officials within the Bush government; forcing Japan to re-start the debate. See the Armitage report (2000), compare Clemons (2001); Wakamyia (2002)

89^ See the Free Library notes, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/CORRECTED:+Koizumi%27s+Constitution+quote+stirs+criticism+of...-a0111295607

90^ However, this plan had been discussed since 2002/2003

91^ See Yomiuri online, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20080116-907457/news/20090403-OYT1T00006.htm

92^ Prime Minister Koizumi has articulated a foreign policy vision, in his Basic Strategy for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21^st century. However, this vision has faded with last year’s DPJ’s triumph over the diet. Present Prime Minister Hatoyama and thus present Japan is, again, described as “lacking leadership and strategic vision.” See Sahashi (2010)

93^ With translations from Japanese by the author