Masaryk university faculty of social studies

4.3 Japan and the North Korea issue
The Korean peninsula is of particular importance to Japan. The Japan-Korea entanglement has lasted for more than two thousand years, and because of the geographical, historical and cultural similarities, the development on Korean peninsula always touch a raw nerve in Japan; and the Korean issues are always unique in Japanese foreign policy (Kawashima 2003, 73). Even through a quick glance at Japanese annual foreign policy white papers (Defense of Japan⁶⁹), since the end of the Cold War, the historical conflicts are being supplemented with new threats to Japan’s international relations, making North Korea issue one of the most serious problems for Japan: “North Korea’s military behavior has increased tension over the Korean peninsula, and constitutes a serious destabilizing actor for the entire East Asia region, including Japan” (Defense of Japan 2009, Part 1: 35)

The historical relations culminated in the 20^th century, primarily with colonization of the peninsula by Japan from 1910 to 1945. This set of events marked an important breakpoint in Japan’s Asia policy and especially in connection to Korea; as these historical issues⁷⁰ tend to form Japan’s public opinion and foreign policy making process. The Korean peninsula was divided right after the Second World War, with Southern part placed under the control of the United States and Northern part under the control of the Soviet Union. In 1948 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established in the north and Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, with DPRK attacking ROK only two years later. However, DPRK (although being a threat to ROK and the US) has not symbolized a major security threat for Japan during most of the Cold War period, compared to the military behemoth of the Soviet Union. That is, Japan’s security interests vis-à-vis North Korea were largely ensured by the U.S.’s massive military presence in Japan and South Korea and the American containment policy towards the North (Hughes 2009, 297).

As the Cold War began to wind down, a number of developments on the Korean peninsula altered the status quo. The Soviet Union normalized its relations with the South Korea in 1990, abandoning the role of security guarantor and economic benefactor of North Korea. Also, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it became apparent, that Russia can no longer play a deterrent role if North Korea took any destabilizing actions. In 1992, even China normalized its relations with ROK, leaving DPRK isolated within the new structure. This isolation was probably the main factor for the ignition of North Korean nuclear energy program⁷¹ (Kawashima 2003, 78). Resulting crisis came in 1994, as DPRK did not allow IAEA (International Agency for Atomic Energy) control over its nuclear power-plants and threatened to begin processing spent nuclear fuel⁷². Even though this crisis was settled with the Agreed framework and Korean Peninsula Energy Development (KEDO - DPRK ceasing its nuclear program against massive international funding for DPRK’s light water reactors in 1994), the 1998 test firing of a Taepodong missile over Japan immediately ignited Japanese already high concern for the region, addressing the missile test as “affecting Japan’s security directly⁷³” (MOFA 1998).

Japan’s growing concern with the region was supplemented with the American one: the Perry report on U.S. North Korea policy from 1999 clearly states, that the “1999 landscape is profoundly different from 1994” and that “DPRK acquisition of nuclear weapons and continued development, testing, deployment, and export of long-range missiles would undermine the relative stability of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, a precondition for ending the Cold War and pursuing a lasting peace in the longer run” (Perry 1999). This stance was a clear outcome of the fact, that with the launching of the Taepodong missile in 1998, it became apparent, that all the speculations about North Korea pursuing the development of ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) had been true.

However, by the end of 1990s Japan’s and American leaders have come to a conclusion, that North Korean behavior originates in the insecurity it feels regarding its economic and political stability and have shown willingness to respond to the DPRK threat by offering economic concessions (Hughes 2009, 297-8; Fouse 2004, 8-9). Nonetheless, economic tools are still the only means of Japanese foreign policy toward the “Korean threat”. Even though during the summitry in 2002 and 2004, Japan tried to engage Korea diplomatically, right after the 2006 nuclear and missile tests, Japan’s reaction were “only” economic sanctions. Despite Japan’s non-military means of settling conflicts with North Korea, Japan is very cautious of the development and with the shift in Japan’s foreign policy, even its position within the region has become more active.⁷⁴
4.3.1 Neorealist vs. Neoliberal approach
North Korean nuclear program and especially the missile crisis of 1994 are regarded by neorealists as a lecture of Realpolitik in Japan’s post-war pacifist heaven. Neorealists have advocated the thesis, that under the threat of an unstable, hostile and unpredictable country, Japan would soon come back to reality from its illusory pacifism. Further on, neorealism predicts not only the shift on the elite level of the state, but also on the level of public. As the power is the principal mean of international relations, the economic carrot and sticks diplomacy is considered as a waste of time. Only military deterrence, either from America or Japan or both would suffice to convince of the errors of its ways. The crises would demonstrate the predominance of military and security matters over the “low politics” issue of economics and trade. At the very least, the North Korean situation would dominate the agenda of Japanese government; states are first and foremost concerned with its security (Mayer 1996, 57).

Institutionalists, on the other hand, emphasize the role of international community and especially the role of the Japan-U.S. alliance in dealing with the Korean problem. With the DPRK’s acquisition of nuclear potential, institutionalists predict Japan to fasten the relations with the United States and with the Republic of Korea, since they share the interest on the issue of nuclear proliferation. Further on, according to neoliberal paradigm, Japan would seek help through the international organizations, such as the United Nations or KEDO, to exert a pressure on North Korea and create solidarity among the “friendly” states. Issue linkages would appear, as Keohane predicted (Mayer 1996, 58). Furthermore, institutionalists argue, that economic concerns with not become subordinate to security issues, as neorealism would argue, as well as the bilateral trade ties with the United States would not remain unaffected, as some neorealists would argue.

4.3.2 Evaluation
Which of these models can more easily be applied to the reality? This question is particularly difficult to assess, as even though Japan’s proactive stance can easily be acknowledged, its policymaking towards the Korean peninsula remains fluid and inconsistent (Green 2003, 111). Nevertheless, as the 1994 nuclear crisis and the development since the Koizumi government indicates, some points of these predictions can be assessed.

First, the institutionalist predictions that “Japan would fasten the relations with the United States” and “organizations such as UN or KEDO” in order to promote the joint interests of all the participating parties, is fundamentally flawed. As we have seen, the 1994 nuclear crisis has not brought Japan and the United States together, as their “common” interests were not as “common” as institutionalism had predicted. In order to fasten the alliance in 1994; Japan would have to serve the bilateral alliance, but with the growing pressure of the structure on Japan’s military cooperation (illustrated by Japan’s inability to deploy troops in the Gulf War); it would not suffice to provide economic help and thus “entrap” Japan in an active military role⁷⁵. Unlike the United States, Japan’s primary objectives were set on the domestic security (as opposed to American regional stability interest), and Japan’s failure to respond positively to Washington’s Article 6-based requests triggered a crisis of political confidence in the alliance, and genuine Japanese fears that it might be abandoned as an untrustworthy ally (Hughes 2009, 300). The strengthening of the alliance and Japan’s new security role in the region, which came right after the 1994 crisis with the 1995 National Defense Program Outline, then, cannot be seen as a product of joint interests of these two actors, but more of a structure-based reaction to Japanese fears of abandonment.

Second, the institutionalists-advocated KEDO also cannot be purely seen as the embodiment of neoliberal paradigm in Japanese policymaking. According to Hiroyatsu Akutsu (2000, 25-31), even KEDO has to be seen as a projection of a structure-inducted realist interest. Formally, Japan announced that its aim in KEDO is to assure Japan’s own security from the DPRK’s direct nuclear threat, to achieve regional security and global nuclear nonproliferation, and to make KEDO an example of multilateral approach to conflict resolution. However, as Japanese behaviour within the program indicates⁷⁶, Japan “used” the program to assure a cheap and effective strengthening of its ties with the United States and containing DPRK; as it stated that KEDO is “the most realistic framework to solve the DPRK’s nuclear issue” and thus repeated what was written in the Perry report.

Third, the neoliberal assumption, that economic concerns will play a prominent role and will not be “subordinate to security policy” is also basically flawed. Even though there is a noticeable North Korean business community nested in Tokyo, their interest in dealing with North Korean issue (supporting Kim Jong Il) is diminishing and as the bilateral business relations between Japan and Republic of Korea are stably growing up⁷⁷, they are undermining the position of Japan-DPRK’s business relations within broader policy scenario.

Furthermore, analyzing Japan’s Defense Policy White papers, despite Japan’s efforts to deal with North Korea diplomatically (through KEDO or Six Party Talks); Japan has become fully aware of the DPRK’s security threat to Japanese people. With the Perry review and Japan’s new guidelines for Japan-U.S. security relations, Japan has acknowledged, that the security of the Korean Peninsula is essential to Japan’s security (National Defense Program Outline in FY1996; Joint Statement 2002). The crises in 1994, 1998 and 2006⁷⁸ acted not only as a catalyst of North Korea’s importance within Japan’s international relations, but also showed the possible divergences between Japan’s security and American regional and global interests. Since 9/11 2001, Japan has remained anxious of the possibility of abandonment by the United States, and thus slowly increasing the assertive attitude towards containing the North Korean threat, clearly emphasizing it over economic policies. For instance, in the wake of October 2006 North Korean nuclear test, Japanese policy makers considered the option of backing a potential U.S. economic blockade of the North, in keeping with Japan’s Defense Guidelines. But the U.S. soon made it clear that it needed to pursue diplomacy and was not prepared as yet to exert military pressure on the North (Asahi Shimbun in Hughes 2009, 301-302).

Overall, by analyzing Japan’s defense and foreign policy towards DPRK and especially during the last twenty years, it is clearly visible that Japan has adopted a more firm and conscious approach; one that counts on the U.S.-Japan alliance, but is aware of possible interest clashes between the United States and Japan. Because of that, most predictions set by the neorealist paradigm can be seen as fulfilled, especially as opposed to neoliberal predictions. The importances of security sphere, the self-consciousness in dealing with the United States, the systemic containment policy towards DPRK are its clear examples.

4. 4. Japan and Multilateral Diplomacy: South East Asia
The multilateral impulse has been strong in Japan’s post-war foreign policy thinking, but in practice it has often been elusive. After joining the United Nations in 1956, MOFA declared Japan’s position within the United Nations as central to Japanese Cold War world role (Wagagaikou no kinkyou, 1957). However, the Soviet veto undermined any further Japanese efforts of acquiring collective security guarantees. Japanese efforts of fostering regional diplomacy proved not much more effective either. Japan had resisted the Eisenhower administrative plan to establish a NATO-style collective defense organization in Asia as well as Soviet plans for region-wide multilateral frameworks. By 1958 the “UN-centrism” had disappeared from the preamble of Diplomatic Bluebook. In short, the Cold War was not kind to multilateralism in Asia (Green 2003, 193-194; Bowles 2002, 231).

Even in this regionalism-unfriendly environment though, there were a couple of initiatives for regional or multilateral cooperation. For instance, Japan’s active role in creating organizations such as Asian Development Bank, the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia, and the Asian Pacific Council (Sudo 1988, 509-510). It was not until the end of the Cold War though, for Japan’s multilateral diplomacy to be fully liberated. The Gulf War of 1990-91 was especially important impetus, as it made the UN appear as reaffirming a central role in international politics. While the United Nations were only scarcely mentioned in Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War, it became an increasingly common leitmotif in the speeches of cabinet ministers from 1991 through 1994⁷⁹ (Green 2003, 194).

Another organization, that became far more attractive for Japan’s post-war policy, was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN⁸⁰). Foreign affairs Minister Nakayama Taro even called for a centered on ASEAN in 1991, enthusiastically supporting what later became the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). These activities were largely lead by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, yet even MITI took part in establishing Asia-Pacific Cooperation Forum (APEC), with the aim of establishing Japanese superiority in the process of regional economic integration. All these efforts suggest, that during the first half of 1990s, Japan’s international relations and its security role were largely focused on multilateralism, as it was written in the 1992 Diplomacy Bluebook: “in this post-Cold War international environment, it is important to promote region-wide political and security dialogues to enhance the sense of mutual reassurance in the Asia-Pacific region” (Diplomatic Bluebook, 1992, Chapter 2).

By the end of the decade, however, the idealism and enthusiasm surrounding Japan’s multilateral diplomacy began driving way to a more cautious position. Whether focused on regional cooperation or collective security, the multilateral impulse in Japanese foreign policy has been frustrated on all fronts (Green 2003, 194). Japanese interest in promoting the UN reform for Japan’s Security Council permanent seat has been fruitless. So have the efforts put into South East Asia regionalism: ASEAN was partly discredited because of its failure in dealing with the 1997-8 regional financial crisis; the ambitious project of establishing the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) were hampered by American unwillingness to support this establishment as well as by Japan’s inability to come to terms with superiority-seeking China (Bowles, 2002: 233; Dieter, Higgot 2003, 450-451).

Nevertheless, despite the lack of cooperation within the South East Asia region, multilateralism remains a very important factor in present Japan’s international relations⁸¹. Over the second half of 20^th century, Japan has become a very rich state, yet (as this is often the ground for criticizing realism) it still has not acquired nuclear weapons or played a significant role within the international system. This position, however, is changing. Japan is using multilateral diplomacy as a framework for its increasing involvement with the outside world, as it was affirmed in (for instance) MOFA’s pamphlet Japan’s Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (2004, 2) which stated that “Japan has taken an active role in the maintenance of international peace and security. “At the same time though, Japan is gradually recasting its approach to multilateralism to fit into its narrower definition of national interest within the changing international structure.
4.4.1 Neorealist approach
Realists explain Japan’s willingness to participate in alliances or institutional framework through the optic of national interest and the principle of balance-of-power politics. As neorealism emphasizes the anarchic structure of international system, states are responsible for their own security. However, according John Mearsheimer and his famous essay The False Premise of International Institutions (1994-95, 5-7), states can undergo cooperation, if it is in accordance with their national interest. Institutions in this sense are just a “reflection of the distribution of power in the world, based on self-interest calculation of the great powers and possessing no independent effect on state behavior.”

This formula is applied to most of the Cold War period. The unfriendly, bi-polar structure of the Cold War international system drove the United States to promote security cooperation, in order to contain the Soviet Union. This cooperation, however weakly institutionalized, was a reflection of the bi-polar system, and the lack of regional cooperation within Asia-Pacific region was a product of this bi-polar system: a regional cooperation was unnecessary for Japan, as its security lied on American security guarantees.

The end of the Cold War significantly changed the security environment; and a stream of threats⁸² has provided a strong rationale for Japan to foster regional cooperation (Leavitt 2005, 219). Neorealists point out especially two motives for Japan’s post-Cold War enthusiasm towards multilateral diplomacy and cooperation: the rise of China and the (possible) withdrawal of United States from Asia. These two countries will attempt to shape regional dynamics according to the dictates of their perceived national interests. Smaller powers, such as the core ASEAN countries, might balance or they might not, but ultimately they would band together in ways that best protect them against emerging security threats (Garofano 2002, 512).
Figure 4: Motives/Outcomes in the region according to neorealists

Source: Garofano 2002, 512

The slow withdrawal of the United States and the strategic uncertainty of 1990s pushed Japan to step to the fore in aiding South East Asia – and itself – to fight common security challenges. This impetus got even more important after 9/11 and the attacks on United States, as their interest switched to their commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, the dealing with China is becoming more and more difficult, as with China’s fast militarization, Japan’s balance-of-power policy is becoming more and more important: “With the expansion of China’s sphere of influence, and with Japan’s emergence as a world power, the role of Japan, not only in Asia, but in entire world, is given new significance…The important role that Japan is forced to accept…will make Japan fulfill its defense obligations“ (Chong Ki-Choi, 1985 in Leavitt, 2005, 220).

In short, neorealism sees Japan’s interest in multilateral diplomacy as a balance-of-power politics to counter the emerging superpower status of China and the change within American role in the region. They predict Japan to further promote security cooperation in the region, driven by this balance-of-power national interest despite the fact that it is unclear, how Japan might interpret its national interest and concept of self-defense. One thing is certain: Japan’s push on becoming a “normal” world leader requires projection of not only economic and cultural power, but also of security power within the region.

4.4.2 Neoliberal approach
In dealing with multilateralism and institutions, the institutionalist paradigm might seem as a perfect one. This approach highlights the contributions to amicable relations made by the informational and enforcement functions of institutions (Garofano 2002, 505). Institutionalist agree with neorealist’s presumption of self-help world, but state, that the institutional constraints and the power of institutions helps to lower the transaction costs, lower information deprivation and connects (or shapes) the interests of participant parties, in order to promote absolute gains.

Institutionalist explanation of Japan’s involvement in South East Asia then, lies on the importance of common interests and economic interdependence. Institutionalists point out, that Japan has been the biggest donor of foreign aid to the region and to regional organizations such as ASEAN, to ensure that their economic interdependence would create a favorable environment to “foster trust and cooperation in all areas of normal state-to-state relations, including military when appropriate” (Leavitt 2005, 222). Moreover, this policy would bring more confidence for the South East Asian countries’ dealing with Japan⁸³, because regional stability is important to all in maximizing economic development.

Figure 5: Motives/Outcomes in the region according to institutionalists

Source: Garofano 2002, 511

Even institutionalists are aware of the progress Japan has been doing in security area. Unlike classical liberalists however (and more similarly to neorealists), institutionalists predicted this situation, due to the existence of shared threats and objectives. These security institutions (or bilateral relations), according to John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi’s seminal work “Uses of Institutions: The U. S., Japan, and Governance in East Asia” are critical - and underappreciated – mechanism for the functioning of regional peace and stability. Even though multilateral institutions are weaker than bilateral ties, they also matter in “shaping and directing the flow of economics and politics” (Ikenberry, Inoguchi 2006, 2-3).

Furthermore, as Ikenberry wrote earlier, binding institutions are particularly important for constraining major powers and giving weaker powers a voice, creating avenues for confidence building, and establishing mechanisms other than coercion and military balancing behavior to resolve conflicts. As such, institutionalized collaboration offers South-east Asia some assurance that Japan will not easily and quickly remilitarize (Ikenberry 2001 in Leavitt 2005, 222-223). We might see some similarities with neorealist paradigm here, as in both scenarios institutions are used for balancing of power, despite being based on different motives.

For instance, let’s look at ASEAN-Japan relations. In July 1977, an ASEAN economic mission, headed by Indonesian Trade Minister Radius Prawiro, vigorously negotiated with its Japanese counterparts. Presenting a four-point plan, the mission emphasized that "ASEAN has been giving priority to its economic development since the end of the Indochina war in 1975. In this context the ASEAN states attach importance to relations with Japan." The mission's requests implied the creation of an economic bloc with ASEAN hoping to win special preferential treatment for its exports to Japan. It naturally behooved Japan to respond to this strong call for an active role in the region (Sudo 1988, 513-514). For these reasons, Japan and ASEAN chose to recognize each other’s calculated interest with a positive relationship. ASEAN needed Japan’s economic assistance to reinforce regional cooperation, and Japan needed ASEAN to play its political role in the region and to develop multilateral economic relations⁸⁴ (Sudo 1988, 514).
4.4.3 Evaluation
The major difference between neorealist and institutionalist approach lies in the reasons for joining or creating the institutional structure. As I have stated before (neo-neo debate), neorealists tend to undermine institutions’ position, since they regard them only as a projection of state’s interests and power. Institutionalists, on the other hand, emphasize institutional effects on state’s behavior and factors such as information and burden sharing, facilitating cooperation between nations.

There is however, an uncertainty in applying institutional paradigm. According to John Garofano’s (2002, 511-512) assessment⁸⁵, neoliberals would expect elites to be aware of the need for future interactions and adjust their behavior accordingly. This may be impossible to measure if such expectations are internalized, but one indication might be the level of flexibility after initial rigidity. Where is real or potential conflict, there should be evidence, that lesser uncertainty (or more information) would ameliorate the situation promptly. Simply the information gap however, cannot be assumed to be the cause of tensions. Also, institutionalists would have to find evidence that information and institutions constrain security policies, moving them away from the worst-case scenarios and purely short-term selfish behavior.

Neorealists (as expected) assess the situation more pragmatically. Japan’s institutionalization processes (or the lack of them) during the second half of 20^th century reflect the power position within the region. Right after the war, Japan relied on the bilateral U.S.-Japan treaty, since the structure was unfriendly for further cooperation and the United States were “enough” for Japan’s security guarantees. Japan’s post Cold War regionalism enthusiasm is also reliably explained by this paradigm, primarily due to the rising power status of China and the withdrawal of the United States. However, even if neorealism provides bigger explanatory potential when dealing with motives of Japan’s behavior, what is interesting in this theoretical clash is the mutual supplement of these theories: it is apparent, that common threats, common goals and institutional linkages provide strong rationale for increasing Japan-South East Asia security cooperation.