Masaryk university faculty of social studies

4 Grounds for application
In the previous chapter, the principal foreign policy making institutions were described (the less important institutions were omitted, as it is not the main focus of this thesis). In this chapter, the emphasis shall switch to the primary topic of this thesis. That is, a close examination of the projections of Japanese international relations (and its changing nature), through the optics of the theories of international relations. Since the hypothesis indicates that neorealism is the most suitable theory for understanding the dynamics and change within Japan’s international relations, it shall be primarily used. Neoliberal theories shall be applied as well, to set this concept in wider surroundings and bring different approach for the same agenda. The grounds for this application shall be divided into several main foreign policy issues Japan has been through during the last 50 years.
4.1 US-Japan security relations
Obviously, one of the topics central to IR theory is the understanding of peace and war in international relations. Since the time of the warring Greek city states, theories have been spun to account for state behavior in alliance construction, threat response, and other aspects of statecraft (Meyer 1996, 52). Japan since the Second World War has been an anomaly among nation-states, a nation that clearly had the capacity to become a military superpower, but chose to remain distanced from security issues. However, unlike Switzerland or Sweden, Japan did not choose to become an “armed neutral state” in the bipolar system between the US and the Soviet Union; Japan pursued a strategy, which can be called “moderately-armed non-neutral state”.

With East Asian security relations in flux after the end of Cold War, Japan’s security role is critical in influencing the region’s future (Hirata 2008: 123). Japan had long depended on the US for its national security, and enjoyed peace and stability without the burden of constructing its own security systems and institutions. The pursuit of economic prosperity had been given priority over security issues. In the 1990s, however, it seemed that Japan showed some distinct signs of change towards becoming a more proactive state even in security field (Hatekeyama 2005, 2). Japan has expanded its role even in the security issues: Japan‘s own military personnel (SDF – Self Defense Forces) has been involved in abroad missions with prime example being the Peace Keeping Forces (PKO) operating within the United Nations peace-keeping operation framework. However, this is not the only outcome of the end of Cold War: with the United States losing a vital interest in Japan (and US bases there), Japan was forced to redefine its role within the US-Japan alliance and enlarge not only its military strength but also its share of „global responsibilities“ (Arase 2007, 566; Rix 1989-1990, 461). Thus, the main questions this section will deal with are: Has Japanese position within the US-Japan framework changed and what is its impact on Japan’s security policy and international relations? A brief overview of Japan-US relations will also be mentioned.

The uniqueness in Japan’s security position in the present era can be seen in comparison to earlier periods. During the first part; 1951-1989, under the influence of the United States, Japan created modest, defensive military configuration. In the 12 years from 1989 to 2001, the U.S. used its increased leverage after the Cold War to prod Japan into an extra-territorial role supporting U.S. forces in the region, aided by a series of international crises and conservative nationalist elements in Japan. In the last 9 years though, Japan’s reluctance to engage in security matters has diminished to an unforeseen rate, and accordingly, American pressure on Japan’s engagement has became more effective (Arase 2007, 561). However, compared to earlier phases, it is presumable, that Japan’s security policy will further expand even without the United States‘pressure.

The roots of Japan’s post-war security policy can be seen in the United State’s occupation and the security sphere of Japanese politics which emerged from it: The 1947 constitution and the 1951 US-Japan Mutual Security Assistance Pact⁵¹ (Samuels 2007, 32). These two events allowed the US to build military bases on Japanese territory, but at the same time forced the US to protect them and thus protect whole Japan. This system actually forced Japan to preserve its pacifist status, as any attempts to change it would be of a very little effect; giving Japan the freedom of following the earlier mentioned Yoshida Doctrine⁵² (Makin, Hellman 1989, 3). The American pressure on Japan’s foreign policy remained even through the later part of 20^th century.

The end of the Vietnam War brought another opportunity to press Japan, as US president Nixon forced Tokyo to acknowledge, that Korean peninsula is its primary security concern (1969 Nixon-Sato Communiqué). The Nixon doctrine clearly stated that allies should take more responsibility for their own defense, forcing Prime Minister Sato to seek for an “autonomous defense” (jishu boei). This idea raised huge discussions within Japanese society, resulting in an acceptance of 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which was a compromise between jishu and senshu policy advocates (Arase 2007: 564).⁵³ The US’s reaction to this document came with the 1978 US-Japan Defense Guidelines for a deeper understanding of US-Japanese security relations. However, it was not until Nakasone Yasuhiro came to office in 1982 that the US-Japan relations began to improve. Nakasone agreed on US’s SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) project and broke the 1% GDP limit on defense spending. However, even through all these efforts, Japanese foreign policy had still been regarded as “check-book diplomacy” (Langdon 1985, 404-8).

The breakthrough came after the end of the Cold War, since with the elimination of common enemy and the emerging Japanese economic superiority, many realist thinkers argued that the alliance is going to dissolve. However, Japanese reluctance to accept a global role and the strength of bilateral institutions prevented the alliance from breaking up. Even though the alliance remained, American incentive on the cooperation changed; it no longer needed military bases on Japanese grounds and Japanese “check-book diplomacy” was no longer sufficient. This was proven by the Gulf War of 1991, which caught Japan unprepared for the new world; with its still reactive policy completely inadequate to Japan’s new international position⁵⁴.

Criticism from the U.S. and the wider international community led Japan to realize it needed to work shoulder-to-shoulder with other nations to maintain peace and stability. However, this meant Japan would have to reconcile acting abroad with Article Nine. Japan responded with the International Peace Cooperation Law (1992), which allowed the SDF to join other nations in U.N. peacekeeping (Arase 2007, 566). This act broke various normative and psychological barriers connected to sending Japanese troops abroad and after the 1993 North Korea crisis and 1994 Geneva Framework Agreement, Japan widened this act with 1995 NDPO, allowing SDF to be dispatched to “situations in the areas around Japan that have a direct effect on Japan’s security”(National Defense Program Outline 1996, Section III).

By 1995 China had conducted 5 nuclear tests since 1992, forcing the US to reevaluate its need for Japan and in 1997 signed US-Japan Defense Cooperation. This document was particularly important for Japan, as it defined the usage of SDF to respond to regional contingencies to support US forces exclusively in non-combat roles, such as naval patrols, medical services, logistics, education, etc.⁵⁵ However, this document did not specify regional contingencies in Korea or Taiwan, stating that SDF was allowed to respond to situations, “which, if remained unchecked, may bring about direct armed attack against Japan.”⁵⁶ This was corrected after the 1998 Taepodong launch by North Korea, with the 1999 Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. These acts, according to David Arase (2007, 568) went far beyond the PKO usage of SDF: “by the end of the decade Japan had agreed to an over-the-horizon role for the SDF supporting U.S. interventions to stabilize the East Asian region.“⁵⁷With this recent “military build-up”, we can see also significant budget rise after, as the Mid-term Defense Build-Up Plan was accepted in 1995⁵⁸. This is reflected in figure 3.

Figure 3: Total Amount of Defense-Related Expenditures Set out in the MTDP’s (Mid-term Defense Programs)

Source: National Defense, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo, Japan

Note: The total amount of Japanese Defense Expenditure for FY 2010 is ¥4,790.3 Billion. See the Japanese Budget (2010)

In brief, Japan had a chance to become an independent actor in international relations, but disregarded it because of its prevailing institutional and normative factors. These factors, however, have been changing, especially since the beginning of 1990’s. The pressure of the international system (especially American criticism) and regional difficulties (China and North Korea in particular) have changed Japan’s perception of peace⁵⁹ within the region. Japan shows signs of greater involvement within the international system, more and more willing to cooperate not only on Peace Keeping Operations, but also in accordance to its security ties with the United States.

4.1.1 Neorealist approach
The economic liberals have often cited Japan’s post-war pacifism and focus on economic policy as a proof, that it has rejected war and fully succumbed under the liberal paradigm (Rosencranze 1985; Berger 2007; Mueller 1988). John Mueller even in 1988 wrote that “(Japan) another formerly aggressive major power seems to have embraced fully the virtues and profits of peace” (Mueller 1998, 77). Realists strongly disagree with this position. Structural realists especially, see Japan’s post-war policy as a clear embodiment of the realist paradigm (Waltz 1993; Green 2003; Samuels 2007; Heginbotham, Samuels 1998). Even though neorealists tend to emphasize military strength and its independence, Japan’s after-war pacifism is also seen as a realist interest, only following the Yoshida doctrine. This is so because the structure of the system of international relations is still present; as Kenneth Waltz puts it: “Despite the changes that constantly take place in the relations of nations, the basic structure of international politics continues to be anarchic” (Waltz 1993, 59).

Thus, neorealists concerned with Japan agree, that Japan’s focus on economic recovery after the war is nothing more than a product of the structure; the alliance with the United States was in accordance with Japan’s post-war strategy of avoiding any commitment that could slow the economic recovery. When John Foster, chief negotiator of the 1951 and 1952 peace and security treaties, pressed Japan to expand its National Security Force from 110,000 to 350,000 troops, Yoshida refused, fearing that if Japan’s forces were larger than absolutely necessary to defend Japan, the United States would ask it to send forces to Korea (Dower 1979 in Heginbotham, Samuels 1998, 175).

Kenneth Waltz also accounts for another aspect of structural realism: the emphasis on relative gains. Waltz (1993, 60) argues that “Prosperity and military power, although connected, cannot be equated. Yet with the use of military force for consequential advantage negated at least among nuclear powers, the more productive and the more technologically advanced have more ways of influencing international outcomes than do the laggards.” In this sense, Waltz also sees Japan’s economic policy only as absolutely necessary for future military build-up and thus fully in accordance with neorealist position.

Furthermore, according to neorealist paradigm, the willingness of a state to assume economic leadership is dependent on the threat of opponent countries and their relative economies. The Soviet Union was still relatively powerful during the 1950s and 1960s and the United States considered countries such as Japan (on the rimland) as especially important for the Cold War and so disregarded the “free-ride” period.

Not only the economic policy then, but also the military policy during the Cold War has not been outside the neorealist premises. From the structural point, realist author Donald C. Hellmann argues, that Japan’s postwar pacifism is largely a result of geopolitical realities surrounding Japan (Hellmann, Makin 1989, 242-243). In the center of these realities during the Cold War were the American hegemony as well as Soviet and possible Chinese threats. Especially the Soviet Union had been regarded as a primary military threat towards Japanese foreign policy. In this context, neorealism understands Japan joining the bilateral agreement with the United States also as a balancing mechanism to counter this threat. Although according to Yoshida doctrine, Japan failed to maintain stable and independent military force, and did not expend significant resources to maintain its connection with the United States; this is not necessarily an objection towards the neorealist interpretation, since relatively weak powers (as Japan was in 1950’s and 1960’s) do not need to balance as actively as more powerful states (Heginbotham, Samuels 1998, 176).

By the end of 1970’s Japan’s economy had surpassed that of the Soviet Union and by the end of the Cold War, Japan was larger in proportion to US economy, than it was in 1939 combined with Germany. Japan had become very rich indeed, yet it suffered from the undermined position of its military or at least in the eyes of neorealist theorists. The uncertainty concerning Japan’s unwillingness to militarize has served as a primary factor for criticizing the neorealist approach (Berger 2007; Heginbotham, Samuels 1998). This critique is usually on the background of the end of the Cold War and the changing nature of international system. As it was already said here, for realist authors, Japan’s pacifism was primarily a product of the structure of international system, the US-Japan relations and the Soviet threat in particular. Why is it then, that even though the Soviet threat has been eliminated, Japan still has not acquired nuclear weapons and forced projection capabilities?

Neorealist theorists’ reply to this argument is that it is just a question of time; some of them even call it inevitable (Waltz 1993; Meyer 1996; Ikenberry, Mastanduno 2003). Furthermore, neorealist theorists emphasize the fact, that even though Japan’s military budget has not been growing up to a desired degree; Japan’s military spending is still the second biggest in the world. This fact is supplemented by the fact, that from early 1990s, Japan has had massive stockpiles of high grade nuclear fuel that was reprocessed in France and with Japanese technology can easily serve for the creation of nuclear weapons⁶⁰ (Ikenberry, Mastanduno 2003, 29-31). Thus, on the technological and strategic level, Japan is very well capable of remilitarization during a very short period of time, either as a result of an unbearable external pressure or by Japan’s own decision resulting from it. Kenneth Waltz (1993, 64) adds that “the increased international activity of Japan (and Germany) reflects the changing structure of international politics,” which, in accordance to a 1988 Prime Minister Takeshita’s plea for “defensive capability matching Japan’s economic power” may symbolize (whether intended or not) Japan’s own incentive on becoming a superpower. Waltz concludes by a neorealist analysis of Takeshita’s request: “He was saying that Japan should present itself in great-power panoply before the nations of the world. A great power’s panoply includes nuclear weapons”⁶¹ (Waltz 1993, 64).

4.1.2 Liberal and neoliberal approach

For classical liberals, as opposed to neoliberal internationalists, Japan is a prime example of a post-modern state, one that has overcome the use of military and settled in a world of “peaceful trading states without military threats” (Meyer 1996,: 54). John Mueller even classifies Japan as a country that underwent “hollandization”, a phenomenon according to which “(countries like Japan) once warlike and militaristic, have been quietly dropping out of the war system to pursue neutrality and, insofar as they are allowed to do so, perpetual peace” (Mueller 1988, 74). Furthermore, this statement implies that the decision to remain peaceful comes from Japan’s own decision. For this to be true, liberals undermine the position of US-Japan alliance during the Cold War, saying that Japanese after-war pacifism is not based on the US-Japan alliance, the American hegemony or even the Soviet threat. For liberals, Japanese after-war economic policy springs from the political and economic conception of “good”. The definition of “good” in this context may spring either from economic benefits of peace, the horrible memories of war or the normative influences of domestic regime. Whichever of these is true, according to classical liberal understanding, Japanese pacifism is not a product of the structure of international relations, but a product of human rationality.

The neoliberal institutionalist explanation is based on different premises and, maybe not surprisingly, is closer to Waltz’s neorealism then to Moravcsik’s liberalism. Institutionalists base their understanding (almost similarly to neorealists) on the US-Japan security cooperation, which created a normative and constitutional framework that would promote a nonaggressive Japan.⁶² This framework allowed Japan to concentrate on economic policy and on the international institutions that promote this policy. Safe under United States’ nuclear umbrella, Japan could pursue the membership of GATT, UN or OECD (Meyer 1996: 55). Furthermore, these regimes, as Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (2001: 267-284) pointed out long ago, facilitate burdensharing, which has been more and more present over the time. Even though Japan had been seen as a free-rider on America over more than the first two decades after war, Japan’s increasing donations towards American foreign policy, military actions or the withdrawal of American troops from Japanese bases put greater emphasis on burdensharing and cooperation.

To some extent, even Japan’s cooperation (especially dispatching the peace-keeping forces) on the Iraq war is seen as burdensharing, again reminding us of the neorealist approach. The difference is that even though neorealists see US-Japan cooperation as a product of the system; institutionalists dwell on the cooperation itself and on the normative framework it produced. Japanese pacifism then clearly originates in this cooperation; and has been sustained by the overlapping of Japanese and American interests; which facilitated other types of cooperation. According to Thomas U. Berger (2007, 260-262), “today’s Japan is making a serious effort to contribute to the international system, not only economically but in the diplomatic and security spheres as well, and what motivates it’s doing so is an essentially liberal philosophy of international relations, one that stresses building international institutions and deepening economic and social ties between nations, including potential adversaries, as ways of creating an international system that is inherently more cooperative and peaceful than it has been in the past.”

This statement, however, implies that even Japan’s militarization and its overall proactive role during the last two decades have origins in institutionalist paradigm. Japan, in Berger’s analysis, is militarizing not because of the pressure of international system, but because of the devotion to international security order and cooperation; Japan’s proactive role serves the international system and institutions it has produced. Burdensharing in this context changes to “contribution to the global order” (kokusai kouken) and spreads into many layers of international relations. However, even in Berger’s analysis, Japanese pacifism and kokusai kouken is only a result of the connection to the United States and the (overall liberal) international system that the United States has produced. (Berger 2007, 286-289) Even if American role within these bilateral relations might be diminishing, it is still the major institutional assurance of Japan’s foreign policy. Japan’s pacifism then, is clearly seen as a result of this alliance and the interests these two countries share. Pacifism will, despite the neorealist fears, remain the mood and policy of Japan, so long as the institutions that support it remain vibrant (Meyer 1996, 56).

4.1.3 Evaluation

For explaining Japanese post-World War 2 pacifism, it is absolutely necessary to put it into historical context. The constitution and the post-war position within the international system shows striking difference from the policies Japan was conducting before and during the war. In this sense, Japan’s post-war pacifism can easily be regarded as artificial, created by American presence within the region. This statement is accepted by both neorealism and institutionalism, yet with differences in motives. Neorealism argues that it was the bipolar international system which provided the opportunity of an American nuclear umbrella for Japan; institutionalism sees this cooperation as a result of overlapping interests and the normative framework it produced. I advocate that the structural point in this debate is the principal mean of understanding this position.

The cold war period and its impact on Japan’s position within the system clearly originate in the Yoshida doctrine, which could only be established (and is a reaction) because of Japan’s geopolitical position in the region and the role it was willing to play within the bipolar structure. The United States accepted this “free-ride” role just because of the system and its need to have Japan balance the Soviet Union. The shift within the America-Japan relations and Japan’s position within the system after the end of Cold War is further proof for the neorealist understanding. With connection to Japan, Waltz predicted that “the great powers of the world must take care of themselves” (Waltz 1993, 64), a sentence that has been present in modern Japan more than ever.

Similarly, the dissolution of the bipolar structure can be seen as the major factor for Japan to understand, that it no longer lies in a post-modern haven and has to “take care of itself”. The Gulf War shock and the post-Gulf War laws, such as Peace Cooperation Law, the 1995 U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Outlines and the 1999 Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan are simply reactions to the newly emerged international system, one with a lesser (although still significant) role of the United States and bigger need for Japan to cope with the multilateral threats this new system had developed. Furthermore, analyzing Japan’s defense policy papers and Japanese officials’ speeches, we can see not only Japan’s growing emphasis on the threats in the region, but also its urge for becoming a “normal nation” (Koizumi 2005), focused on promoting its role in the newly emerged multilateral system. All these examples assess that it was not an overlapping of Japan’s and America’s interest or interdependent economic ties, which formed Japan’s foreign policy during last 60 years or so, but more of a outside structure-induced pressure, created by Japan’s interaction with the United States and other actors in the region.
4.2 Japan – China relations
Throughout much of modern history, the way China and Japan relate to each other has fundamentally shaped their respective regional roles and the contours of the East Asian international system (Deng 1997, 373). However, in the mid-1950s Japan and China were separated from political, economic and security interaction with each other by the structural boundaries of the Cold War bipolarity, together with the legacies of national division and the colonial past. Although these structural factors and mutual suspicions continued to limit Japan-China relations, at the same time Japan has had powerful motives to circumvent the restraints imposed by the structure of the international system and push for gradual and constructive engagement (Hook et al. 2001, 164).

This strategy was established by Yoshida Shigeru, who believed, that Japan and the West will eventually lure China away from Moscow by offering it an advantageous alternative to the dependence on the Soviet Union. In Yoshida’s view, prosperous China would inevitably become friendly with Japan and the United States⁶³ (Green 2003, 77). China’s prosperous state and good relations with Japan were necessary then, for Yoshida’s economic policy and especially for the opening of China’s huge market and natural resources. Even though Yoshida was hotly debated within the pro-Beijing and pro-Taipei fractions of LDP for doing so, his predictions were largely precise. Even though during the Sato administration (1964-1972), Japan had tightly followed American foreign policy despite the external and internal pressure, and the weakening of the bipolar Cold War structure and Nixon’s China policy effectively removed US objections towards the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations (Hook et al. 2001, 166).

The year of 1972 and Nixon’s visit to China brought significant improvement of not only the China-Japan relations. The tripartite relations with U.S., Japan and China were greatly improved, based upon a common antagonism toward the Soviet Union (Choi 2003, 79). According to this re-establishment of Sino-Japanese relations, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited China in 1972 and signed joint communiqué establishing full relations with China.⁶⁴ This communiqué signalized abandoning official ties with Taiwan and accepting the “three principles” of normalization, with only the Sankaku islands issue unresolved.

These circumstances created a wonderful environment for the deepening of economic ties, as it was presupposed by Yoshida Shigeru. Zaikai, and primarily Keidanren, immediately grabbed this opportunity and with the use of its business ties facilitated the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China⁶⁵. During the negotiations for this document, China even privately indicated that it would tolerate Japan’s security relations with the US (Hook et al. 2001, 167). During the 1980s, the relations followed this track, primarily through growing economic interdependence, investment and economic assistance from Japan⁶⁶. This economic assistance had almost no opposition in Japan, as Japan saw a major trading partner in China, but also regarded this money as atonement for its past behavior; Japan’s conciliatory behavior reflected a powerful consensus among Japanese political and bureaucratic elites (Berger 2007, 236).

Yoshida’s predictions were only partly correct though. Greater trade, foreign aid and investments could not fully insulate the bilateral relations from the turbulent incidents of the last 20 years. Even though Japan’s reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident was very muted and weak – compared to the public outcry in the United States, particularly because of the historical experiences between China and Japan which did not allow Japan to criticize China or impose economic sanctions – the break-up of the Soviet Union marked a new era in Japan-China relations. Consequently with the disappearance of a common enemy for Japan and China, Japan’s position was undermined with the economic “bubble” crisis of 1991.

The real impact of the Soviet Union break-up on the bilateral relations did not come until the mid 1990s. In 1993, Japanese government (Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro) started pressing for greater transparency in Chinese military policy. Another fallback in bilateral relations came in 1995 after five consequent Chinese nuclear tests and especially in 1996 during the Taiwan Strait crisis, reaffirming US-Japan bilateral relations. These incidents were reflected even in the public opinion and by the end of 20^th century, Japan’s fundamental thinking of China changed from economy-lead policy to a more pragmatic and realistic policy.

This pragmatic political stance towards Japan-China relations were particularly set out during the rule of the Koizumi cabinet (2001-2006). In 2002, Koizumi released a document called Basic Strategy for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21^st Century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy ⁶⁷, in which he explicitly called for more active role not only In relations with China, bet overall by stating that: “Japan has not seen the external world enough so far. Japan has to face the reality of the world and to actively engage itself in world affairs.“ Furthermore, he described Japan’s relations with China as the most important foreign policy theme of the 21^st century and stated, that these relations would involve a mix of “cooperation and coexistence” with “competition and friction”. These statements mean a shift in Japan’s approach towards this relation: even though Japan was still to some extent willing to engage China, it intended on articulating its views and interests in a frank and pragmatic way and thus building the relations on the mutual respect and common interests instead of “historical connection or friendship”.
4.2.1 Neorealist approach
Neorealists understand Japan’s after war policy and the Yoshida strategy in Sino-Japanese relations as a continuation of the neorealist paradigm. According to Yoshida’s strategy, Japan was engaging China in order to wean it away from the Soviet Union; towards the stable, friendly and wealthy side of the United States. This understanding is based on the geoeconomical perception of China: rich and prosperous China would inevitably become friends with Japan and the United States and function as a vital part of anti-soviet alliance. This strategy also brings up to light on of the major factors in Sino-Japanese relations during the second part of the 20^th century: the Japan-US security alliance. This alliance is seen as a vital part of Japan’s international relations, as it held Japan from becoming more independent in foreign policy making.

Even the shift within Japan-China bilateral relations has been seen by neorealist theorists as a prime example of a shift towards more realistic foreign policy (Green 2003, 1996). This shift originates in China’s strategic position; according to neorealists, Japan looks at China as a country sitting in between Japan and South East Asia, Japan’s most important source of raw materials and one of its most important markets for finished products. Furthermore, China’s economic and especially military capabilities are growing and thus making China the greatest strategic problem in nowadays Japanese foreign politics (Heginbotham, Samuels 1998, 181).

Chinese military budget is continuously growing⁶⁸ and even Chinese foreign policy has developed some sort of Grand strategy; according to Ikenberry and Mastanduno (2003, 4), this strategy is similar to that of Bismarck: “an effort to engage and reassure other major powers in order to provide space for Chinese development as a great power without alarming or provoking more powerful rivals, individually or collectively.” This strategy is then understood as China pushing on a structural change within the East Asia region; a transition from a U.S.-dominated order to one that is more genuinely multipolar.

This calling for a greater role in the region is ultimately seen as a threat to Japan’s position. Japan’s approach towards this problem however, can be seen as to some extent relative. As realist paradigm (and its balance-of-power logic) would presuppose, Japan would rather pursue relative gains at the expense of China; Japan would cut the aid and investments to China as method for retarding the role of China in the system. Japan has not done so. Instead, as Michael J. Green (2003, 79) points out “Japan’s China policy is moving forward on two levels. At one level, Tokyo continues to provide massive economic assistance in the form of yen loans, with only slight decreases in ODA. At another level, however, Tokyo is actively seeking to counter Chinese political influence in Asia while hedging against the prospect of longer-term Chinese threats.” This policy thus combines the engagement (economic aid) and pragmatic approach (balancing) towards Chinese foreign policy, as it was set in the Koizumi memorandum.

This stance was further expressed in an LDP foreign policy paper of 1997: “Ultimately China’s future rests in its own hands-including how stably it will develop. Therefore, even as we seek to preserve and enhance our amicable relations with China, we must maintain a close watch on the direction China is headed and be prepared to cope with a variety of contingencies” (cited from Green 2003, 79). This foreign policy review is then seen as an affirmation of the neorealist approach as the suspicion within Sino-Japanese relations causes the urge to effect the change in China and balance it through multilateral or bilateral security networks.

Maybe even greater importance lies in the future of this relation. According to neorealist interpretation; Japan has two possible alternatives on the future coping with the growing China. First one lies in Japan’s acquirement of nuclear weapons as a balancing factor for Chinese rising military threat. Second one lies in even stronger cooperation with the United States, as well as creating tighter cooperation ties with geopolitically important states in South East Asia, such as South Korea or India. With both of these solutions, neorealists emphasize the importance of reevaluation of Japan’s economic policy towards China to “exhibit great sensitivity to the distribution of gains through the trade with China (Heginbotham, Samuels 1998, 182).

4.2.2 Neoliberal approach
Institutionalists see Japan in a different way than realists: even though they also to some extent acknowledge the geopolitical realities, they emphasize, that because of its relative size and population, Japan would not play a central role in dealing with rising China. Therefore, Japan must work within a broader alliance, connected to other countries and organizations. Primarily the United States and the United Nations will play a major role in this environment, as the United States and the institutions it has been promoting are seen as the architects of the international system. But again, as it is the normative framework that has created Japan’s foreign policy, it is the overlapping of Japan’s and American interests that is crucial in dealing with China.

As the shift within Japan’s approach towards China is clearly visible, even neoliberal authors cope with it. Opposed to neorealists however, they do not stress the shift leading towards a balance-of-power policy, the regard Japan’s approach towards its China relations primarily as a reflection of Japan’s engage strategy. During the period from 1972 to the middle part of 1990s, Japan had been leading “friendship diplomacy”, trying to engage China into economic interdependence and institutional framework; in order to resolve historical disputes and anchor China within the institutional system preferable for Japan.

The shift towards “reluctant realism” within Japan-China relations has been explained by institutionalists as compromise between engaging and balancing Chinese influence within the system. Unlike realists though, institutionalists emphasize the economic sphere of this policy; they argue, that balancing of China is particularly inefficient and dangerous, since it would inevitably lead to the deterioration of the security dilemma and endless spiral of military build-up. On the other hand, institutionalists emphasize the economic interdependence and common concerns about transnational issues such as environmental degradation. These aspects of international relations are and will be steering China-Japan relations to maintain a cooperative relationship (Roy 2005 in Berger 2007, 250-251).

These policies have even been leading China to a more conciliatory approach toward Japan. However, given the historical disputes and conflicts, Japan and China should strike a grand bargain to establish “a new era of cooperative and forward looking bilateral relations” (Berger 2007, 252). This deal then, would be centered on compromise diplomacy largely under the framework of a larger, multilateral cooperation and would embrace not only cooperation on security fields, but also the promotion of common interests within international relations of these two countries: economic interdependence, energy security, environmental protection and social equity. These policies would lead to the promotion of cooperation of these two countries in the region and would lessen the frictions within their relations.

4.2.3 Evaluation
The evolution of Japan-China relations is clearly an evolution towards the predictions set by the realist paradigm, based on motives best understood by neorealist predictions. The structural threat, that China means to Japan has been reflected in Japan’s official foreign policy papers, making China a primary threat to Japan’s East Asia order (See Koizumi memorandum, MOFA papers, etc.). Japan has been using some institutionalist-propagated means of settling the security dilemma with China, such as multilateral diplomacy or the push for economic interdependence; Chinese responses have pushed forward its security policy at the expense of common interest-lead multilateral diplomacy.

Therefore, Chinese militarization, nuclear weapons tests, the emphasis on security policy and aggressive rhetoric, and historical, but also present Japan-China disputes are the core of the new Japanese perception of China’s role within the region. Even the withering of Japan’s engagement policy towards China can be seen as a more pragmatic, realistic approach, and not as an emphasis on a promotion of common interests or an outcome of interdependent policies.