Master thesis

5.1Case Descriptions

In the following case studies the question of how the local management is influencing the condition and status of the CPRs will be investigated both through interviews conducted in all villages and through estimates of the land status. This is done in order to understand the background of the institutional organisations and to investigate the current situation of the Commons.

5.1.1Case I: Udaipur District

Udaipur district is located in the south of Rajasthan and dominated by the Aravali Hills, one of the oldest mountain ranges in the world. The area is characterized by semi-arid climatic conditions and undulating terrain. Many of the hills are barren and the area is marked by scarcity of rainfall, which usually takes place during monsoon months. On top of this, the low levels of vegetation increases water erosion by the monsoon, and wash-off of nutritious soil, leaving the land less fertile and barren. According to the Rajasthan Government Statistics from 2007, out of the total population of 2.63 million, 81.4% lives in the rural areas¹³⁹.The total population of Udaipur District has increased by about 600.000¹⁴⁰ since 1999 and according to the State Statistics 47.86% of the total population in the district belong to a Scheduled Tribe and 6% to Scheduled Caste groups¹⁴¹. The population in Udaipur is mainly rural and heavily depends on natural resources for their survival¹⁴². However, due to the increase in human and livestock population and the high level of dependency of the natural resource, the common lands have been severely degraded over the last 15 years through overexploitation, misuse and encroachments. This has resulted in a variety of negative environmental and social impacts, which may see the future subsistence of the land uncertain.


“In the hills, not so arid areas of the south, land consolidation is an important policy option, as at present fragmented form of lands makes it very difficult to promote value addition in agriculture. Here, the general practice of the ST communities of claiming the land as new families are formed—a practice from the expansive agriculture era—brings marginal lands under the plough, leads to cutting of the woods and further fragmentation of the existing land. This must, now, give way to more sustainable styles of land use. For this, a new settlement process must be initiated.”

Government of Rajasthan, Human Development Report, 2008.

Water scarcity, diminished land quality and small landholdings place severe constraints on agricultural productivity. Therefore, in addition to widespread involvement in agriculture and animal husbandry a large section of the rural population, including the youth, have become heavily involved and dependent on various forms of casual labour, migrating for work on a daily or seasonal basis¹⁴³. While the local population is largely dependent on natural resources for their livelihood, most of the commons have fallen victim to overgrazing and encroachment¹⁴⁴. Furthermore, these processes of degradation have been amplified by the fragile nature of the land, which makes the area vulnerable to droughts and limits the possibility of developing new alternative activities to increase the productivity of lands. The economic condition of these tribal communities can be gauged from the fact that roughly 44 % of all families live below the poverty line¹⁴⁵.

As the immediate livelihood needs are increasingly being met through labour migration, the destruction of the local ecology for short-term private gain has increasingly become the norm¹⁴⁶. At present, with continuously growing demand for resources and the growing value of lands, the commons are increasingly becoming subject of speculation. As the state seeks to encourage economic growth, it is increasingly unlikely that fragmented communities will be able to compete with powerful business interests who see large profits in utilizing the lands. This presents a serious threat to the local ecology and, therefore, the very foundation of sustainable local livelihoods¹⁴⁷.

1. Ramaj

See appendix II for Ramaj village details

Village Statistics:

All parcels smaller than one hectare were omitted from the survey. Subsequently 70% by area of total common land was surveyed, yet only 15% by number of parcels, indicating that a small number of parcels represent the majority of common land in Ramaj.

Figure 1 – Level of Survey

The total de facto area (pastureland, revenue waste land and barren and uncultivable land) is of 318.64 ha compiling of 467 parcel units. The surveyed land area is 230.88 ha, 70 parcel units. In terms of percentage it is 72.46% of land in merely 14.99% of the parcel units.

Figure 2 - Level of Survey by land categories

The surveyed pasture land in area is 75.8 ha, which is 92.64% of the total pasture land in Ramaj. The surveyed revenue land area is 45.91 ha which amounts to 86.49% of the total revenue wasteland. The surveyed Barren and Uncultivable land area is 109.18 ha which cover 59.42% of the total Barren land category. Barren and Uncultivable land is the major land mass in Ramaj with a total area of 183.75 ha in 361 parcel unit. The surveyed parcels in the Barren and Uncultivable land covered merely 6.93% of the total parcel units, with an average parcel area of 4.3 ha, but covered nearly 60% of the total category.

Table - Level of Survey

	Pastureland	Revenue Wasteland	Barren and uncultivable	Total
Total area of land (ha)	81.81	53.08	183.75	318.64
Area of land (ha) surveyed	75.79	45.91	109.18	230.88
Level of surveying	92.64%	86.49%	59.42%	72,46%
Total number of parcels	53	53	361	467
Number of parcels surveyed	22	23	25	70
% of parcels surveyed	41.51%	43.40%	6.93%	14,99%

Some caution is warranted regarding Ramaj village, as it is considered to be a typical representative of the common land scenarios. There is no forestland in Ramaj, which eliminates forest resource use, deforestation and additionally, the unique set of institutional and legal implications of Forest Department jurisdiction.

Level of encroachment

Table - Level of encroachment by land category

	Pastureland	Revenue Wasteland	Barren and Uncultivable	TOTAL
Area of land (ha)	75.79	45.91	109.18	230.88
Encroached Area (ha)	23.56	35.495	101.51	160.565
Level of encroachment	31.09%	77.31%	92.97%	69.54%

Table 2 shows the level of encroachment in land categories, and according to the findings Ramaj has a high average level of encroachment on the commons.

Although, there is a difference between the categories ranging from 31% in pasture lands, 77% in revenue wasteland and to 93% in uncultivable land. The high level of encroachment found in Revenue Wasteland is closely connected with the policy of regularization, this could indicate Hardin´s model of behaviour. The individual farmer has knowledge of the regularization policy, although the process often takes 10-15 years, the bribes and fines that come with the encroachment are fairly low and the fines are often never given. While the individual farmer will gain all of the benefits from the additional land and in the end could get the land allotted through government policies. The degeneration to the rest of the Revenue Wasteland will only affect him mildly. The high amount of encroachments could also indicate the fear of losing access to the resources, due to others encroachment, as a high motivator for further encroachments. This would be in accordance to Hardin´s non-verbal understanding of the desistance to overexploit.

The relatively low level (31%) of encroachment on pastureland reflects the consistent effort over 25 years, undertaken by villagers to protect the pastures. The pasture land in Ramaj shows that community organization have functioned, although not perfect, it is still far from the encroachment levels of the other categories. The highest level of encroachment (93%) occurs on barren and uncultivable land, which cannot be allotted. This could point to a lack of knowledge of the current land laws in the village, and the rights of use and allotment following these laws. But it could also be a sign of a difference between, what the villagers determine as common land and what is stated in the revenue records, an example of De Facto village commons.

Status of Vegetation

In Ramaj there is no forest land and only sparse tree vegetation is present on the land categories that are recorded in revenue department documents. The villagers stated that most of the forest was sold off as timber shortly after independence. Although, there is currently no evidence to prove this statement, other than the statement from the villagers, it is not an uncommon scenario during the governance changes during the early days of independence. The fact is that there is no forest in Ramaj anymore.

The vegetation shows some notable differentiation across the land categories. Barren and uncultivable land has the lowest level of vegetated area. Pastureland shows the highest level of vegetation, this is mainly due to the long effort by the community and NGO to protect the pasture land in Ramaj. The Village Development initiatives largely account for the whole difference and have had a big and positive effect on the village plantation efforts and concerns towards the regeneration of the pasture land.

Figure 3 - Vegetation type by land classification

Village data Conclusion:

The level of encroachment (69.5%) across the land categories in Ramaj is high and it promotes honeycombing. Moreover, parcels with partial encroachment might be completely inaccessible to villagers because of the encroaching households’ staking claims to the lands.

The Pastureland Development initiative remains a notable exception in the village. In relation to this, the old encroaching households, that were removed prior to the demarcation, have begun to send their cattle for grazing on the land during the last couple of years, claiming rights to the land or wanting compensation in other areas. On the pasture land developed in 2005-06, there were extensive encroachments before the area was enclosed. These encroachments were removed and the land marked by a boundary of cactus plants¹⁴⁸. But during the last two years the former encroachers have begun to send their cattle for grazing inside the boundary and stake a claim for their old land holdings. The claim is; the former encroachers had an agreement with the Panchayat of getting the land back after 5-6 years or get land allotted in another Phalla¹⁴⁹, being the revenue wasteland, ergo government land holdings that can be allotted. They feel they have been unfairly treated since many other encroachers are still present in other areas of the village.

The high rate (92.97%) of encroachment on Barren and Uncultivable land is unexpected, given that villagers cannot receive these lands through regularization. One possibility is that Revenue Department officials could change the category of a parcel to revenue wasteland, which can then be allotted as private agricultural land. Experience shows that bribery and other irregular activities, between villagers and government officials play an important role in allotment, making this a possibility. Encroachment on revenue wasteland, a category that can be allotted by the Revenue Department, is expected as villagers can stake a claim for future allotment while cultivating land, all at the cost of relatively small fines (100 rupee) or bribes over several years. As stated, fines are rarely given and bribes often keep the Panchayat ineffective. The accountability of the encroachers towards the community is very low and the sanction functions are ineffective and rarely enforced. This provides a serious stumbling block for the community governance of the commons, and it is highlighted by Ostrom´s principle that without accountability and effective sanctions, community organization will have a very hard time.

Interview

The interview in Ramaj was done during two different visits and with two different groups. The group referred to as Group A, consists of four elder members of the village who were or had been members of the Village Development Committee and had all been involved in the development of pastureland and five private Chaks (grazing lands) during the late 90’s.

The other interview group consisted of seven village members, five men and two women. They were mostly elder community members and all of them were farmers and livestock herders. The second group was not willing to speak much about the encroachment problems in the village, very likely because some of them were encroachers themselves. This gave the replies some aspect of being biased and lacking clear information. When the two interviews were combined it proved fruitful and gave insights from different village perspectives.

Interview findings:

The initial talk of the land categories, boundaries and water sources, with both groups, showed a good understanding for the different land categories and the location of the water resources and the moist conservation constructions, like anicuts and water treatment areas; although, there is an ongoing internal conflict over encroachment on the village commons. As the data findings indicate, there is a massive problem with encroachments on common land in Ramaj. Where one group acknowledge this problem and were willing to talk about it the other group denied the encroachments altogether.

One group of villagers (Group A) has tried to take action against the massive problems concerning encroachment, mainly focused on the pasture- and the revenue wasteland encroachments. This has been tried through the local political institutions. But they feel their efforts, overall, have been unsuccessful. Group A, indicated that some of the members of the local Panchayat are either encroachers themselves or that they are economically and/or politically connected to the encroachers, therefore it is against their personal interests to change the conduct of the Ramaj commons.

Group A stated that, more that 75% of the village pasture land is actually encroached upon, and not available for common grazing. The pasture lands have become divided into small areas by the encroachment boundaries, making access to the rest even more difficult. Some of the villagers stated, that around 50 households are encroaching on the pastures and this creates a fairly large and powerful group who does not want to talk about changing the conduct and norm, as the act of encroaching has become a norm over the last 20-25 years without much resistance.

One major hindrance Group A has met in their efforts, has been to prove the encroachers have no legal right to the land. This is coursed by the village having no records of land holdings and –categories (Gambandi¹⁵⁰). By this the encroachers uphold their claims on land titles.

Group A has tried to remove the encroachers through the legal process of both the village, the Gram Panchayat and through the Chief Block Adiministrator (Tehsildar). They claim the local Panchayat members are also encroachers and the Panchayat-leader (Kamlendra Singh) corrupted the election with bribes of money and liquor to the Scheduled Tribes in the area, and is supported by the Rajput in the region. Kamlendra Singh is of the Rajput caste and not from Ramaj, furthermore it was said that he is a “straw man” for his elder brother and father, and other powerful individuals in the region. He takes only very few and minor decisions without consulting with his farther and bother first. Additionally it was said that his elder brother is the King Maker and the real power behind the rural politics in the area.

Group A tried to go to the Panchayat to get the encroachers removed; the Panchayat leader went to his farther, who is an encroacher, and promised the villagers to make the Dept. Sagh-Panch take action. The villagers said that the Dept. Sagh-Panch is related to some of the encroaching households and therefore did nothing. The villagers wrote a letter of complaint to the Chief Revenue Collector but with no effect, this complaint was registered and the Patvari made a report. During the next Panchayat Gram Sabat meting Group A raised the issue of encroachment, but with no real effect, even though the law states that, if a complaint is registered by the Pamchad and sent to the Tehsildar, they are bound by law to react on this and investigate the issue.

Within the village there is only one caste represented, it is the Ratwa-Meena. It is legally recognized as a Scheduled Tribe, but socially they are more empowered compared to other ST. in Udaipur District. As such the community could be seen as very homogeneous but within the community there are a lot of social and economic differences. This comes to light through the internal conflict of the village.

Related to the specific questions and principals, it shows that there are problems with the precise area of the different land categories in the village. In other words, the general area of a land category is known but the category of the specific parcels is a subject, and reason, to internal conflict, focused on the division between private land and common land on sight. In that regard there is a large overlap between the village and the CPRs.

The rules of access and the usage, and to some extent, the CPR-boundaries are set by the Gram Panchayat and otherwise by the Revenue Department, but all authorities show a high level of corruption and conflicts of interest.

The main usage of the CPR in Ramaj is grazing and fodder for the livestock; otherwise the area is dominated by farming. The village is very dependent on the remaining CPR for grazing, but as described the allocation of the resources available not nor equal due to the large amount of encroachment.

The local authority on the CPR is the Panchayat and the Gram Panchayat, and their role is to administer the local CPRs and solve any conflict regarded to this. In reality, as indicated by the internal conflicts, this is not the case. The implementation of rules and sanctions is very poor and close to non-existence, as well as the level of accountability towards the rules from the village in general. There is no real management system of the village CPRs and all areas are set for open grazing, all through the year.

In all of Ramaj there are 15 handpumps and around 90 tubewells and four anicuts, two government and two constructed by Seva Mandir, according to the villagers none of the important sources of water run dry during summer season. The water level will of course be low but not gone. The wells and anicuts are maintained by the village, cleaned of silt and repaired every five years and the community was very happy, and interested in showing the anicuts. A reason for the little concern with water scarcity, is partly due to the many tube wells in the area and of course as well to the maintenance of the water conservation efforts, but another reason could also be the plentiful monsoons seasons the last three years, the villagers said that the last drought was in 2006.

During droughts the villagers’ plant and harvest grass on their fields for fodder, other than that, they graze the livestock on the pasture lands and revenue lands, as normal. The villagers are provided with additional fodder and other essentials from the government store, at a low price, when required, during difficult times. The more wealthy households are able to cover their needs through buying goods at the market. When asked the villagers were interested in improving the vegetation on the common land, but indicated that they were not able to due to lack of funds. However, they indicated that they would like to obtain help from external agencies to do plantation efforts, and in doing so would provide labour as the community’s main contributing resource.

2. Ramaj Conclusion:

The internal and long term conflict goes against Ostrom´s principles where conflict resolution is easy and the high level of encroachment indicates that the community based governance is not functioning and the accountability to the rules is very low. It also indicates Hardin´s Tragedy where the actors are trapped in the second-level dilemma due to negative impacts of the first. The villagers are unable to solve their internal conflict due to the existing problems with the local governance institution and encroachments.

The local governance institution seems to be rife with corruption, both in terms of power distribution and towards the legal process of encroachments. Given the long term conflict, over 30 years, the villagers seem unable to solve the issue without external help. Although, they have tried to find a resolution through the legal process, this has come to little effect. Without the official land records and government officials to back them up the encroachers are too powerful.

The overall situation in Ramaj seems to fit with Hardin´s perception of the Commons e.g. the Tragedy, where the short-term gains are the motivator for the users. In effect the commons have massively decreased in size and availability, mainly due to the large scale encroachments, but the resources needed have remained high and this, more than anything, have led to the overall degradation of the CPR. But on the other hand, Ramaj also shows some ability for improving and protecting the pasture land, although with some difficulty and with help from an external actor. In regards to the pasture land, the monitoring has been done by the Village Development Committee in cooperation with the NGO and it has been fairly effective. This shows that Ramaj has been capable of forming local organization, but only in connection with the pasture land and only with outside help. In all other regards the monitoring is ineffective to non-existent from both the Panchayat and from the Revenue Department. There are some clear rules for usage of the CPRs, but the only one that are upheld, is to exclude people from other villages from the CPR. The encroachment has become a social norm in the village as well as bribery of officials. It would indicate that there is only minor forces working for community access and the majority, and the more empowered, are focusing on their private gains rather than the sustainability of the CPR and they have the money and political power to influence local officials and policy.

Ramaj has a fairly long history of community institutions, going back to the 1990’ies. Although many development projects, have met difficulties and failures, due to the ineffectiveness of the local institutions, conflicts and general mismanagement, the villagers have also managed to overcome some of these difficulties. An example of this would be the work on the pasture land, which initially failed due to poor management and improper protection. Although, these pasture lands have again become an issue of encroachment and illegal grazing and have resulted in conflict.

In regards to sanctions towards the rule violators, it is basically non-existent. There are only a few cases of fines and only in relation to the pasture land, in all other regards sanctions towards the encroachers are absent from both the Panchayat and the Revenue Department. The group that is working against the encroachers only seems interested in the pasture land and the water sources, little interest is shown towards the other land categories.

There are a few cases of conflict resolution in Ramaj, again mainly in regard to the pasture land, but the overall picture would be that resolutions are not easy, eventhough the political power to do so lies with the village Panchayat. But due to the corruption the institution is seriously hampered and ineffective. As stated in the analysis, it is mandatory by law that the Gram Panchayat and Tehsildar reacts on a recorded complaint of encroachment on village CPR. So the accusation on members of the Panchayat being encroachers themselves, or at least to be involved financially, seems to hold true.

The villagers in the interview indicated a high dependency on the commons for grazing their livestock, as they are the main source of income for most of the community. Especially, with the shrinkage of the commons available, due to the encroachments, the continued overgrazing and depletion of the CPR in Ramaj is likely to continue, without any restriction norms.

The water sources are in good condition and well maintained and it is the only area where the village has a continued effective management of a common resource. This indicates, according to Ostrom, that the vitality and scarcity of the resource makes the community form management organisation and uphold the rules of conduct. But it does not hold true towards any other CPR in the village and with the increasing lack of fodder available it is rather the funds and employment the village receive from for development work on the water facilities from Seva Mandir, which is the motivator.

Overall there are massive problems with encroachment on the common lands, corruption in the administrative levels and with very low accountability towards the rules of conduct on the CPRs. There are only a few members who are alarmed about the general status of the village CPRs. The majority of the community are not concerned with the encroachments and are unwilling to take any action against the encroachers. This has created a norm of, Encroach or watch someone else do it, which fits with Hardin´s analysis of behaviour towards commons. The few successes Ramaj has had in development of the commons have time and again been spoiled by further encroachments and the ineffectiveness of the Panchayat.

3. Dodawali

For Dodawali details see Appendix III

Village Statistic:

All parcels smaller than one hectare were omitted from the survey. 93% of the total area was surveyed equivalent to 42,85% of the total parcels.

Table – Level of survey

	Forest land	Revenue Wasteland	Barren and uncultivable	Total
Total area (ha) of land	707.97	57.57	130.78	896.31
Area (ha) surveyed	707.97	31.95	94.00	833.91
Level of surveying	100%	55.5%	71.87%	93.03%
Total number of parcels	63	125	274	462
Number of parcels surveyed	63	52	83	198
% parcels surveyed	100%	41.6%	30%	42.85%

The table above depicts the level of surveying in terms of parcels and area of the common lands of Dodawali village.

The parcel distribution in terms of size is quite uneven and it ranges from less than a hectare to more than 6 hectares. This is why encroachments in terms of area are so high in terms of percentage but not parcel-wise. Even if only a few parcels are encroached upon, it covers a large part of the common lands due to the size of the parcels.

Figure : Number of parcels surveyed Figure : Area of land surveyed (ha)

The above graphs depict the total land surveyed in terms of parcels and area. The total number of parcels of common land in Dodawali village is 462 covering an area of 896.31 ha. The survey covers 198 parcels (42,8%) but it covers an area of 834 ha.

Figure : Classification of land Figure : Level of surveying

Dodawali village consists of three categories of land, Forest Land, Revenue Wasteland and Barren and Uncultivable land. There are two JFM sites being constructed in cooperation with Seva Mandir, of 50 ha each in the forest of Dodawali. As an attempt to rebuild the forest cover in the village.

Level of encroachment:

Figure - Level of encroachment

The above graph depicts the level of encroachment on surveyed land. There is only 3.77% encroachment in the forest land. This is mainly because of the distance and difficult terrain, the very same terrain somewhat, protects the forest from overuse and thereby contributes to the sustainability of the forest. The forest land is generally undulating and steep hills which make it difficult to encroachment upon and the productivity of the land, once cleared of forest, is not particularly high. The percentage of encroachment is very high in the other two land categories with 67.37% in the revenue wasteland category and 86.19% in the barren and uncultivable land category.

Table – Level of encroachment

	Forrest land	Revenue Wasteland	Barren and Uncultivable	TOTAL
Total land encroached land (ha)	26.72	24.54	68.86	120.12
Total land surveyed (ha)	707.97	36.43	79.90	824.29
Percentage of land (ha) encroached	3.77%	67.37%	86.19%	52,44%
Total number of parcels encroached	17	51	79	147
Total number of parcels surveyed	63	52	83	198
Percentage of parcels encroached	26.98%	98.08%	95.18%	74.24%

The above table gives data about the encroachment in the common lands of Dodawali village in terms of hectares as well as in number of parcels among the three land categories of the area.

The table shows that although only 3.77% of the total area of forest in terms of hectares is encroached, the encroachment is 26.98% in terms of parcels. This is an example of honeycombing where many parcels in the same area are being encroached by a number of villagers, this form a cluster of encroachments in the forest. The area in terms of hectares is small because of the uneven distribution of land parcels in terms of hectares. This is a cause of concern as the parcels in which encroachments are done are rendered useless for any forestation activities and have a high likelihood of further degradation over time.

A similar trend is seen in the other two land categories as well. The percentage of encroachment in terms of area (hectares) is 67.37% and in terms of parcels is 98.08% for the revenue wasteland category. However for the barren and uncultivable land category there is a slight shift in trend where we see the percentage of encroachment in terms of area (hectares) is 86.19% while the percentage of encroachment in terms of area is 95.18%. This is due to the reason that the land in the barren and uncultivable category is superficially divided into a huge number of parcels in terms of area where most of the land in terms of area is less than a hectare.

Status of Vegetation

Figure – Vegetation type by land classification in terms of area (ha)

The above graph depicts the vegetation status of the land in terms of area; in spite of only 3.77% of encroachment in the forest land, almost 261 hectares of the forest land has been degraded and 426 hectares are only sparsely vegetated while well vegetation is found on 20.9% of land.

This is due to the honeycombing of parcels in the forest land and the large single unit parcel sizes on those lands. On the other hand, we see that although the level of encroachment is very high on barren and uncultivable land the well vegetated land is almost at par with the forest land which proves the assumption of the superficial distribution of land parcels in terms of area in the barren and uncultivable land category. This also justifies the assumption of leaving out the parcels below 0.4 hectares in size from the purview of our survey.

Village Data Conclusion:

The amount of encroachments in Dodawali is covering a large part of the common lands, in total 74,24% of the land is encroached upon. This is evident, especially in the Revenue Wasteland and the Barren and Uncultivable category. The reason for this, as stated above, is that the forest lands are located on the upper slopes of the hills. Therefore, the effort that is needed to turn the forest land into agriculture land is high, and secondly the quality of the land, thereby the productivity of the land, is lower that the Revenue Wasteland and the Barren and Uncultivable lands. Out of the 63 parcels of forest land surveyed only 17 parcels were encroached upon (26.98%). In comparison, the Revenue Wasteland has, in terms of parcels, 51 out of 52 surveyed parcels were encroached and of the Barren and Uncultivable land 79 out of 83 parcels were encroached. This makes the percentage of encroachments in both categories close to 100% (98% and 95%). In effect, there is only a very limited amount of village common land left for grazing, fodder collection and for collection of fire wood, and has led to further degradation in all land categories. Thereby, continuously increasing the difficulty for the poorest households to make ends meet. One of the major reasons behind the problems with encroachment in the common land is tied to the government policies of regularization. The state policy permits the regularization of encroachment done before Oct. 1980, but more often than not, it supports the demand for the privatization of encroached land regardless of the period they were done.¹⁵¹

In all of the categories, the land deemed to be degraded or sparsely vegetated amount to a large majority of the total amount of land. There are many reasons for this; (1) the increase in population and livestock, (2) change in rain falls, (3) open grazing and forestry on the common land, (4) loss of community norms towards the maintenance of the common lands. It is likely that all of the mentioned points are contributing to the further degradation of the common land. The forest land in Dodawali, Mutta Gatta hills, is under the Ubeshvar Forest Department and is not protected. Although, there are two plots set aside for JFM by Seva Mandir, the villagers are collecting both fodder and timber from the forest, throughout the year. In relation to the increase in population, more resources are needed to make ends meet and the result has been a sharp degradation of the forest land in Dodawali during the last 10-15 years.

Interview Findings:

The interview in Dodawali was conducted with a group of six villagers, all elder members of the community and all from an agricultural/livestock dependent household. During the interview a social map was drawn of the village to indicate land categories, water sources and development efforts.

There is a fairly good understanding of where and what are the areas of the common land, as the government has set the boundaries recently and marked it by a boundary wall. There is no regulation or the rules on the usage and there are no special rules of usage during droughts or summer seasons. The villagers practise open grazing on the pasture land all through the year and there is no organized grass harvesting or areas left for growing grass. In this sense the concept of open-access from Hardin applies well to the CPR in Dodawali, the only exception is the exclusion of non-village members.

Dodawali has a very old and still ongoing conflict with four nearby villages; Surana, Karnali, Pipliya and Kundala, the conflict is stretching back to the times of local kings and minor wars, before the British colonial period. Now the conflict is focused on the access and rights of the forest land. According to the villagers there are no internal conflicts in Dodawali over resources. Although, the conflict is partly historical by nature it is now bound to the lack of forest resources in the neighbouring villages. The conflict seems to have little prospect of resolution, both due to its embedded status in the local culture but mainly due to the general lack of natural resources in the area. The people from Dodawali seemed unwilling to seek resolution as they saw the conflict as their right being violated and the outsiders as trespassers on their land.

The local authority for rules and regulations for the CPR lies with the Patwari. The government does not interfere with the local rules and management of the land, but at the same time there is no efficient rules of conduct set out from the village institutions. The village does not hold any meetings concerning the maintenance of the CPRs, but in relation to the proposed JFM there is a FPC¹⁵² that meets every 2^nd month and discusses the progress of the JFM. The CPRs in Dodawali is mainly used for grazing and collection of wood and within the JFM-site there is still ongoing tree felling and grazing. The initiative to form the FPC and create a JFM site mainly came from Seva Mandir and there was no meeting conducted by the village regarding the forming of a FPC or the JFM, all meetings concerning initiation of the JFM was set up by Seva Mandir. Now that the committee is formed and working and the site for JFM is set up, there is a generally good interest from the villagers towards the JFM.

The Patwari, as stated, has the responsibility of setting the fines and penalties for land grapping and to report encroachments, but according to some of the villagers there has not been paid a single fine for encroachment in over 10 years. Even though, the evidence of encroachment is significant in the data collected, there is no real effort to approach this problem by the community. Some stated during the interview that no one takes any action towards the encroachers and that there are many cases of corruption and bribery to the government officials from both Revenue- and Forest Department. The villager stated that, nobody wants to be the one who disturbs the harmony of the community. This indicates the villagers have not been able to form functioning local organisations in accordance with Ostrom´s theory, the main efforts have come from external actors (Seva Mandir) and the fact that no fines have been paid over the last decade, despite of the massive encroachments, as well as the statement that no one is willing to act on the encroachment problem out of fear of creating an internal conflict in the village, could indicate that the community is indeed trapped in Hardin´s dilemma.

The management of the village commons is mainly done on the JFM site, where plantation efforts have been carried out with Bamboo and Mango. Only the water sources are maintained, this is done by both the government and the community. The government set five tube wells and 13 hand pumps in the village. Additionally, there are 20 dug wells and a good number of check dams and anicuts in the village, and these are all maintained by the community, and cleaned of silt every two years in the autumn when the anicuts are dry.

During droughts the livestock will be roaming to nearby areas to find water and furthermore the government provides a water tank for household water usage. Other than that, the villagers will dig new and deeper wells in search for water in droughts. There are no access or usage restrictions on common water sources during drought. In droughts mainly fodder in the form of grass will be cultivated, or there will be no farming at all, due to the lack of water. Consummation needs are covered by purchasing the products from the market; the state government will provide some financial aid in this regard.

4. Dodawali conclusion:

The knowledge of the village commons is clear and the boundaries have changed little over time. This was indicated by the elder members of the community and their significant and detailed knowledge of the village. Although there is severe problems with encroachments on both the village common land and the government land the official boundaries are well known. There is open access to all the Commons, although only for village members. This access is being contested by the conflict with the neighbouring villages over the access to the natural resources. It is not the open access term of Hardin but there is little to no restrictions on extraction, even during droughts, on any of the CPRs. In other words, internally there is a clear understanding of the boundaries but externally there is uncertainty and conflict over the access and boundaries.

In addition, there is a set of management rules related to the JFM site, where grazing and timber collection is illegal. Although, there are problems with upholding these “new” social norms and open grazing is present on the site. During droughts the Rajasthan Government supplies the village with additional fodder products from a government store at low prices, and this does take some of the pressure off the village commons.

The local institution in Dodawali is relatively weak concerning the management of the CPRs, and has done only very little to prevent further encroachments on the land. In addition to the high level of encroachment, it must be concluded that the villagers’ participation in the local governance is only minor and without much effect so far. As seen in Ramaj, the local authorities could very likely be involved in the encroachments through power and influence or being encroachers themselves.

The villagers generally seem unwilling to resolve the encroachment issue, and prioritised community harmony over evicting the trespassers. This could indicate that a majority of the households, or at least the powerful ones, are encroaching on the commons and in effect they view the CPRs more as sections of private property. This is also due to the overall age of the encroachments, many being over 25 years old. Another issue is the traditional right to inherit the land owned by the farther and thereby enhances the view of private property. As stated, there are no internal conflicts and in accordance with Hardin this could be due to the perception of the Commons as mostly private lands.

As indicated by the high level of encroachments, there is very little effective monitoring of the lands and very little effort is made by the local governance to remove encroachers from the Common. In contract the villagers keep a very close eye on outsiders coming into their area. This is mainly due to the lack of resources available. From the government officials there is also only little effort to resolve the encroachment problem. The fact that no fine has been effectively collected for encroachment related to the very significant presence observed in the field indicate an extremely weak monitoring by the local governance institution as well as a very low accountability towards the rules towards the CPRs. As stated by Ostrom, with the lack of guarantied sanctions towards rule violators, it will be very hard to have an effective local institution. The norms regarding the JFM site is having a better foothold in the village, but is still broken on a regular basis. As stated, there is no real sanction system in Dodawali, and it is obviously having a negative effect on the behavioural norms regarding Commons.

This lack of sanctions towards rule/norm breaking in the CPRs brings about a feeling of apathy in the community. The villagers know that no or only very little action will be taken towards the encroachers, and they feel incapable of taking action against more powerful and influential members of the community themselves. In addition, this trend is breaking down the community solidarity, which in turn could make future development work more difficult.

The conflict resolution will take place within the Panchayat when they arise. In these situations the resolution is both cheap, in that it takes place locally and within the community, and easy to access and participate in for the community. Although, there is no inter-village conflict in Dodawali but when the conflict between Dodawali and the neighbouring villages is brought into account, there is very little effort for conflict resolution. In other words, the tools for cheap and easily accessible conflict resolution, in accordance with Ostrom, are there in Dodawali, but it is not utilized.

The only management that seemed to be working well was the efforts in maintaining the water sources and cleaning them of slit to keep them functioning. The JFM is fairly new and it is expected that it will take some time to adjust. Although, there seemed to be a general goodwill towards the JFM programme and plantation efforts is being done by the community. Although, there are a number of illegal activities within the JFM site, very little action is taken against any rule breaking.