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258 
 
litmus test for the Confederation’s decision to continue sending the volunteers. 
Shanibov, however, did not refrain to confess his pessimism over the course of the 
meeting.
622
 
During the talks, Shevardnadze mainly criticised the role of ‘mercenaries’ 
of the Confederation in Abkhaz issue. In an interview he defined the Confederation 
as:  
“on their merits, the actions of its leadership can only be described as 
international terrorism reeking of fascism. 
The Confederation is carrying out aggression and is interfering in our 
internal affairs from the territory of those republics. Radio transmitters 
coordinating combat operations in Abkhazia are operating over there. It is 
from there that gunmen come to murder our citizens and orders are issued to 
sow terror in our capital. And all Georgians who are citizens of those 
republics have been declared hostages.”
623
 
 
The Moscow meeting concluded with a stillborn agreement of 4 September 
under the signs of Yeltsin, Shevardnadze, Ardzinba, and the leaders of the krays 
and oblasts bordering the North Caucasus.
624
 
The principal aspect of the agreement was the reaffirmation of the territorial 
integrity of Georgia. The implementation of a cease-fire on 5 September, disarming 
and withdrawal of illegal armed forces active in Abkhazia, and the reduction of the 
Georgian armed forces to a number sufficient to prevent the sabotage of railways 
and other important installations were also agreed. The agreement also provided for 
the resumption in Sukhum of governmental functions by legitimate authorities of 
                                                                                                                                        
621
 “Volunteers from North Caucasus returning home from Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1478, C2/3, 5 
September 1992. 
622
 “Mountain Peoples’ Confederation seeks to unite Caucasus,” SWB SU/1477, C2/2, 4 September 
1992. 
623
 “Shevardnadze interviewed on unrest in Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1476, C1/3, 3 September 1992. 
624
 For the full text of the agreement see, SWB SU/1478, C2/1, 5 September 1992. 

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259 
 
Abkhazia by 15 September 1992, and called on the UN and CSCE to support the 
principles of the agreement. 
Shevardnadze said, “if we do not manage to implement the accords that 
have been reached, the Caucasus will turn into a second Lebanon.”
625
 The cease-
fire, however, was never fully implemented. The Georgian side blamed the Abkhaz 
for the lack of willingness to implement the agreement, and for attacking the 
positions vacated by the Georgian troops. In addition, Shevardnadze insisted on the 
attitudes of the volunteers of the Confederation. His main concern was the removal 
of those volunteers from Abkhazia. Therefore at the third round of negotiations 
which began, on 15 September in Adler, the Georgian side has set a ten-day grace 
to the Abkhazian leadership for the withdrawal of the volunteers of the 
Confederation. They warned the Abkhaz that, when the deadline expired, the 
military command would retain the right to ensure the withdrawal of the 
uncontrolled, illegal armed detachments from Abkhazia using all possible 
means.
626
  
In response, the Abkhaz authorities stressed that the Georgians did not 
withdraw their troops as agreed and that they consistently violated the cease-fire. 
Later, Ardzinba clarified the issue of volunteers by saying “the withdrawal of 
confederation units is possible only after the forces of the State Committee leave 
Abkhazia.”
627
 
 
                                                 
625
 “Press conference: Ardzinba expresses doubts about document,” SWB SU/1478, C2/2, 5 
September 1992. 
626
 “Cease-fire agreed at meeting of control commission,” SWB SU/1488, C1/1, 17 September 1992. 
627
 “Abkhazian leader on need for cease-fire,” SWB SU/1505, C1/2, 7 October 1992. 

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260 
 
In those days in order to pressurise the Confederation, the Russian 
authorities arrested Shanibov on 23 September.
628
 He had been accused of 
encouraging ‘international disharmony’ by signing a document on forming armed 
detachments to be send to Abkhazia. Nevertheless, the demonstrations with the 
participation of thousands in late September in Nalchik
629
 forced Russians to turn a 
blind eye when Shanibov escaped arrest and appeared in Nalchik before the crowds 
on 28 September.
630
 
 
Shanibov’s escape made the internal strife within the Russian Federation on 
the policies towards the North Caucasus more evident. While Yeltsin and Kozyrev 
were in favour of the policies for supporting Shevardnadze, the Russian Military 
and some other groups such as Sergei Baburin’s
631
 were less inclined to pressurise 
Abkhazia in favor of Shevardnadze. In this context, Chairman of the Defence and 
Security Committee of Russian Parliament, Sergey Stepashin accused Russia’s 
                                                 
628
 “Head of Caucasian Mountain Peoples under investigation,” SWB SU/1495, i, 25 September 
1992. 
629
 “Demonstrations in Kabarda-Balkaria support mountainmen’s leader,” SWB SU/1497, C2/2, 28 
September 1992. Following the deaths, the president of Kabardin-Balkaria, Valeriy Kokov 
introduced a state of emergency lasting for a period of two months on 27
th
 September. But after the 
talks between government and the leaders of the Congress of the Kabardin People, this decree was 
suspended next day. See “State of emergency declared in Kabarda-Balkaria; Fighting continues,” 
SWB SU/1498, B/4, 29 September 1992. 
630
 Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts,” 50-1. “Nalchik demonstration continues; situation relatively calm,” 
SWB SU/1500, B/2, 1 October 1992. 
631
 Baburin was elected to the Russian Parliament in 1990 with the support of Democratic Russia 
movement. However, in the parliament he did not affiliate himself with the democrats and instead 
organised a fraction of deputies called “Russia”. Then in order to unite the nationalist-minded 
statists, he formed ROS Movement (Rossiskaya Obschchenarodnogo Soyuza) in October 1991. This 
organization blamed the forces that come to power in August 1991 for leading the country to social, 
economic, and geopolitical catastrophe. The program of the ROS called for organization of a new 
social force of civil patriotic unity to prevent this catastrophe and help the rebirth of Russia. In the 
autumn of 1992, his group joined the National Salvation Front (Front Natsionalnogo Spaseniya) 
which called for revolutionary overthrow of the “provisional occupation regime”. 

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