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261 
 
law-enforcement agencies by acting abominably and, actually made it possible for 
Shanibov to flee from custody.
632
 
 
Following the successful Abkhaz offensive with the support of the 
Confederation forces to Gagra in October, Kitovani clarified the Georgian State 
Council’s position that Georgia must be a unitary state in which there was no place 
for any type of autonomous area. In a departure from his earlier position, on 3 
December Shevardnadze stated before the Parliament that a peaceful solution to the 
conflict in Abkhazia was no longer possible, only the military means could solve 
the issue and that this would have to happen soon. 
Most of the 1993 saw a military stand off with the two forces facing each 
other across the River Gumista, to the north of Sukhum. During which, the Abkhaz 
continued to consolidate their strength and positions over the early summer as 
Shevardnadze’s troubles continued unabated in Mingrelia, and towards the end of 
July 1993, it looked as if just one more push was needed for them to take Tiflis. 
In this period the support and the presence of the Confederation troops or 
the volunteers, which Georgians named as the ‘mercenaries’ was apparent. 
Shevardnadze, most of the time, blamed Russian ‘military circles’ of supporting the 
Abkhaz. In his official telegram to Yeltsin in March 1993 he stated that: 
“particularly difficult situation had arisen after a number of actions were 
carried out in Abkhazia by forces known to Yeltsin. As a result thousands 
of Russian citizens acting as mercenaries and also acting Russian 
                                                 
632
 After the mid-1992, a policy shift occurred in Moscow, which has been described by Mohiaddin 
Mesbahi as a switch from a Euro-Atlanticist to a Euroasianist perspective. Russian policy turned 
back toward a conservative “Great Russian” approach. See, Mohiaddin Mesbahi (eds.), 1994. 
Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and Internationsl Dynamics, 
Gainesville: University Press of California, and “Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus,” 1993. Central Asian Survey, 12(2): 181-215. 

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servicemen had been directly involved in military actions against 
Georgia.”
633
  
 
On 17 March 1993, the Georgian parliament adopted a law on mercenaries. 
According to this law henceforth criminal proceedings would be instituted against 
mercenaries who participated in the armed conflicts on the territory of Georgia. 
Terrorists would be deprived of their freedom for from 10 to 15 years or be shot, 
depending on the degree of their guilt.
634
 
Despite the Georgian accusations, the Confederation, never did hesitate to 
declare its support to Abkhazia, but in all cases it openly and strongly rejected the 
Georgian pretensions of the Russian support to the Confederation. Because it 
seems probable that, with the help of Abkhazia, the Confederation recovered the 
lost prestige during the Osetian-Ingush conflict. After its success in Abkhazia, the 
Confederation engaged widespread support among the North Caucasian peoples. In 
addition to the inclusion of Akki, Dargin, Lezgi, Rutul, Karachays, Nogays, and 
Kumuks even the Cossacks participated in the work of the Confederation as 
observers. 
This caused the increasing of the Russian interest towards the conflict and 
the North Caucasus in general. Despite the conclusion of a cease-fire in the 
Georgian-Russian summit in Moscow on 14 May 1993, the armed clashes 
intensified once more in July. On 2 July, the Abkhazian parliament asked Yeltsin to 
force the Georgian authorities to leave their forces from Abkhazia. At the same 
time it issued a call to Shanibov for help. Shamil Basayev, the Confederation’s 
                                                 
633
 “Shevardnadze protests to Yeltsin on Abkhazia but says he would meet him,” SWB SU/1641, 
B/10, 19 March 1993. 
634
 “Georgian Parliament passes law on mercenaries,” SWB SU/1642, B/19, 20 March 1993. 

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263 
 
troops commander in Abkhazia responded this call by ordering combat readiness in 
response to the escalation of combat operations on 4 July. The next day, at a 
session of its Presidential Council held in Nalcik, the Confederation announced a 
total mobilization of volunteers for fighting in Abkhazia against the Georgian 
troops.
635
 
Thereupon, the press center of the Georgian parliament released a statement 
by the parliamentary collegium and express the hope that the peoples of the North 
Caucasus would not be provoked by any appeals and intervene to aggravate the 
conflict and pose a threat the whole Caucasus region.
636
 
In addition, Shevardnadze described the Confederation’s decision as a 
‘serious trouble’. Moreover with his special envoy Aleksandr Kavsadze (the 
chairman of the Georgian human rights and inter-ethnic relations committee), he 
sent a letter to the Russian Deputy Premier Shakhray, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, 
Security Minister Barannikov, and Procurator General Stepankov on 6 July. In this 
letter, he condemned the decisions of the Confederation and pointed out that “such 
actions by the confederation is nothing other than rude interference in the internal 
affairs of a sovereign state. Moreover, it is an undisguised aggression against 
Georgia.” He appealed these Russian officials “to take all measures to stop the 
illegal infiltration of Russian citizens representing this organization as well as 
transportation of military equipment to the conflict zone, because a general 
Caucasian war is becoming a reality.”
637
 
                                                 
635
 “Caucasian peoples mobilize to fight for Abkhazia,” SWB SU/1734, B/7, 7 July 1993. 
636
 “Confederation troops on alert; Georgia asks North Caucasus not to intervene,” SWB SU/1733, 
B/8, 6 July 1993. 
637
 “Georgia appeals to Russia to halt forces from Caucasus Confederation,” SWB SU/1737, B/7, 10 
July 1993. 

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