Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

h. 
Core Technology of JTF 1-79 
The core technology of an organization refers to how the organization 
accomplishes its assigned tasks with the technical systems they have in place. The 
development of the mission order for JTF 1-79 followed a similar process to the one 
described in the Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Plans and Policy: 

---

139 
Figure 37.
Task Architecture of JTF 1-79 (Joint Pub 5-00.2, 1999, p. IX-15) 
2. 
Phase I: Planning, Preparation, and Rehearsals 
The complexities of planning a rescue, the scale of which had never before been 
undertaken, were huge. Tactically conducting a rescue in a twenty-seven acre compound 
consisting of more than sixteen buildings holding upwards of 67 possible hostages at five 
different locations guarded by a force numbering more than 150, which in turn was 
supported by bands of armed zealot irregulars, was daunting. Coupled with the above 
were a hostile (or at least questionable) government status and an unpredictable civilian 
population that was in the throes of a social revolution. Compounding the problem was 
the fact that the rescue objective was located in a congested urban center more than 1,600 
miles from the nearest American military base. The American Embassy was located 
almost dead center in the capital city, which held the potential to be very nasty hornet’s 
nest, once disturbed. 
In a nutshell, the situation was more challenging than any exercise, or 
series of “what if’s” problem-solving intellectual excursions ever 
conducted by REDCOM, Blue Light or Delta, or faced by the Israeli 
Defense Forces or the German CT-unit GSFG-9 (Lennahan, 1998, pp. 30-
31). 
To set up a rescue force that could accomplish the mission, the JTF conducted 
mission analysis processes in order to produce the operations order (OPORD). The core 
technology within the JTF was simple in order to develop and produce the output of the 
order. Once this master plan was approved, it was modified and improved as new 
intelligence surfaced throughout the hostage ordeal. 

---

140 
Once the master operations order (OPORD) was approved by the NCA, the JTF 
would wait for their “on order” execution call to conduct the operation. In the meantime, 
the plan continued to be refined and modified by developing detailed mission essential 
tasks list (METL) and joint METL responsible for focusing the specific elements within 
the organization. The METL and JMETL would serve a critical element in the core 
technology of the organization, providing a frame of reference for mission focus and 
success criteria. Without these lists of tasks to focus the organization, the mission could 
not succeed. 
The orders process for JTF 1-79 followed the standard mission analysis format for 
the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The following diagram describes the 
sequential nature for the planning process. 
Military Decision Making 
Process
MISSION RECEIVED
STAFF ACTIONS
INFO TO CDR
STAFF
EST
MISSION ANALYSIS 
PROPOSED RESTATED MSN
COA DEVELOPMENT
COA ANALYSIS, 
COMPARISON, 
RECOMMENDATION
PREP PLAN/ 
ORDER/FRAGO
ISSUE PLAN/ 
ORDER/FRAGO
MSN REC’D BY 
SUB UNITS
EXECUTION
CDR ACTIONS
INFO TO STAFF
MSN ANALYSIS 
RESTATED MSN 
CDR’S GUIDANCE
COA DEVELOPMENT/ 
ANALYSIS
COA COMPARISON 
AND DECISION
PLAN/ORDER/ 
FRAGO APPROVAL
CDR’S
EST
Figure 38.
Author’s Representation of the MDMP Process(FM 101-5, 1997, p. 5-2) 
During the mission analysis phase of the operation, several mission-planning cells 
were developed to come up with different courses of action (COAs) on how to infiltrate 
the raiding force into Tehran and into the U.S. Embassy undetected. These COA 
working cells or “option teams” were compartmentalized into different buildings adjacent 

---

141 
to the JTF; they were isolated from one another in order to keep one plan from being 
influenced by the ideas of another planning group.
The option teams worked imaginatively and aggressively from 13 through 18 
November. The courses of action examined included overland approaches from each of 
the neighboring countries. Helicopter launches from each, maritime infiltration via the 
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and both air-land and parachute entries were 
considered. The teams included a person familiar with the logistic nuances of the 
possible options and launch environments, plus officers familiar with the mobility and 
operational needs of the strike force (Lennahan, R., 1998, p. 40). 
The complexity and uniqueness of command and control (C2) for this operation 
required a robust and highly reliable and secure communications network, from the NCA 
all the way down to the operators on the ground. “Communications had reached a new 
high in technical achievement with the satellite radio systems” (Kyle, 1995, p. 225).
Rod Lennahan describes in his book 
Crippled Eagle
, four communication networks that 
were established prior to the operation.
Command Net Alpha 
provided the link from the 
NCA/CJCS in Washington to JTF Headquarters at Wadi Kena and to the alternate 
location at Masirah. This was the primary net that connected all the moving pieces. It 
included satellite, UHF and HF frequencies, plus telephone connectivity back to 
Washington.
Command Net Bravo
provided command and control from JTF 
Headquarters to the various force elements, regardless of where they were. This was the 
NSA network, which ran from Fort Meade through landline to the JTF, to the JTF 
headquarters in Wadi Kena. This net also provided information on all early warning 
SIGINT hits from Iran, and forwarded information to the elements on the ground.
Command Net Charlie
provided intra-theater command and control, and served as a key 
link between those force elements not possessing the UHF satellite capability. The CIA 
operated this network; it fed inputs from their regional headquarters in Virginia, to the 
JTF headquarters in Wadi Kena. Finally, 
Command Net Delta 
provided the basic 
redundant capability and could serve as a primary path when desired. This was the 
emergency net to fill in for any of the first three that went down (Lennahan, 1998, pp. 
120-122). In addition, operators carried portable HF radios. The overall communications 
platform relied on UHF satellites as the principle means. 

---

142 
Even though this highly technical communications system and network was in 
place, the operational restrictions and OPSEC requirements impeded the proper use of 
this designed network. Communicators on the ground at DESERT ONE and aviators in 
flight could not effectively communicate with any of these nets. The redundancy in 
networks was there, but it did not allow room for the connectivity between elements.
Other examples of the technical systems critical to the operation were the tactical light 
beacons being used for the first time by the USAF Combat Control Teams to light up the 
airfield; motorcycles for speed during emplacement; the use of NVGs by the pilots as 
well as the assaulters; the use of minesweeping helicopters with internal fuel blivets for 
their lift capability and range; the use of new Forward Area Refueling Points (FARP) 
systems out of tanker aircraft into helicopters, and the use of special cutting tools and 
demolition charges for entry access into the embassy grounds by Delta operators. 
Overall, in this first phase of the operation the JTF had to establish a raiding force 
capable of assaulting the objective successfully, something that had never been done 
before by a U.S. counterterrorist force. It also had to create and assemble an air 
component composed of fixed wing and helicopter aircraft to support the operation.
They had to be able to fly long range, at night through mountainous high-risk 
environment and arrive on target with surgical precision. They had to be able to conduct 
refueling operations from KC-130 and C-130 tanker aircrafts, and they had to be heavy-
lift type aircraft in order to support the fuel and personnel load requirements. In addition, 
they had to be capable of landing and taking off from clandestine airstrips under blackout 
conditions and conduct refueling operations with helicopters. Intelligence requirements 
generated the need for two survey teams to conduct clandestine reconnaissance; two 
teams had to be assembled and infiltrated undetected into Iran to conduct reconnaissance 
prior to the operation. A combat search and rescue element had to be formed to provide 
coverage throughout the operations, including the reconnaissance missions. In addition, 
the Ranger security force had their set of collective tasks regarding the airfield seizure 
and blocking positions along the roads at DESERT ONE.