Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

4. 
Phase III: Post Assault 
The operation never made it past DESERT ONE. All remaining personnel were 
transloaded into the remaining C-141 aircrafts to return to their home stations, without 
ever attempting a follow up rescue. Planning for a second rescue continued for the 
remaining part of the year, but no follow on rescue was ever attempted. Eventually, all 
hostages were released minutes after President Reagan was inaugurated into office in 
1980. The total duration for the hostage siege was 444 days. 
D. 
PRINCIPLES FOR HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS 
1. Intelligence 
Extreme OPSEC measures were detrimental to the overall execution of the 
operation. None of the operational elements was allowed to speak to one another or to 
take notes and keep written products during the planning process. OPSEC measures were 
completely violated at DESERT ONE, by abandoning mission capable aircraft with 
classified intelligence documents and communications cryptology still inside, without 
destroying any of it prior to exfiltration.
The complexity of this operation required a high degree of intelligence assets and 
personnel to process it. Initially the JTF only had one assigned intelligence officer; later 
three more intelligence officers were added. Still, the ad-hoc nature of the JTF and the 
lack of coordination with other intelligence agencies coupled with inter-agency rivalries, 
proved to be fatal in coming up with an executable plan. The lack of intelligence and 
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American operatives inside Tehran (pilot team) had already commandeered these vehicles. 

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HUMINT sources in Iran added to the environmental uncertainty of the JTF. Two survey 
teams were launched by clandestine means prior to the operation: one survey team with a 
combat controller from the Air Force to survey the landing strip at DESERT ONE and 
place landing lights, and another survey team to survey the actual grounds in Tehran and 
prepare a welcoming committee with vehicles. Both of these operations were highly 
dangerous and proved to be very successful, but the intelligence collected during these 
operations was not disseminated. 
The weather conditions were critical in adding uncertainty during the operation, 
specifically for the pilots, increasing the difficulty of flying under such conditions. The 
uncertainty of the condition in which the hostages were in as well as an increasingly 
hostile attitude by the government of Iran, added to the volatility of the environment, thus 
precipitating the President’s decision to act. No one really knew the condition of the 
hostages. The lack of contingency rehearsals added uncertainty during the infiltration 
phase. The inexperience of the Marine pilots being placed in an uncertain environment 
that was inevitably hostile, and expected to conduct a high-risk, high skill level task with 
little or no preparation, was a recipe for failure.