Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

4. Deception 
The deception plan for the operation was non-existent. Deception for JTF 1-79 
was only seen as a means of survivability, by camouflaging helicopters and utilizing 
minesweeper equipment in order to eliminate their signature and preserve OPSEC. The 
only resemblance of any deception plan was used by the advance party elements already 
in country, pre-staging the vehicles to be used by the assault force. Their deception plan 
was based on survivability and not linked to a surprise attack. With advance 

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reconnaissance elements already operating around the target area, it would have been a 
perfect opportunity to devise a distraction or some sort of a ruse to aid in the covering the 
assault force’s infiltration. Deception allows operational leverage for the assault force, 
and it gives them the opportunity to surprise the enemy, based on accurate intelligence.
None of these factors were at play during the operation.
E. CONCLUSION 
At the conclusion of Operation EAGLE CLAW, and towards the end of 1980, the 
Department of Defense established the Holloway Commission
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in an effort to examine 
what went wrong with the operation and make improvements and recommendations to 
prevent another disaster of this magnitude. Twenty-three issues were identified and 
investigated as a result of the operation, and eleven of these were categorized as having a 
direct impact on the outcome of the operation. Colonel James H. Kyle lists four of these 
findings as critical in the failure of the operation. First, alternate helicopter pilots (USAF 
Special Operations or Rescue Service H-53 pilots) should have been selected to team 
with Marines. Second, helicopter aborts—pilots lacked certain knowledge vital to 
reaching an informed decision whether to abort or to proceed. Third, enemy radar 
threat—helicopter pilots based low-level tactics on erroneous intelligence reports.
Fourth, helicopter communications—pilots lacked secure modes of communication to 
receive vital mission information (Kyle, 1995, p. 365). In the end, the Holloway 
Commission determined that the overriding cause for the mission abort was an 
unexpected helicopter failure rate and low-visibility flight conditions en route to Desert-
One (p. 365). 
While overconfidence in one’s abilities seems to be one of the most 
overwhelming common denominators in most of SOF failures, in the case of DESERT 
ONE it was the lack of confidence of the helicopter pilots that caused the decision to 
abort. The inexperience of the Marine pilots flying the helicopters, the mechanical 
failures of the helicopters, and the reluctance of the pilots to continue and complete the 
mission, were the root problems of why the operation was called off. Colonel Beckwith 
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The Holloway Commission, named after its chairman retired Admiral James L. Holloway III, was 
created to examine the organization, planning, coordination, direction, and control of the Iran hostage 
rescue mission with an eye towards recommending improvements in these areas for the future (Kyle, 1995, 
p. 363). 

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did not exhibit overconfidence when it came time to stick to his abort criteria of no less 
than six helicopters, based on labor and the tasks to be accomplished by his operators.
This is actually the overall theme for Colonel Kyle’s book 
The Guts to Try
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.
At the end 
of the book, he mentions that the mission could have been completed if the helicopter 
pilots had had the guts to try.