Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

2. Surprise 
The element of surprise during EAGLE CLAW was never considered as a 
principle to provide leverage and achieve operational superiority over the enemy.
Throughout all phases of the planned operation, there was an ever-present feeling of 
wishful thinking, hoping that each stage of the phased infiltration would work and that 
none of the elements would be compromised.
Surprise was lost as soon as the rescue elements landed on DESERT ONE.
Immediately upon arrival, the Ranger security element had to open fire on a passenger 
bus, creating large fires and explosions in the middle of the desert; surprise was 
impossible to recover after that one incident. In addition, a vehicle infiltration into the 
target area, in the middle of Tehran, is considered an emergency deliberate assault. Even 
if everything had gone as planned, the element of surprise would have been lost 
immediately preventing the assault force to take any advantage of it.

---

146 
The principles of hostage rescue operations are very closely tied together; they 
depend on one another in order for the operation to work. The proper intelligence was 
not available to provide a good deception plan that would allow the assault force to 
surprise the enemy. This concept was gravely misunderstood by JTF 1-79.
3. Operator’s 
Skills 
One of JTF 1-79’s biggest failures was the inability to match the technical 
systems to the operator’s skills. In reality, General Vaught misused the robust 
communications package due to the OPSEC restrictions and the inordinate control of 
mission execution. The new systems for the helicopters and the lack of experience of the 
Marine pilots caused great uncertainty, especially flying with night vision devices 
(NVDs); pilots complained of vertigo and could not see each other through the dust 
clouds. JTF 1-79 failed to anticipate the proper number of aircraft required to conduct 
the operation by not taking into consideration the failure rates for the helicopter force. A 
force of 8 helicopters was launched on mission day from the USS Nimitz, in hopes of 
having 6 helicopters arrive at the target site. By doing a simple probabilistic analysis
65
for the helicopter force, using helicopter data and actual success ratios, we can calculate 
that in order to have 6 operational helicopters at the target site (assuming an optimistic 
80% reliability for each helicopter and a 95% probability of overall success), the JTF 
should have sent at least 10 helicopters. The JTF also failed to anticipate changes in the 
environment by not having contingency plans to respond to the changing weather and 
aircraft mishaps. A fatal error for the rescue operation was that no full dress rehearsals 
took place. “Disparate groups of different units cobbled together in haste attempted to 
synchronize their work literally on the fly” (Carney and Schemmer, 2002, p. 100). The 
very last rehearsal conducted by anyone in the raiding force had taken place three weeks 
prior to the operation. Each element conducted its own rehearsal, but the force never got 
together as a whole. It was assumed that everyone would do his job and get to DESERT 
ONE and to the objective on his own. Many changes were made during the last three 
weeks prior to the operation, especially with the air movement. The communications 
plan between elements was completely flawed; the operators and the C-130’s were the 
65
Taken from the probabilistic analysis conducted by Captain Wayne Hughes, Jr., USN Department 
of Operations Research, Naval Post Graduate School, 8 September 1981, and discussed with Professor 
Giordano in the SO 3410 course during the Spring of 2003. 

---

147 
only elements with secure communications capability. To make matters worse, there was 
no bump plan in place in case of aircraft failure.
The very nature of a hostage rescue operation is a highly technical and complex 
endeavor. It takes specially selected and well-trained individuals who are self-reliant and 
can operate well under pressure. Special Operators cannot be mass-produced overnight; 
it is a long process of training and dedication to reach the level of professionalism 
required by JTF 1-79 personnel. Delta Force had been activated only a few hours prior to 
the hostage situation. Colonel Beckwith was alerted to the hostage situation on his way 
back from Delta’s final culmination and capabilities exercise (CAPEX). This operation 
would be their validation and the opportunity for Colonel Beckwith to show off his new 
force. Each component of the force conducted a series of rehearsals throughout the 
planning phases of the operation. Delta Force conducted over 90 rehearsals. Overall, 
there were only seven combined rehearsals, each involving only a few of the components 
from the rescue force.
The members of the newly formed Delta Force had just been officially certified 
and had tremendous pressure to excel and prove themselves as the world’s number one 
counter terrorist force. On the other hand, the helicopter crews lacked the internal drive 
and pressure to excel. The pilots and crews did not waste any time when it came time to 
abort the operation. They failed to adapt to a complex environment and continue with the 
operation. The pilots for the helicopter force received highly specialized training. Flying 
at night with NVDs still was considered a dangerous operation, one rarely done by any 
aviator. Pilots had to train extensively flying with NVDs. The initial group of helicopter 
pilots had come from the Navy; after several rehearsals, the whole group was disbanded 
due to their inability to fly at night. Col Beckwith and Col Kyle later would recruit 
Marine pilots to replace the Navy pilots. Some would argue that the Marine pilots were 
given the mission only in order to have representatives from each service within the JTF.
The Marine pilots had to go through a train up phase to become familiar with the 
new technology as well as with new helicopters. RH-53D minesweeper helicopters were 
reconfigured and outfitted with fuel blivets for the extended flight to Tehran. Marine 
pilots had to get used to flying these aircraft for extended periods, while under strict radio 

---

148 
silence, limiting their ability to check with one another. The JTF planners overestimated 
the ability of the helicopter pilots in accomplishing the mission. The pilots had trained 
together as a group for a period of only five months with new equipment and helicopters, 
and it was assumed that this training would be enough.
Not only did they not take care of them, but also the strange helicopters 
did not belong to them, they actually used them as “hangar queens”—
cannibalizing them for spare parts (Snook, 2000, p. 137).
Col Beckwith identified this as a critical flaw in the plan in the very early stages 
of the planning phase, but he “wished” the problem away and figured it would eventually 
get resolved. In addition, the assumption was made that since communications would 
only be conducted during emergencies, critical secure satellite communications 
equipment (SATCOM) was removed to reduce weight inside the aircraft. The 
contingency plan for this was a series of signals developed by the crew chiefs (flashing 
lights and hand signals), which were useless in low visibility conditions. The JTF 
overestimated their abilities by not looking back at previous operations and seeing what 
worked then, as in the case of the Son Tay raid ten years prior. They failed to learn from 
previous experiences. 
The fixed wing pilots also received specialized training. The refueling operations 
from KC-130 fuel tankers to helicopters in a clandestine airfield had never been done 
before. Other options were explored, trained for, and tested, as in the case of airborne 
heavy drops with fuel blivets, but these proved too unpredictable. Landing on a desert 
airstrip that had been surveyed five weeks prior, without knowing what condition the 
airstrip was in at the time of arrival, also had a big impact on the skill set and training for 
the pilots.