Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

c. Operator’s 
Skills 
The German authority’s CT capability was in its infancy at the time. The 
Israeli experts in counterterrorism offered help throughout the crisis, but it was refused 
several times. The tactics, techniques, and procedures of all personnel within the rescue 
element were completely below the standard of a seasoned CT national level asset. The 
sniper-observer teams were not properly equipped or trained in target acquisition at 
nighttime, nor did they have communications equipment. Some of the sniper weapons 

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were not even fitted with telescopic sites, and none had infrared or thermal sites (Reeve, 
2000, p. 116). They did not have proper firing positions or direct line of sight with the 
terrorists; instead, the pilots and aircrew were in their way. As the firefight broke out, a 
police officer standing at the base of the air traffic control tower was shot in the head by 
one of the terrorists, as he tried to support the sniper element with a sub machinegun.
Nevertheless, the worst mistake for this element was having only five snipers for eight 
terrorists. After several investigations covering the disaster, it was determined that some 
of the Israeli hostages were killed by the Germans’ erratic gunfire.
The concept of an open-air option to end a hostage siege is a high-risk 
option considered in hostage rescue operations. For this specific reason, it is considered 
only when the skills of the sniper elements are highly effective, and the unit is very 
comfortable with its standard operating procedures responding to contingencies. The 
order should never have been given to open fire once it was determined that there were 
eight and not five terrorists holding the Israelis. The plan should have been aborted and 
another option considered. To make matters worse, the chaos that ensued during the 
firefight and the mad infantry attack by the assault element show a lack of discipline and 
expertise by all in the assault force. The safety of the hostages was of secondary 
importance to the German authorities at the time; the focus was to kill the terrorists. 
Six months after the disaster at the airfield, the Germans vowed they 
would not be taken by surprise again and authorized the creation of the 
Grenzschutzgruppe 9
(GSG-9 or Border Protection Group) counterterrorist unit, which 
was deemed operational in April and was responsible for the success of operation FIRE 
MAGIC in 1977 (see case study D).