Naval postgraduate school monterey, california thesis

2. 
Principles for Hostage Rescue Operations 
a. Intelligence 
Intelligence operations during the hostage siege at the Olympic Village 
were not employed properly. Even though the initial negotiations process was stalled 
during three different occasions successfully, no effort was made by the German 
authorities to exploit this advantage and utilize TECHINT or HUMINT assets during the 
standoff. The German police effectively bought time but did not exploit this advantage.
They attempted to conduct an emergency-deliberate plan of action without considering 
employing TECHINT means first in order to find out the basic information requirements 
inside the target area. They did not know until the execution phase of the operation, that 
there were eight terrorists and not five as had been assumed all along. This was a critical 
failure directly attributed to a lack of intelligence efforts. 
b. Surprise 
The element of surprise was considered by the German police, but did not 
work effectively because of the lack of intelligence about the terrorists and mediocre 
operator’s skills. The German authorities understood that surprise was critical for the 
safe release of the hostages; it was considered during the initial emergency assault, during 
the delivery of food to the apartment, and during the planned ambush at the airfield. No 
HUMINT or TECHINT was employed in the Connollystrasse apartments at the Olympic 
Village to pinpoint how many hostages and terrorists were inside the room. During the 
negotiations process, Manfred Schreiber, the Munich Police Commissioner, was 
concerned only with ending the siege as fast as possible and not drawing out the process 
to gather intelligence. The efforts of the German authorities to control the situation 
throughout all the conversations with the terrorists were opportunities not exploited.