Principles of Morals and

50/Jeremy Bentham
to the primary one. First comes the self-regarding pleasure: then comes
the idea of the pleasure of sympathy, which you suppose that pleasure
of yours will give birth to in the bosom of your friend: and this idea
excites again in yours a new pleasure of sympathy, grounded upon his.
The first plea- sure issuing from your own bosom, as it were from a
radiant point, illuminates the bosom of your friend: reverberated from
thence, it is reflected with augmented warmth to the point from whence
it first proceeded: and so it is with pains.
Nor does this effect depend wholly upon affection. Among near
relations, although there should be no kindness, the pleasures and pains
of the moral sanction are quickly propagated by a peculiar kind of sym-
pathy: no article, either of honour or disgrace, can well fall upon a man,
without extending to a certain distance within the circle of his family.
What reflects honour upon the father, reflects honour upon the son:
what reflects disgrace, disgrace. The cause of this singular and seem-
ingly unreasonable circumstance (that is, its analogy to the rest of the
phenomena of the human mind,) belongs not to the present purpose. It is
sufficient if the effect be beyond dispute.
XXVII. 22. Of a man’s connexions in the way of antipathy, there
needs not any thing very particular to be observed. Happily there is no
primeval and constant source of antipathy in a human nature, as there is
of sympathy. There are no permanent sets of persons who are naturally
and of course the objects of antipathy to a man, as there are who are the
objects of the contrary affection. Sources, however, but too many, of
antipathy, are apt to spring up upon various occasions during the course
of a man’s life: and whenever they do, this circumstance may have a
very considerable influence on the effects of various exciting causes. As
on the one hand, a punishment, for instance, which tends to separate a
man from those with whom he is connected in the way of sympathy, so
on the other hand, one which tends to force him into the company of
those with whom he is connected in the way of antipathy, will, on that
account, be so much the more distressing. It is to be observed, that
sympathy itself multiplies the sources of antipathy. Sympathy for your
friend gives birth to antipathy on your part against all those who are
objects of antipathy, as well as to sympathy for those who are objects of
sympathy to him. In the same manner does antipathy multiply the sources
of sympathy; though commonly perhaps with rather a less degree of
efficacy. Antipathy against your enemy is apt to give birth to sympathy
on your part towards those who are objects of antipathy, as well as to

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/51
antipathy against those who are objects of sympathy, to him.
XXVIII. 23. Thus much for the circumstances by which the effect
of any exciting cause may be influenced, when applied upon any given
occasion, at any given period. But besides these supervening incidents,
there are other circumstances relative to a man, that may have their
influence, and which are co-eval to his birth. In the first place, it seems
to be universally agreed, that in the original frame or texture of every
man’s body, there is a something which, independently of all subse-
quently intervening circumstances, renders him liable to be affected by
causes producing bodily pleasure or pain, in a manner different from
that in which another man would be affected by the same causes. To the
catalogue of circumstances influencing a man’s sensibility, we may there-
fore add his original or radical frame, texture, constitution, or tempera-
ment of body.
XXIX. 24. In the next place, it seems to be pretty well agreed, that
there is something also in the original frame or texture of every man’s
mind, which, independently of all exterior and subsequently intervening
circumstances, and even of his radical frame of body, makes him liable
to be differently affected by the same exciting causes, from what an-
other man would be. To the catalogue of circumstances influencing a
man’s sensibility, we may therefore further add his original or radical
frame, texture, constitution or temperament of mind.
XXX. It seems pretty certain, all this while, that a man’s sensibility
to causes producing pleasure or pain, even of mind, may depend in a
considerable degree upon his original and acquired frame of body. But
we have no reason to think that it can depend altogether upon that frame:
since, on the one hand, we see persons whose frame of body is as much
alike as can be conceived, differing very considerably in respect of their
mental frame: and, on the other hand, persons whose frame of mind is as
much alike as can be conceived, differing very conspicuously in regard
to their bodily frame.
XXXI. It seems indisputable also, that the different sets of a exter-
nal occurrences that may befall a man in the course of his life, will make
great differences in the subsequent texture of his mind at any given
period: yet still those differences are not solely to be attributed to such
occurrences. Equally far from the truth seems that opinion to be (if any
such be maintained) which attributes all to nature, and that which at-
tributes all to education. The two circumstances will therefore still re-
main distinct, as well from one another, as from all others.

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52/Jeremy Bentham
XXXII. Distinct however as they are, it is manifest, that at no pe-
riod in the active part of a man’s life can they either of them make their
appearance by themselves. All they do is to constitute the latent ground-
work which the other supervening circumstances have to work upon
and whatever influence those original principles may have, is so changed
and modified, and covered over, as it were, by those other circumstances,
as never to be separately discernible. The effects of the one influence are
indistinguishably blended with those of the other.
XXXIII. The emotions of the body are received, and with reason, as
probable indications of the temperature of the mind. But they are far
enough from conclusive. A man may exhibit, for instance, the exterior
appearances of grief, without really grieving at all, or at least in any
thing near the proportion in which he appears to grieve. Oliver Cromwell,
whose conduct indicated a heart more than ordinarily callous, was as
remarkably profuse in tears.
5
 Many men can command the external ap-
pearances of sensibility with very little real feeling. The female sex com-
monly with greater facility than the male: hence the proverbial expres-
sion of a woman’s tears. To have this kind of command over one’s self,
was the characteristic excellence of the orator of ancient times, and is
still that of the player in our own.
XXXIV. The remaining circumstances may, with reference to those
already mentioned, be termed secondary influencing circumstances.
These have an influence, it is true, on the quantum or bias of a man’s
sensibility, but it is only by means of the other primary ones. The man-
ner in which these two sets of circumstances are concerned, is such that
the primary ones do the business, while the secondary ones lie most
open to observation. The secondary ones, therefore, are those which are
most heard of; on which account it will be necessary to take notice of
them: at the same time that it is only by means of the primary ones that
their influence can be explained; whereas the influence of the primary
ones will be apparent enough, without any mention of the secondary
ones.
XXXV. 25. Among such of the primitive modifications of the cor-
poreal frame as may appear to influence the quantum and bias of sensi-
bility, the most obvious and conspicuous are those which constitute the
sex. In point of quantity, the sensibility of the female sex appears in
general to be greater than that of the male. The health of the female is
more delicate than that of the male: in point of strength and hardiness of
body, in point of quantity and quality of knowledge, in point of strength

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