Principles of Morals and

48/Jeremy Bentham
sure. The consideration of the profit itself belongs to the head of a man’s
pecuniary circumstances. It is evident, that if by any means a punish-
ment, or any other exciting cause, has the effect of putting it out of his
power to continue in the pursuit of any such occupation, it must on that
account be much the more distressing. A man’s habitual occupations,
though intimately connected in point of causality with the bent of his
inclinations, are not to be looked upon as precisely the same circum-
stance. An amusement, or channel of profit, may be the object of a
man’s inclinations, which has never been the subject of his habitual
occupations: for it may be, that though he wished to betake himself to it,
he never did, it not being in his power: a circumstance which may make
a good deal of difference in the effect of any incident by which he hap-
pens to be debarred from it.
XXV. 20. Under the head of pecuniary circumstances, I mean to
bring to view the proportion which a man’s means bear to his wants: the
sum total of his means of every kind, to the sum total of his wants of
every kind. A man’s means depend upon three circumstances: 1. His
property. 2. The profit of his labour. 3. His connexions in the way of
support. His wants seem to depend upon four circumstances. 1. His
habits of expense. 2. His connexions in the way of burthen. 3. Any
present casual demand he may have. 4. The strength of his expectation.
By a man’s property is to be understood, whatever he has in store inde-
pendent of his labour. By the profit of his labour is to be understood the
growing profit. As to labour, it may be either of the body principally, or
of the mind principally, or of both indifferently: nor does it matter in
what manner, nor on what subject, it be applied, so it produce a profit.
By a man’s connexions in the way of support, are to be understood the
pecuniary assistances, of whatever kind, which he is in a way of receiv-
ing from any persons who, on whatever account, and in whatever pro-
portion, he has reason to expect should contribute gratis to his mainte-
nance: such as his parents, patrons, and relations. It seems manifest,
that a man can have no other means than these. What he uses, he must
have either of his own, or from other people: if from other people, either
gratis or for a price. As to habits of expense, it is well known, that a
man’s desires are governed in a great degree by his habits. Many are the
cases in which desire (and consequently the pain of privation connected
with it) would not even subsist at all, but for previous enjoyment. By a
man’s connexions in the way of burthen, are to be understood whatever
expense he has reason to look upon himself as bound to be at in the

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/49
support of those who by law, or the customs of the world, are warranted
in looking up to him for assistance; such as children, poor relations,
superannuated servants, and any other dependents whatsoever. As to
present casual demand, it is manifest, that there are occasions on which
a given sum will be worth infinitely more to a man than the same sum
would at another time: where, for example, in a case of extremity, a man
stands in need of extraordinary medical assistance: or wants money to
carry on a law-suit, on which his all depends: or has got a livelihood
waiting for him in a distant country, and wants money for the charges of
conveyance. In such cases, any piece of good or ill fortune, in the pecu-
niary way, might have a very different effect from what it would have at
any other time. With regard to strength of expectation; when one man
expects to gain or to keep a thing which another does not, it is plain the
circumstance of not having it will affect the former very differently from
the latter; who, indeed, commonly will not be affected by it at all.
XXVI. 21. Under the head of a man’s connexions in the way of
sympathy, I would bring to view the number and description of the per-
sons in whose welfare he takes such a concern, as that the idea of their
happiness should be productive of pleasure, and that of their unhappi-
ness of pain to him: for instance, a man’s wife, his children, his parents,
his near relations, and intimate friends. This class of persons, it is obvi-
ous, will for the most part include the two classes by which his pecuni-
ary circumstances are affected: those, to wit, from whose means he may
expect support, and those whose wants operate on him as a burthen. But
it is obvious, that besides these, it may very well include others, with
whom he has no such pecuniary connexion: and even with regard to
these, it is evident that the pecuniary dependence, and the union of af-
fections, are circumstances perfectly distinguishable. Accordingly, the
connexions here in question, independently of any influence they may
have on a man’s pecuniary circumstances, have an influence on the ef-
fect of any exciting causes whatsoever. The tendency of them is to in-
crease a man’s general sensibility; to increase, on the one hand, the
pleasure produced by all pleasurable causes; on the other, the pain pro-
duced by all afflictive ones. When any pleasurable incident happens to a
man, he naturally, in the first moment, thinks of the pleasure it will
afford immediately to himself: presently afterwards, however (except in
a few cases, which is not worth while here to insist on) he begins to
think of the pleasure which his friends will feel upon their coming to
know of it: and this secondary pleasure is commonly no mean addition

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