Principles of Morals and



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68/Jeremy Bentham
the name by which it stands distinguished. These we shall have occasion
to distinguish hereafter by the name of criminative circumstances. Other
circumstances again entering into combination with the act and the former
set of circumstances, are productive of still farther consequences. These
additional consequences, if they are of the beneficial kind, bestow, ac-
cording to the value they bear in that capacity, upon the circumstances
to which they owe their birth the appellation of exculpative or extenuative
circumstances: if of the mischievous kind, they bestow on them the ap-
pellation of aggravative circumstances. Of all these different sets of
circumstances, the criminative are connected with the consequences of
the original offence, in the way of production; with the act, and with one
another, in the way of conjunct influence: the consequences of the origi-
nal offense with them, and with the act respectively, in the way of deri-
vation: the consequences of the modified offense, with the criminative,
exculpative, and extenuative circumstances respectively, in the way also
of derivation: these different sets of circumstances, with the consequences
of the modified act or offense, in the way of production: and with one
another (in respect of the consequences of the modified act or offense) in
the way of conjunct influence. Lastly, whatever circumstances can be
seen to be connected with the consequences of the offense, whether di-
rectly in the way of derivation, or obliquely in the way of collateral
affinity (to wit, in virtue of its being connected, in the way of derivation,
with some of the circumstances with which they stand connected in the
same manner) bear a material relation to the offense in the way of evi-
dence, they may accordingly be styled evidentiary circumstances, and
may become of use, by being held forth upon occasion as so many proofs,
indications, or evidences of its having been committed.


Chapter VIII: Of Intentionality
I. So much with regard to the two first of the articles upon which the evil
tendency of an action may depend: viz., the act itself, and the general
assemblage of the circumstances with which it may have been accom-
panied. We come now to consider the ways in which the particular cir-
cumstance of intention may be concerned in it.
II. First, then, the intention or will may regard either of two objects:
1. The act itself: or, 2. Its consequences. Of these objects, that which the
intention regards may be styled intentional. If it regards the act, then the
act may be said to be intentional: if the consequences, so also then may
the consequences. If it regards both the act and consequences, the whole
action may be said to be intentional. Whichever of those articles is not
the object of the intention, may of course be said to be unintentional.
III. The act may very easily be intentional without the consequences;
and often is so. Thus, you may intend to touch a man without intending
to hurt him: and yet, as the consequences turn out, you may chance to
hurt him.
IV. The consequences of an act may also be intentional, without the
act’s being intentional throughout; that is, without its being intentional
in every stage of it: but this is not so frequent a case as the former. You
intend to hurt a man, suppose, by running against him, and pushing him
down: and you run towards him accordingly: but a second man coming
in on a sudden between you and the first man, before you can stop
yourself, you run against the second man, and by him push down the
first.
V. But the consequences of an act cannot be intentional, without the
act’s being itself intentional in at least the first, stage. If the act be not


70/Jeremy Bentham
intentional in the first stage, it is no act of yours: there is accordingly no
intention on your part to produce the consequences: that is to say, the
individual consequences. All there can have been on your part is a dis-
tant intention to produce other consequences, of the same nature, by
some act of yours, at a future time: or else, without any intention, a bare
wish to see such event take place. The second man, suppose, runs of his
own accord against the first, and pushes him down. You had intentions
of doing a thing of the same nature: viz., To run against him, and push
him down yourself; but you had done nothing in pursuance of those
intentions: the individual consequences therefore of the act, which the
second man performed in pushing down the first, cannot be said to have
been on your part intentional.
VI. Second. A consequence, when it is intentional, may either be
directly so, or only obliquely. It may be said to be directly or lineally
intentional, when the prospect of producing it constituted one of the
links in the chain of causes by which the person was determined to do
the act. It may be said to be obliquely or collaterally intentional, when,
although the consequence was in contemplation, and appeared likely to
ensue in case of the act’s being performed, yet the prospect of producing
such consequence did not constitute a link in the aforesaid chain.
VII. Third. An incident, which is directly intentional, may or either
be  ultimately so, or only mediately. It may be said to be ultimately
intentional, when it stands last of all exterior events in the aforesaid
chain of motives; insomuch that the prospect of the production of such
incident, could there be a certainty of its taking place, would be suffi-
cient to determine the will, without the prospect of its producing any
other. It may be said to be mediately intentional, and no more, when
there is some other incident, the prospect of producing which forms a
subsequent link in the same chain: insomuch that the prospect of pro-
ducing the former would not have operated as a motive, but for the
tendency which it seemed to have towards the production of the latter.
VIII. Fourth. When an incident is directly intentional, it may either
be exclusively so, or inexclusively. It may be said to be exclusively in-
tentional, when no other but that very individual incident would have
answered the purpose, insomuch that no other incident had any share in
determining the will to the act in question. It may be said to have been
inexclusively (or concurrently) intentional, when there was some other
incident, the prospect of which was acting upon the will at the same
time.


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