Principles of Morals and

Principles of Morals and Legislation/77
and reflection to the imagined circumstance, as, by discovering to him
the nonexistence, improbability, or immateriality of it, would have ef-
fectually disposed him to prevent the mischievous incident from taking
place.
XIII. In ordinary discourse, when a man does an act of which the
consequences prove mischievous, it is a common thing to speak of him
as having acted with a good intention or, with a bad intention, of his
intention’s being a good one or a bad one. The epithets good and bad are
all this while applied, we see, to the intention: but the application of
them is most commonly governed by a supposition formed with regard
to the nature of the motive. The act, though eventually it prove mischie-
vous, is said to be done with a good intention, when it is supposed to
issue from a motive which is looked upon as a good motive: with a bad
intention, when it is supposed to be the result of a motive which is looked
upon as a bad motive. But the nature of the consequences intended, and
the nature of the motive which gave birth to the intention, are objects
which, though intimately connected, are perfectly distinguishable. The
intention might therefore with perfect propriety be styled a good one,
whatever were the motive. It might be styled a good one, when not only
the consequences of the act prove mischievous, but the motive which
gave birth to it was what is called a bad one. To warrant the speaking of
the intention as being a good one, it is sufficient if the consequences of
the act, had they proved what to the agent they seemed likely to be,
would have been of a beneficial nature. And in the same manner the
intention may be bad, when not only the consequences of the act prove
beneficial, but the motive which gave birth to it was a good one.
XIV. Now, when a man has a mind to speak of your intention as
being good or bad, with reference to the consequences, if he speaks of it
at all he must use the word intention, for there is no other. But if a man
means to speak of the motive from which your intention originated, as
being a good or a bad one, he is certainly not obliged to use the word
intention: it is at least as well to use the word motive. By the supposition
he means the motive; and very likely he may not mean the intention. For
what is true of the one is very often not true of the other. The motive
may be good when the intention is bad: the intention may be good when
the motive is bad: whether they are both good or both bad, or the one
good and the other bad, makes, as we shall see hereafter, a very essen-
tial difference with regard to the consequences. It is therefore much
better, when motive is meant, never to say intention.

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78/Jeremy Bentham
XV. An example will make this clear. Out of malice a man pros-
ecutes you for a crime of which he believes you to be guilty, but of
which in fact you are not guilty. Here the consequences of his conduct
are mischievous: for they are mischievous to you at any rate, in virtue of
the shame and anxiety which you are made to suffer while the prosecu-
tion is depending: to which is to be added, in case of your being con-
victed, the evil of the punishment. To you therefore they are mischie-
vous; nor is there any one to whom they are beneficial. The man’s mo-
tive was also what is called a bad one: for malice will be allowed by
every body to be a bad motive. However, the consequences of his con-
duct, had they proved such as he believed them likely to be, would have
been good: for in them would have been included the punishment of a
criminal, which is a benefit to all who are exposed to suffer by a crime
of the like nature. The Intention therefore, in this case, though not in a
common way of speaking the motive, might be styled a good one. But of
motives more particularly in the next chapter.
XVI. In the same sense the intention, whether it be positively good
or no, so long as it is not bad, may be termed innocent. Accordingly, let
the consequences have proved mischievous, and let the motive have been
what it will, the intention may be termed innocent in either of two cases:
1. In the case of un-advisedness with respect to any of the circumstances
on which the mischievousness of the consequences depended: 2. In the
case of mis-advisedness with respect to any circumstance, which, had it
been what it appeared to be, would have served either to prevent or to
outweigh the mischief.
XVII. A few words for the purpose of applying what has been said
to the Roman law. Unintentionality, and innocence of intention, seem
both to be included in the case of infortunium, where there is neither
dolus nor culpa. Unadvisedness coupled with heedlessness, and mis-
advisedness coupled with rashness, correspond to the culpa sine dolo.
Direct intentionality corresponds to dolus. Oblique intentionality seems
hardly to have been distinguished from direct; were it to occur, it would
probably be deemed also to correspond to dolus. The division into culpa,
lata, levis, and levissima, is such as nothing certain can correspond to.
What is it that it expresses? A distinction, not in the case itself, but only
in the sentiments which any person (a judge, for instance) may find
himself disposed to entertain with relation to it: supposing it already
distinguished into three subordinate cases by other means.
The word dolus seems ill enough contrived: the word culpa as in-

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