Principles of Morals and

82/Jeremy Bentham
birth to it. He must look, therefore, in every case, to some event poste-
rior to the act in contemplation: an event which as yet exists not, but
stands only in prospect. Now, as it is in all cases difficult, and in most
cases unnecessary, to distinguish between objects so intimately connected,
as the posterior possible object which is thug looked forward to, and the
present existing object or event which takes place upon a man’s looking
forward to the other, they are both of them spoken of under the same
appellation, motive. To distinguish them, the one first mentioned may be
termed a motive in prospect, the other a motive in esse: and under each
of these denominations will come as well exterior as internal motives. A
fire breaks out in your neighbour’s house: you are under apprehension
of its extending to your own: you are apprehensive, that if you stay in it,
you will be burnt: you accordingly run out of it. This then is the act: the
others are all motives to it. The event of the fire’s breaking out in your
neighbour’s house is an external motive, and that in esse: the idea or
belief of the probability of the fire’s extending to your own house, that
of your being burnt if you continue, and the pain you feel at the thought
of such a catastrophe, are all so many internal events, but still in esse:
the event of the fire’s actually extending to your own house, and that of
your being actually burnt by it, external motives in prospect: the pain
you would feel at seeing your house a burning, and the pain you would
feel while you yourself were burning, internal motives in prospect: which
events, according as the matter turns out, may come to be in esse: but
then of course they will cease to act as motives.
VII. Of all these motives, which stand nearest to the act, to the
production of which they all contribute, is that internal motive in esse
which consists in the expectation of the internal motive in prospect: the
pain or uneasiness you feel at the thoughts of being burnt. All other
motives are more or less remote: the motives in prospect, in proportion
as the period at which they are expected to happen is more distant from
the period at which the act takes place, and consequently later in point
of time: the motives in esse, in proportion as they also are more distant
from that period, and consequently earlier in point of time.
VIII. It has already been observed, that with motives of which the
influence terminates altogether in the understanding, we have nothing
here to do. If then, amongst objects that are spoken of as motives with
reference to the understanding, there be any which concern us here, it is
only in as far as such objects may, through the medium of the under-
standing, exercise an influence over the will. It is in this way, and in this

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/83
way only, that any objects, in virtue of any tendency they may have to
influence the sentiment of belief, may in a practical sense act in the
character of motives. Any objects, by tending to induce a belief con-
cerning the existence, actual, or probable, of a practical motive; that is,
concerning the probability of a motive in prospect, or the existence of a
motive in esse; may exercise an influence on the will, and rank with
those other motives that have been placed under the name of practical.
The pointing out of motives such as these, is what we frequently mean
when we talk of giving reasons. Your neighbour’s house is on fire as
before. I observe to you, that at the lower part of your neighbour’s
house is some wood-work, which joins on to yours; that the flames have
caught this wood-work,and so forth; which I do in order to dispose you
to believe as I believe, that if you stay in your house much longer you
will be burnt. In doing this, then, I suggest motives to your understand-
ing; which motives, by the tendency they have to give birth to or strengthen
a pain, which operates upon you in the character of an internal motive in
esse, join their force, and act as motives upon the will.
§ 2. 
No motives either constantly good or constantly bad.
IX. In all this chain of motives, the principal or original link seems to be
the last internal motive in prospect: it is to this that all the other motives
in prospect owe their materiality: and the immediately acting motive its
existence. This motive in prospect, we see, is always some pleasure, or
some pain; some pleasure, which the act in question is expected to be a
means of continuing or producing: some pain which it is expected to be
a means of discontinuing or preventing. A motive is substantially noth-
ing more than pleasure or pain, operating in a certain manner.
X. Now, pleasure is in itself a good: nay, even setting aside immu-
nity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil; and, indeed, with-
out exception, the only evil; or else the words good and evil have no
meaning. And this is alike true of every sort of pain, and of every sort of
pleasure. It follows, therefore, immediately and incontestibly, that there
is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one.
XI. It is common, however, to speak of actions as proceeding from
good or bad motives: in which case the motives meant are such as are
internal. The expression is far from being an accurate one; and as it is
apt to occur in the consideration of most every kind of offence, it will be
requisite to settle the precise meaning of it, and observe how far it quad-
rates with the truth of things.

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