Principles of Morals and

Principles of Morals and Legislation/87
XVIII. As to the other pleasures of sense they are of too little conse-
quence to have given any separate denominations to the corresponding
motives.
XIX. To the pleasures of wealth corresponds the sort of motive
which, in a neutral sense, may be termed pecuniary interest: in a bad
sense, it is termed, in some cases, avarice, covetousness, rapacity, or
lucre: in other cases, niggardliness: in a good sense, but only in particu-
lar cases, economy and frugality; and in some cases the word industry
may be applied to it: in a sense nearly indifferent, but rather bad than
otherwise, it is styled, though only in particular cases, parsimony.
1. For money you gratify a man’s hatred, by putting his adversary
to death. 2. For money you plough his field for him.—In the first case
your motive is termed lucre, and is accounted corrupt and abominable:
and in the second, for want of a proper appellation, it is styled industry;
and is looked upon as innocent at least, if not meritorious. Yet the mo-
tive is in both cases precisely the same: it is neither more nor less than
pecuniary interest.
XX. The pleasures of skill are neither distinct enough, nor of conse-
quence enough, to have given any name to the corresponding motive.
XXI. To the pleasures of amity corresponds a motive which, in a
neutral sense, may be termed the desire of ingratiating one’s self. In a
bad sense it is in certain cases styled servility: in a good sense it has no
name that is peculiar to it: in the cases in which it has been looked on
with a favourable eye, it has seldom been distinguished from the motive
of sympathy or benevolence, with which, in such cases, it is commonly
associated.
1. To acquire the affections of a woman before marriage, to pre-
serve them afterwards, you do every thing, that is consistent with other
duties, to make her happy: in this case your motive is looked upon as
laudable, though there is no name for it. 2. For the same purpose, you
poison a woman with whom she is at enmity: in this case your motive is
looked upon as abominable, though still there is no name for it. 3. To
acquire or preserve the favour of a man who is richer or more powerful
than yourself, you make yourself subservient to his pleasures. Let them
even be lawful pleasures, if people choose to attribute your behaviour to
this motive, you will not get them to find any other name for it than
servility. Yet in all three cases the motive is the same: it is neither more
nor less than the desire of ingratiating yourself.
XXII. To the pleasures of the moral sanction, or, as they may other-

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wise be called, the pleasures of a good name, corresponds a motive
which, in a neutral sense, has scarcely yet obtained any adequate
appellative. It may be styled, the love of reputation. It is nearly related
to the motive last preceding: being neither more nor less than the desire
of ingratiating one’s self with, or, as in this case we should rather say, of
recommending one’s self to, the world at large. In a good sense, it is
termed honour, or the sense of honour: or rather, the word honour is
introduced somehow or other upon the occasion of its being brought to
view: for in strictness the word honour is put rather to signify that imagi-
nary object, which a man is spoken of as possessing upon the occasion
of his obtaining a conspicuous share of the pleasures that are in ques-
tion. In particular cases, it is styled the love of glory. In a bad sense, it is
styled, in some cases, false honour; in others, pride; in others, vanity. In
a sense not decidedly bad, but rather bad than otherwise, ambition. In
an indifferent sense, in some cases, the love of fame: in others, the sense
of shame. And, as the pleasures belonging to the moral sanction run
undistinguishably into the pains derived from the same source, it may
also be styled, in some cases, the fear of dishonour, the fear of disgrace,
the fear of infamy, the fear of ignominy, or the fear of shame.
1. You have received an affront from a man: according to the cus-
tom of the country, in order, on the one hand, to save yourself from the
shame of being thought to bear it patiently; on the other hand, to obtain
the reputation of courage; you challenge him to fight with mortal weap-
ons. In this case your motive will by some people be accounted laud-
able, and styled honour: by others it will be accounted blameable, and
these, if they call it honour, will prefix an epithet of improbation to it,
and call it false honour. 2. In order to obtain a post of rank and dignity,
and thereby to increase the respects paid you by the public, you bribe
the electors who are to confer it, or the judge before whom the title to it
is in dispute. In this case your motive is commonly accounted corrupt
and abominable, and is styled, perhaps, by some such name as dishon-
est or corrupt ambition, as there is no single name for it. 3. In order to
obtain the good-will of the public, you bestow a large sum in works of
private charity or public utility. In this case people will be apt not to
agree about your motive. Your enemies will put a bad colour upon it,
and call it ostentation: your friends, to save you from this reproach, will
choose to impute your conduct not to this motive but to some other:
such as that of charity (the denomination in this case given to private
sympathy) or that of public spirit. 4. A king, for the sake of gaining the

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admiration annexed to the name of conqueror (we will suppose power
and resentment out of the question) engages his kingdom in a bloody
war. His motive, by the multitude (whose sympathy for millions is eas-
ily overborne by the pleasure which their imagination finds in gaping at
any novelty they observe in the conduct of a single person) is deemed an
admirable one. Men of feeling and reflection, who disapprove of the
dominion exercised by this motive on this occasion, without always per-
ceiving that it is the same motive which in other instances meets with
their approbation, deem it an abominable one; and because the multi-
tude, who are the manufacturers of language, have not given them a
simple name to call it by, they will call it by some such compound name
as the love of false glory or false ambition. Yet in all four cases the
motive is the same: it is neither more nor less than the love of reputation.
XXIII. To the pleasures of power corresponds the motive which, in
a neutral sense, may be termed the love of power. People, who are out of
humour with it sometimes, call it the lust of power. In a good sense, it is
scarcely provided with a name. In certain cases this motive, as well as
the love of reputation, are confounded under the same name, ambition.
This is not to be wondered at, considering the intimate connexion there
is between the two motives in many cases: since it commonly happens,
that the same object which affords the one sort of pleasure, affords the
other sort at the same time: for instance, offices, which are at once posts
of honour and places of trust: and since at any rate reputation is the road
to power.
1. If, in order to gain a place in administration, you poison the man
who occupies it. 2. If, in the same view, you propose a salutary plan for
the advancement of the public welfare; your motive is in both cases the
same. Yet in the first case it is accounted criminal and abominable: in
the second case allowable, and even laudable.
XXIV. To the pleasures as well as to the pains of the religious sanc-
tion corresponds a motive which has, strictly speaking, no perfectly
neutral name applicable to all cases, unless the s, word religion be ad-
mitted in this character: though the word religion, strictly speaking, seems
to mean not so much the motive itself, as a kind of fictitious personage,
by whom the motive is supposed to be created, or an assemblage of acts,
supposed to be dictated by that personage: nor does it seem to be com-
pletely settled into a neutral sense. In the same sense it is also, in some
cases, styled religious zeal: in other cases, the fear of God. The love of
God, though commonly contrasted with the fear of God, does not come

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