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Principles of Morals and Legislation/65
regard to matter, is the motion or rest of one single atom of matter. An
act indivisible, with regard to motion, is the motion of any body, from
one single atom of space to the next to it.
Fifth, acts may be distinguished into simple and complex: simple,
such as the act of striking, the act of leaning, or the act of drinking,
above instanced: complex, consisting each of a multitude of simple acts,
which, though numerous and heterogeneous, derive a sort of unity from
the relation they bear to some common design or end; such as the act of
giving a dinner, the act of maintaining a child, the act of exhibiting a
triumph, the act of bearing arms, the act of holding a court, and so forth.
XX. It has been every now and then made a question, what it is in
such a case that constitutes one act: where one act has ended, and an-
other act has begun: whether what has happened has been one act or
many. These questions, it is now evident, may frequently be answered,
with equal propriety, in opposite ways: and if there be any occasions on
which they can be answered only in one way, the answer will depend
upon the nature of the occasion, and the purpose for which the question
is proposed. A man is wounded in two fingers at one stroke,—Is it one
wound or several? A man is beaten at 12 o’clock, and again at 8 minutes
after 12.—Is it one beating or several? You beat one man, and instantly
in the same breath you beat another.—Is this one beating or several? In
any of these cases it may be one, perhaps, as to some purposes, and
several as to others. These examples are given, that men may be aware
of the ambiguity of language: and neither harass themselves with un-
solvable doubts, nor one another with interminable disputes.
XXI. So much with regard to acts considered in themselves: we
come now to speak of the circumstances with which they may have been
accompanied. These must necessarily be taken into the account before
any thing can be determined relative to the consequences. What the con-
sequences of an act may be upon the whole can never otherwise be
ascertained: it can never be known whether it is beneficial, or indiffer-
ent, or mischievous. In some circumstances even to kill a man may be a
beneficial act: in others, to set food before him may be a pernicious one.
XXII. Now the circumstances of an act, are, what? Any objects (or
entities) whatsoever. Take any act whatsoever, there is nothing in the
nature of things that excludes any imaginable object from being a cir-
cumstance to it. Any given object may be a circumstance to any other.
XXIII. We have already had occasion to make mention for a mo-
ment of the consequences of an act: these were distinguished into mate-

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66/Jeremy Bentham
rial and immaterial. In like manner may the circumstances of it be dis-
tinguished. Now materiality is a relative term: applied to the conse-
quences of an act, it bore relation to pain and pleasure: applied to the
circumstances, it bears relation to the consequences. A circumstance
may be said to be material, when it bears a visible relation in point of
causality to the consequences: immaterial, when it bears no such visible
relation.
XXIV. The consequences of an act are events. A circumstance may
be related to an event in point of causality in any be one of four ways: 1.
In the way of causation or production. 2. In the way of derivation. 3. In
the way of collateral condition. 4. In the way of conjunct influence. It
may be said to be related to the event in the way of causation. when it is
of the number of those that contribute to the production of such event: in
the way of derivation, when it is of the number of the events to the
production of which that in question has been contributory: in the way
of collateral connexion, where the circumstance in question, and the
event in question, without being either of them instrumental in the pro-
duction of the other, are related, each of them, to some common object,
which has been concerned in the production of them both: in the way of
conjunct influence, when, whether related in any other way or not, they
have both of them concurred in the production of some common conse-
quence.
XXV. An example may be of use. In the year 1628, Villiers, Duke
of Buckingham, favourite and minister of Charles I. of England, re-
ceived a wound and died. The man who gave it him was one Felton,
who, exasperated at the maladministration of which that minister was
accused, went down from London to Portsmouth, where Buckingham
happened then to be, made his way into his anti-chamber, and finding
him busily engaged in conversation with a number of people round him,
got close to him, drew a knife and stabbed him. In the effort, the assassin’s
hat fell off, which was found soon after, and, upon searching him, the
bloody knife. In the crown of the hat were found scraps of paper, with
sentences expressive of the purpose he was come upon. Here then, sup-
pose the event in question is the wound received by Buckingham: Felton’s
drawing out his knife, his making his way into the chamber, his going
down to Portsmouth, his conceiving an indignation at the idea of
Buckingham’s administration, that administration itself, Charles’s ap-
pointing such a minister, and so on, higher and higher without end, are
so many circumstances, related to the event of Buckingham’s receiving

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the wound, in the way of causation or production: the bloodiness of the
knife, a circumstance related to the same event in the way of derivation:
the finding of the hat upon the ground, the finding the sentences in the
hat, and the writing them, so many circumstances related to it in the way
of collateral connexion: and the situation and conversations of the people
about Buckingham, were circumstances related to the circumstances of
Felton’s making his way into the room, going down to Portsmouth, and
so forth, in the way of conjunct influence; inasmuch as they contributed
in common to the event of Buckingham’s receiving the wound, by pre-
venting him from putting himself upon his guard upon the first appear-
ance of the intruder.
XXVI. These several relations do not all of them attach upon an
event with equal certainty. In the first place, it is plain, indeed, that
every event must have some circumstance or other, and in truth, an
indefinite multitude of circumstances, related to it in the way of produc-
tion: it must of course have a still greater multitude of circumstances
related to it in the way of collateral connexion. But it does not appear
necessary that every event should have circumstances related to it in the
way of derivation: nor therefore that it should have any related to it in
the way of conjunct influence. But of the circumstances of all kinds
which actually do attach upon an event, it is only a very small number
that can be discovered by the utmost exertion of the human faculties: it
is a still smaller number that ever actually do attract our notice: when
occasion happens, more or fewer of them will be discovered by a man in
proportion to the strength, partly of his intellectual powers, partly of his
inclination. It appears therefore that the multitude and description of
such of the circumstances belonging to an act, as may appear to be
material, will be determined by two considerations: 1. By the nature of
things themselves. 2. By the strength or weakness of the faculties of
those who happen to consider them.
XXVII. Thus much it seemed necessary to premise in general con-
cerning acts, and their circumstances, previously to the consideration of
the particular sorts of acts with their particular circumstances, with
which we shall have to do in the body of the work. An act of some sort
or other is necessarily included in the notion of every offense. Together
with this act, under the notion of the same offense, are included certain
circumstances: which circumstances enter into the essence of the of-
fense, contribute by their conjunct influence to the production of its
consequences, and in conjunction with the act are brought into view by

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