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and irrational.
V. Now the intention, with regard to the consequences of an act, will
depend upon two things: 1. The state of the will or intention, with re-
spect to the act itself. And, 2. The state of the understanding, or percep-
tive faculties, with regard to the circumstances which it is, or may ap-
pear to be, accompanied with. Now with respect to these circumstances,
the perceptive faculty is susceptible of three states: consciousness, un-
consciousness, and false consciousness. Consciousness, when the party
believes precisely those circumstances, and no others, to subsist, which
really do subsist: unconsciousness, when he fails of perceiving certain
circumstances to subsist, which, however, do subsist: false conscious-
ness, when he believes or imagines certain circumstances to subsist,
which in truth do not subsist.
VI. In every transaction, therefore, which is examined with a view
to punishment, there are four articles to be considered: 1. The act itself,
which is done. 2. The circumstances in which it is done. 3. The inten-
tionality that may have accompanied it. 4. The consciousness, uncon-
sciousness, or false consciousness, that may have accompanied it.
What regards the act and the circumstances will be the subject of
the present chapter: what regards intention and consciousness, that of
the two succeeding.
VII. There are also two other articles on which the general tendency
of an act depends: and on that, as well as on other accounts, the demand
which it creates for punishment. These are, 1. The particular motive or
motives which gave birth to it. 2. The general disposition which it indi-
cates. These articles will be the subject of two other chapters.
VIII. Acts may be distinguished in several ways, for several pur-
poses.
They may be distinguished, in the first place, into positive and nega-
tive. By positive are meant such as consist in motion or exertion: by
negative, such as consist in keeping at rest; that is, in forbearing to
move or exert one’s self in such and such circumstances. thus, to strike
is a positive act: not to strike on a certain occasion, a negative one.
Positive acts are styled also acts of commission; negative, acts of omis-
sion or forbearance.
IX. Such acts, again, as are negative, may either be absolutely so,
or relatively: absolutely, when they import the negation of all positive
agency whatsoever; for instance, not to strike at all: relatively, when
they import the negation of such or such a particular mode of agency;

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for instance, not to strike such a person or such a thing, or in such a
direction.
X. It is to be observed, that the nature of the act, whether positive or
negative, is not to be determined immediately by the form of the dis-
course made use of to express it. An act which is positive in its nature
may be characterized by a negative expression: thus, not to be at rest, is
as much as to say to move. So also an act, which is negative in its
nature, may be characterized by a positive expression: thus, to forbear
or omit to bring food to a person in certain circumstances, is signified
by the single and positive term to starve.
XI. In the second place, acts may be distinguished into external and
internal. By external, are meant corporal acts; acts of the body: by
internal, mental acts; acts of the mind. Thus, to strike is an external or
exterior act: to intend to strike, an internal or interior one.
XII. Acts of discourse are a sort of mixture of the two: external
acts, which are no ways material, nor attended with any consequences,
any farther than as they serve to express the existence of internal ones.
To speak to another to strike, to write to him to strike, to make signs to
him to strike, are all so many acts of discourse.
XIII. Third, acts that are external may be distinguished into transi-
tive and intransitive. Acts may be called transitive, when the motion is
communicated from the person of the agent to some foreign body: that
is, to such a foreign body on which the effects of it are considered as
being material; as where a man runs against you, or throws water in
your face. Acts may be called intransitive, when the motion is commu-
nicated to no other body, on which the effects of it are regarded as ma-
terial, than some part of the same person in whom it originated, as where
a man runs, or washes himself.
XIV. An act of the transitive kind may be said to be in its com-
mencement, or in the first stage of its progress, while the motion is
confined to the person of the agent, and has not yet been communicated
to any foreign body, on which the effects of it can be material. It may be
said to be in its termination, or to be in the last stage of its progress, as
soon as the motion or impulse has been communicated to some such
foreign body. It may be said to be in the middle or intermediate stage or
stages of its progress, while the motion, having passed from the person
of the agent, has not yet been communicated to any such foreign body.
Thus, as soon as a man has lifted up his hand to strike, the act he per-
forms in striking you is in its commencement: as soon as his hand has

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64/Jeremy Bentham
reached you, it is in its termination. If the act be the motion of a body
which is separated from the person of the agent before it reaches the
object, it may be said, during that interval, to be in its intermediate
progress, or in gradu mediativo: as in the case where a man throws a
stone or fires a bullet at you.
XV. An act of the intransitive kind may be said to be in its com-
mencement, when the motion or impulse is as yet confined to the mem-
ber or organ in which it originated; and has not yet been communicated
to any member or organ that is distinguishable from the former. It may
be said to be in its termination, as soon as it has been applied to any
other part of the same person. Thus, where a man poisons himself, while
he is lifting up the poison to his mouth, the act is in its commencement:
as soon as it has reached his lips, it is in its termination.
XVI. In the third place, acts may be distinguished into transient and
continued. Thus, to strike is a transient act: to lean, a continued one. To
buy, a transient act: to keep in one’s possession, a continued one.
XVII. In strictness of speech there is a difference between a contin-
ued act and a repetition of acts. It is a repetition of acts, when there are
intervals filled up by acts of different natures: a continued act, when
there are no such intervals. Thus, to lean, is continued act: to keep strik-
ing, a repetition of acts.
XVIII. There is a difference, again, between a repetition of acts,
and a habit or practice. The term repetition of acts may be employed,
let the acts in question be separated by ever such short intervals, and let
the sum total of them occupy ever so short a space of time. The term
habit is not employed but when the acts in question are supposed to be
separated by long-continued intervals, and the sum total of them to oc-
cupy a considerable space of time. It is not (for instance) the drinking
ever so many times, nor ever so much at a time, in the course of the
same sitting, that will constitute a habit of drunkenness: it is necessary
that such sittings themselves be frequently repeated. Every habit is a
repetition of acts; or, to speak more strictly, when a man has frequently
repeated such and such acts after considerable intervals, he is said to
have persevered in or contracted a habit: but every repetition of acts is
not a habit.
XIX. Fourth, acts may be distinguished into indivisible and divis-
ible. Indivisible acts are merely imaginary: they may be easily conceived,
but can never be known to be exemplified. Such as are divisible may be
so, with regard either to matter or to to motion. An act indivisible with

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