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96/Jeremy Bentham
cious. For by what method of investigation can a man be assured, that
with regard to the motives ranked under the name of good, the good
effects they have had, from the beginning of the world, have, in each of
the four species comprised under this name, been superior to the bad?
still more difficulty would a man find in assuring himself, that with
regard to those which are ranked under the name of neutral or indiffer-
ent, the effects they have had have exactly balanced each other, the
value of the good being neither greater nor less than that of the bad. It is
to be considered, that the interests of the person himself can no more be
left out of the estimate, than those of the rest of the community. For
what would become of the species, if it were not for the motives of
hunger and thirst, sexual desire, the fear of pain, and the love of life?
Nor in the actual constitution of human nature is the motive of displea-
sure less necessary, perhaps, than any of the others: although a system,
in which the business of life might be carried on without it, might possi-
bly be conceived. It seems, therefore, that they could scarcely, without
great danger of mistakes, be distinguished in this manner even with ref-
erence to each other.
XXXIII. The only way, it should seem, in which a motive can with
safety and propriety be styled good or bad, is with reference to its ef-
fects in each individual instance; and principally from the intention it
gives birth to: from which arise, as will be shown hereafter, the most
material part of its effects. A motive is good, when the intention it gives
birth to is a good one; bad, when the intention is a bad one: and an
intention is good or bad, according to the material consequences that are
the objects of it. So far is it from the goodness of the intention’s being to
be known only from the species of the motive. But from one and the
same motive, as we have seen, may result intentions of every sort of
complexion whatsoever. This circumstance, therefore, can afford no clue
for the arrangement of the several sorts of motives.
XXXIV. A more commodious method, therefore, it should seem,
would be to distribute them according to the influence which they ap-
pear to have on the interests of the other members of the community,
laying those of the party himself out of the question: to wit, according to
the tendency which they appear to have to unite, or disunite, his inter-
ests and theirs. On this plan they may be distinguished into social,
dissocial, and self-regarding. In the social class may be reckoned, 1.
Good-will. 2. Love of reputation. 3. Desire of amity. 4. Religion. In the
dissocial may be placed, 5. Displeasure. In the self-regarding class, 6.

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/97
Physical desire. 7. Pecuniary interest. 8. Love of power. 9. Self-preser-
vation; as including the fear of the pains of the senses, the love of ease,
and the love of life.
XXXV. With respect to the motives that have been termed social, if
any farther distinction should be of use, to that of good-will alone may
be applied the epithet of purely-social; while the love of reputation, the
desire of amity, and the motive of religion, may together be comprised
under the division of semi-social: the social tendency being much more
constant and unequivocal in the former than in any of the three latter.
Indeed these last, social as they may be termed, are self-regarding at the
same time.
§ 4. 
Order of pre-eminence among motives.
XXXVI. Of all these sorts of motives, good-will is that of which the
dictates, taken in a general view, are surest of coinciding with those of
the principle of utility. For the dictates of utility are neither nor less than
the dictates of the most extensive
8
 and enlightened (that is well-advised)
benevolence. The dictates of the other motives may be conformable to
those of utility, or repugnant, as it may happen.
XXXVII. In this, however, it is taken for granted, that in the case in
question the dictates of benevolence are not contradicted by those of a
more extensive, that is enlarged, benevolence. Now when the dictates of
benevolence, as respecting the interests of a certain set of persons, are
repugnant to the dictates of the same motive, as respecting the more
important (or valuable) interests of another set of persons, the former
dictates, it is evident, are repealed, as it were, by the latter: and a man,
were he to be governed by the former, could scarcely, with propriety, be
said to be governed by the dictates of benevolence. On this account were
the motives on both sides sure to be alike present to a man’s mind, the
case of such a repugnancy would hardly be worth distinguishing, since
the partial benevolence might be considered as swallowed up in the more
extensive: if the former prevailed, and governed the action, it must be
considered as not owing its birth to benevolence, but to some other mo-
tive: if the latter prevailed, the former might be considered as having no
effect. But the case is, that a partial benevolence may govern the action,
without entering into any direct competition with the more extensive
benevolence, which would forbid it; because the interests of the less
numerous assemblage of persons may be present to a man’s mind, at a
time when those of the more numerous are either not present, or, if

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98/Jeremy Bentham
present, make no impression. It is in this way that the dictates of this
motive may be repugnant to utility, yet still be the dictates of benevo-
lence. What makes those of private benevolence conformable upon the
whole to the principle of utility, is, that in general they stand unopposed
by those of public: if they are repugnant to them, it is only by accident.
What makes them the more conformable, is, that in a civilized society,
in most of the cases in which they would of themselves be apt to run
counter to those of public benevolence, they find themselves opposed by
stronger motives of the self-regarding class, which are played off against
them by the laws; and that it is only in cases where they stand unop-
posed by the other more salutary dictates, that they are left free. An act
of injustice or cruelty, committed by a man for the sake of his father or
his son, is punished, and with reason, as much as if it were committed
for his own.
XXXVIII. After good-will, the motive of which the dictates seem to
have the next best chance for coinciding with those of utility, is that of
the love of reputation. There is but one circumstance which prevents the
dictates of this motive from coinciding in all cases with those of the
former. This is, that men in their likings and dislikings, in the disposi-
tions they manifest to annex to any mode of conduct their approbation
or their disapprobation, and in consequence to the person who appears
to practice it, their good or their ill will, do not govern themselves exclu-
sively by the principle of utility. sometimes it is the principle of asceti-
cism they are guided by: sometimes the principle of sympathy and an-
tipathy. There is another circumstance, which diminishes, not their con-
formity to the principle of utility, but only their efficacy in comparison
with the dictates of the motive of benevolence. The dictates of this mo-
tive will operate as strongly in secret as in public: whether it appears
likely that the conduct which they recommend will be known or not:
those of the love of reputation will coincide with those of benevolence
only in proportion as a man’s conduct seems likely to be known. This
circumstance, however, does not make so much difference as at first
sight might appear. Acts, in proportion as they are material, are apt to
become known: and in point of reputation, the slightest suspicion often
serves for proof. Besides, if an act be a disreputable one, it is not any
assurance a man can have of the secrecy of the particular act in ques-
tion, that will of course surmount the objections he may have against
engaging in it. Though the act in question should remain secret, it will
go towards forming a habit, which may give birth to other acts, that

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