Principles of Morals and

Principles of Morals and Legislation/119
vousness of the disposition manifested by the enterprise, is as. the ap-
parent mischievousness of the act.
Thus, it would show a more depraved disposition, to murder a man
for a reward of a guinea, or falsely to charge him with a robbery for the
same reward, than to obtain the same sum from him by simple theft: the
trouble he would have to take, and the risk he would have to run, being
supposed to stand on the same footing in the one case as in the other.
Rule 2. The apparent mischievousness of the act being given, a
man’s disposition is the more depraved, the slighter the temptation is
by which he has been overcome.
Thus, it shows a more depraved and dangerous disposition, if a man
kill another out of mere sport, as the Emperor of Morocco, Muley
Mahomet, is said to have done great numbers, than out of revenge, as
Sylla and Marius did thousands, or in the view of self-preservation, as
Augustus killed many, or even for lucre, as the same Emperor is said to
have killed some. And the effects of such a depravity, on that part of the
public which is apprised of it, run in the same proportion. From Augustus,
some persons only had to fear, under some particular circumstances.
From Muley Mahomet, every man had to fear at all times.
Rule 3. The apparent mischievousness of the act being given, the
evidence which it affords of the depravity of a man’s disposition is the
less conclusive, the stronger the temptation is by which he has been
overcome.
Thus, if a poor man, who is ready to die with hunger, steal a loaf of
bread, it is a less explicit sign of depravity, than if a rich man were to
commit a theft to the same amount. It will be observed, that in this rule
all that is said is, that the evidence of depravity is in this case the less
conclusive: it is not said that the depravity is positively the less. For in
this case it is possible, for any thing that appears to the contrary, that the
theft might have been committed, even had the temptation been not so
strong. In this case, the alleviating circumstance is only a matter of
presumption; in the former, the aggravating circumstance is a matter of
certainty.
Rule 4. Where the motive is of the dissocial kind, the apparent
mischievousness of the act, and the strength of the temptation, being
given, the depravity is as the degree of deliberation with which it is
accompanied.
For in every man, be his disposition ever so depraved, the social
motives are those which, wherever the self-regarding ones stand neuter,

---

120/Jeremy Bentham
regulate and determine the general tenor of his life. If the dissocial mo-
tives are put in action, it is only in particular circumstances, and on
particular occasions; the gentle but constant force of the social motives
being for a while subdued. The general and standing bias of every man’s
nature is, therefore, towards that side to which the force of the social
motives would determine him to adhere. This being the case, the force
of the social motives tends continually to put an end to that of the dissocial
ones; as, in natural bodies, the force of friction tends to put an end to
that which is generated by impulse. Time, then, which wears away the
force of the dissocial motives, adds to that of the social. The longer,
therefore, a man continues, on a given occasion, under the dominion of
the dissocial motives, the more convincing is the proof that has been
given of his insensibility to the force of the social ones.
Thus, it shows a worse disposition, where a man lays a deliberate
plan for beating his antagonist, and beats him accordingly, than if he
were to beat him upon the spot, in consequence of a sudden quarrel: and
worse again, if, after having had him a long while together in his power,
he beats him at intervals, and at his leisure.
XLIII. The depravity of disposition, indicated by an act, is a mate-
rial consideration in several respects. Any mark of extraordinary de-
pravity, by adding to the terror already inspired by the crime, and by
holding up the offender as a person from whom there may be more
mischief to be apprehended in future, adds in that way to the demand for
punishment. By indicating a general want of sensibility on the part of
the offender, it may add in another way also to the demand for punish-
ment. The article of disposition is of the more importance, inasmuch as,
in measuring out the quantum of punishment, the principle of sympathy
and antipathy is apt to look at nothing else. A man who punishes be-
cause he hates, and only because he hates, such a man, when he does not
find any thing odious in the disposition, is not for punishing at all; and
when he does, he is not for carrying the punishment further than his
hatred carries him. Hence the aversion we find so frequently expressed
against the maxim, that the punishment must rise with the strength of
the temptation; a maxim, the contrary of which, as we shall see, would
be as cruel to offenders themselves, as it would be subversive of the
purposes of punishment.

---

Chapter XII: Of the Consequences of a
Mischievous Act
§1. 
Shapes in which the mischief of an act may show
itself
I. Hitherto we have been speaking of the various articles or objects on
which the consequences or tendency of an act may depend: of the bare
act itself: of the circumstances it may have been, or may have been
supposed to be, accompanied with: of the consciousness a man may
have had with respect to any such circumstances: of the intentions that
may have preceded the act: of the motives that may have given birth to
those intentions: and of the disposition that may have been indicated by
the connexion between such intentions and such motives. We now come
to speak of consequences or tendency: an article which forms the con-
cluding link in all this chain of causes and effects, involving in it the
materiality of the whole. Now, such part of this tendency as is of a
mischievous nature, is all that we have any direct concern with; to that,
therefore, we shall here confine ourselves.
II. The tendency of an act is mischievous when the consequences of
it are mischievous; that is to say, either the certain consequences or the
probable. The consequences, how many and whatsoever they may be,
of an act, of which the tendency is mischievous, may, such of them as
are mischievous, be conceived to constitute one aggregate body, which
may be termed the mischief of the act.
III. This mischief may frequently be distinguished, as it were, into
two shares or parcels: the one containing what may be called the pri-
mary mischief; the other, what may be called the secondary. That share

---