Principles of Morals and

188/Jeremy Bentham
different sexes. Accordingly the relation of parentality may be distin-
guished into four species: 1. That which a father bears to his son: this is
termed paternity. 2. That which a father bears to his daughter: this also
is termed paternity. 3. That which a mother bears to her son: this is
called maternity. 4. That which a mother bears to her daughter: this also
is termed maternity. Uncontiguous natural relations may be distinguished
into immediate and remote. Such as are immediate, are what one person
bears to another in consequence of their bearing each of them one simple
relation to some third person. Thus the paternal grandfather is related to
the paternal grandson by means of the two different kinds, which to-
gether they bear to the father: the brother on the father’s side, to the
brother, by means of the two relations of the same kind, which together
they bear to the father. In the same manner we might proceed to find
places in the system for the infinitely diversified relations which result
from the combinations that may be formed by mixing together the sev-
eral sorts of relationships by ascent, relationships by descent, collat-
eral relationships, and relationships by affinity: which latter, when the
union between the two parties through whom the affinity takes place is
sanctioned by matrimonial solemnities, are termed relationships by
marriage. But this, as it would be a most intricate and tedious task, so
happily is it, for the present purpose, an unnecessary one. The only
natural relations to which it will be necessary to pay any particular
attention, are those which, when sanctioned by law, give birth to the
conditions of husband and wife, the two relations comprised under the
head of parentality, and the corresponding relations comprised under
the head of filiality or filiation.
What then are the relations of a legal kind which can be superin-
duced upon the above-mentioned natural relations? They must be such
as it is the nature of law to give birth to and establish. But the relations
which subsist purely by institution exhaust, as we shall see, the whole
stock of relationships which it is in the nature of the law to give birth to
and establish. The relations then which can be superinduced upon those
which are purely natural, cannot be in themselves any other than what
are of the number of those which subsist purely by institution: so that all
the difference there can be between a legal relation of the one sort, and
a legal relation of the other sort, is, that in the former case the circum-
stance which gave birth to the natural relation serves as a mark to indi-
cate where the legal relation is to fix: in the latter case, the place where
the legal relation is to attach is determined not by that circumstance but

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/189
by some other. From these considerations it will appear manifestly
enough, that for treating of the several sorts of conditions, as well natu-
ral as purely conventional, in the most commodious order, it will be
necessary to give the precedence to the latter. Proceeding throughout
upon the same principle, we shall all along give the priority, not to those
which are first by nature, but to those which are most simple in point of
description. There is no other way of avoiding perpetual anticipations
and repetitions.
XL. We come now to consider the domestic or family relations,
which are purely of legal institution. It is to these in effect, that both
kinds of domestic conditions, considered as the work of law, are in-
debted for their origin. When the law, no matter for what purpose, takes
upon itself to operate, in a matter in which it has not operated before, it
can only be by imposing obligation. Now when a legal obligation is
imposed on any man, there are but two ways in which it can in the first
instance be enforced. The one is by giving the power of enforcing it to
the party in whose favour it is imposed: the other is by reserving that
power to certain third persons, who, in virtue of their possessing it, are
styled ministers of justice. In the first case, the party favoured is said to
possess not only a right as against the party obliged, but also a power
over him: in the second case, a right only, uncorroborated by power. In
the first case, the party favoured may be styled a superior, and as they
are both members of the same family, a domestic superior, with refer-
ence to the party obliged: who, in the same case, may be styled a domes-
tic inferior, with reference to the party favoured. Now in point of possi-
bility. it is evident, that domestic conditions, or a kind of fictitious pos-
session analogous to domestic conditions, might have been looked upon
as constituted, as well by rights alone, without powers on either side, as
by powers. But in point of utility it does not seem expedient: and in
point of fact, probably owing to the invariable perception which men
must have had of the inexpediency, no such conditions seem ever to
have been constituted by such feeble bands. Of the legal relationships
then, which are capable of being made to subsist within the circle of a
family, there remain those only in which the obligation is enforced by
power. Now then, wherever any such power is conferred, the end or
purpose for which it was conferred (unless the legislator can be sup-
posed to act without a motive) must have been the producing of a ben-
efit to somebody: in other words, it must have been conferred for the
sake of somebody. The person then, for whose sake it is conferred, must

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