Principles of Morals and

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non-investment of mastership. 2. Wrongful interception of mastership.
3. Wrongful divestment of mastership. 4. Usurpation of mastership. 5.
Wrongful investment of mastership. 6. Wrongful abdication of master-
ship. 7. Wrongful detrectation of mastership. 8. Wrongful imposition of
mastership. 9. Abuse of mastership. 10. Disturbance of mastership. 11.
Breach of duty in servants. 12. Elopement of servants. 13. Servant-
stealing.
XLII. As to the power by which the condition of a master is consti-
tuted, this may be either limited or unlimited. When it is altogether
unlimited, the condition of the servant is styled pure slavery. But as the
rules of language are as far as can be conceived from being steady on
this head, the term slavery is commonly made use of wherever the limi-
tations prescribed to the power of the master are looked upon as incon-
siderable. Whenever any such limitation is prescribed, a kind of ficti-
tious entity is thereby created, and, in quality of an incorporeal object of
possession, is bestowed upon the servant: this object is of the class of
those which are called rights: and in the present case is termed, in a
more particular manner, a liberty; and sometimes a privilege, an immu-
nity, or an exemption. Now those limitations on the one hand, and these
liberties on the other, may, it is evident, be as various as the acts (posi-
tive or negative) which the master may or may not have the power of
obliging the servant to submit to or to perform. Correspondent then to
the infinitude of these liberties, is the infinitude of the modifications
which the condition of mastership (or, as it is more common to say in
such a case, that of servitude) admits of. These modifications, it is evi-
dent, may, in different countries, be infinitely diversified. Indifferent
countries, therefore, the offences characterised by the above names will,
if specifically considered, admit of very different descriptions. If there
be a spot upon the earth so wretched as to exhibit the spectacle of pure
and absolutely unlimited slavery, on that spot there will be no such thing
as any abuse of mastership; which means neither more nor less than that
no abuse of mastership will there be treated on the footing of an offence.
As to the question, Whether any, and what, modes of servitude ought to
be established or kept on foot? this is a question, the solution of which
belongs to the civil branch of the art of legislation.
XLIII. Next, with regard to the offences that may concern the con-
dition of a servant. It might seem at first sight, that a condition of this
kind could not have a spark of benefit belonging to it: that it could not be
attended with any other consequences than such as rendered it a mere

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/193
burthen. But a burthen itself may be a benefit, in comparison of a greater
burthen. Conceive a man’s situation then to be such, that he must, at
any rate, be in a state of pure slavery. Still may it be material to him,
and highly material, who the person is whom he has for his master. A
state of slavery then, under one master, may be a beneficial state to him,
in comparison with a state of slavery under another master. The condi-
tion of a servant then is exposed to the several offences to which a
condition, in virtue of its being a beneficial one, is exposed. More than
this, where the power of the master is limited, and the limitations an-
nexed to it, and thence the liberties of the servant, are considerable, the
servitude may even be positively eligible. For amongst those limitations
may be such as are sufficient to enable the servant to possess property
of his own: being capable then of possessing property of his own, he
may be capable of receiving it from his master: in short, he may receive
wages, or other emoluments, from his master; and the benefit resulting
from these wages may be so considerable as to outweigh the burthen of
the servitude, and, by that means, render that condition more beneficial
upon the whole, and more eligible, than that of one who is not in any
respect under the control of any such person as a master. Accordingly,
by these means the condition of the servant may be so eligible, that his
entrance into it, and his continuance in it, may have been altogether the
result of his own choice. That the nature of the two conditions may be
the more clearly understood, it may be of use to show the sort of
correspondency there is between the offences which affect the existence
of the one, and those which affect the existence of the other. That this
correspondency cannot but be very intimate is obvious at first sight. It is
not, however, that a given offence in the former catalogue coincides
with an offence of the same name in the latter catalogue: usurpation of
servantship with usurpation of mastership, for example. But the case is,
that an offence of one denomination in the one catalogue coincides with
an offence of a different denomination in the other catalogue. Nor is the
coincidence constant and certain: but liable to contingencies, as we shall
see. First, then, wrongful non-investment of the condition of a servant,
if it be the offence of one who should have been the master, coincides
with wrongful detrectation of mastership: if it be the offence of a third
person, it involves in it non-investment of mastership, which, provided
the mastership be in the eyes of him who should have been master a
beneficial thing, but not otherwise, is wrongful. 2. Wrongful intercep-
tion of the condition of a servant, if it be the offence of him who should

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