Principles of Morals and

194/Jeremy Bentham
have been master, coincides with wrongful detrectation of mastership: if
it be the offence of a third person, and the mastership be a beneficial
thing, it involves in it wrongful interception of mastership. 3. Wrongful
divestment of servantship, if it be the offence of the master, but not
otherwise, coincides with wrongful abdication of mastership: if it be the
offence of a stranger, it involves in it divestment of mastership, which,
in as far as the mastership is a beneficial thing, is wrongful. 4. Usurpa-
tion of servantship coincides necessarily with wrongful imposition of
mastership: it will be apt to involve in it wrongful divestment of master-
ship: but this only in the case where the usurper, previously to the usur-
pation, was in a state of servitude under some other master. 5. Wrongful
investment of servantship (the servantship being considered as a benefi-
cial thing) coincides with imposition of mastership; which, if in the eyes
of the pretended master the mastership should chance to be a burthen,
will be wrongful. 6. Wrongful abdication of servantship coincides with
wrongful divestment of mastership. 7. Wrongful detrectation of servant-
ship, with wrongful non-investment of mastership. 8. Wrongful imposi-
tion of servantship, if it be the offence of the pretended master, coin-
cides with usurpation of mastership: if it be the offence of a stranger, it
involves in it imposition of mastership, which, if in the eyes of the pre-
tended master the mastership should be a burthen, will be wrongful. As
to abuse of mastership, disturbance of mastership, breach of duty in
servants, elopement of servants, and servant-stealing, these are offences
which, without any change of denomination, bear equal relation to both
conditions. And thus we may reckon thirteen sorts of offences to which
the condition of a servant stands exposed: viz., 1. Wrongful non-invest-
ment of servantship. 2. Wrongful interception of servantship. 3. Wrong-
ful divestment of servantship. 4. Usurpation of servantship. 5. Wrong-
ful investment of servantship. 6. Wrongful abdication of servantship. 7.
Wrongful detrectation of servantship. 8. Wrongful imposition of ser-
vantship. 9. Abuse of mastership. 10. Disturbance of mastership. 11.
Breach of duty in servants. 12. Elopement of servants. 13. Servant-
stealing.
XLIV. We now come to the offences to which the condition of of a
guardian is exposed. A guardian is one who is invested with power over
another, living within the compass of the same family, and called a ward;
the power being to be exercised for the benefit of the ward. Now then,
what are the cases in which it can be for the benefit of one man, that
another, living within the compass of the same family, should exercise

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Principles of Morals and Legislation/195
power over him? Consider either of the parties by himself, and suppose
him, in point of understanding, to be on a level with the other, it seems
evident enough that no such cases can ever exist. To the production of
happiness on the part of any given person (in like manner as to the
production of any other effect which is the result of human agency)
three things it is necessary should concur: knowledge, inclination, and
physical power. Now as there is no man who is so sure of being in-
clined, on all occasions, to promote your happiness as you yourself are,
so neither is there any man who upon the whole can have had so good
opportunities as you must have had of knowing what is most conducive
to that purpose. For who should know so well as you do what it is that
gives you pain or pleasure? Moreover, as to power, it is manifest that no
superiority in this respect, on the part of a stranger, could, for a con-
stancy, make up for so great a deficiency as he must lie under in respect
of two such material points as knowledge and inclination. If then there
be a case where it can be for the advantage of one man to be under the
power of another, it must be on account of some palpable and very
considerable deficiency, on the part of the former, in point of intellects,
or (which is the same thing in other words) in point of knowledge or
understanding. Now there are two cases in which such palpable defi-
ciency is known to take place. These are, 1. Where a man’s intellect is
not yet arrived at that state in which it is capable of directing his own
inclination in the pursuit of happiness: this is the case of infancy. 2.
Where by some particular known or unknown circumstance his intellect
has either never arrived at that state, or having arrived at it has fallen
from it: which is the case of insanity.
By what means then is it to be ascertained whether a man’s intellect
is in that state or no? For exhibiting the quantity of sensible heat in a
human body we have a very tolerable sort of instrument, the thermom-
eter; but for exhibiting the quantity of intelligence, we have no such
instrument. It is evident, therefore, that the line which separates the
quantity of intelligence which is sufficient for the purposes of self-gov-
ernment from that which is not sufficient, must be, in a great measure,
arbitrary. Where the insufficiency is the result of want of age, the suffi-
cient quantity of intelligence, be it what it may, does not accrue to all at
the same period of their lives. It becomes therefore necessary for legis-
lators to cut the gordian knot, and fix upon a particular period, at which
and not before, truly or not, every person whatever shall be deemed, as
far as depends upon age, to be in possession of this sufficient quantity.

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