Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

5. Potentials for a joint agenda

By and large, the emergence of a political interface between Russia and the EU is assessed by Moscow as a valuable asset. The importance of this asset has been only increased by the structural consolidation of political relationship between two sides. However, this characterizes only the instrumental part of their political interaction. It is the substance and the scope of the latter that are the most important parameters allowing to make conclusion on how successful this process is and to what extent it responds to expectations of the participants.

In fact, this comes to the task of defining the zones of overlapping and/or mutual foreign policy interests of Russia and the EU. When and where such interests emerge, Russia and the EU might engage in developing partnership that eventually will evolve into coordination and perhaps joint actions. In other words, the agenda of their foreign policy interaction is to be built upon issues that both sides might consider appropriate to address together rather than separately.

It should be noted that for the time being this relates to theory rather than to practice. The task of defining joint agenda—in a politically substantive way, rather than just bureaucratically or diplomatically—is still to be formulated and addressed by both sides. And they can do it only proceeding from serious thinking on longer-term prospects of international developments, as well as on their respective interests therein.

Meanwhile, neither the EU nor Russia seem to have adequately assessed a challenge of engaging in such kind of exercise. Their rapprochement, as suggested earlier, represents a very significant factor in the current European developments, but future-oriented policy requires focusing more substantively on where and with what purposes they should cooperate. The lack of strategic vision often pushes them to interact instinctively rather than consistently, reactively rather than with a sense of initiative. For this reason, any attempts to describe a would-be agenda of their interaction can be, at this stage, only tentative and subjective.

There is also a need to structure this tentative agenda. In a broad sense, Russia's goal seems to consist in filling it with political issues allowing to promote Russia's approaches towards various aspects of international developments. Actually, the list of these issues includes practically all those that are relevant to Russia's own foreign policy agenda in the making. It is another matter whether they fit into, or overlap with the CFSP agenda. Even when they do, it is obvious that sensitivities and focuses of Russia and the EU may be different. That's why it seems appropriate to overview the major international constellations where both sides might proceed from similar concerns and/or look for coordinated approaches.

Michael Emerson and his colleagues from the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), when conceptualizing the emerging relationship between Russia and the EU, distinguish two categories: 'geopolitical Europe' and 'borderland Europe'⁴². This approach seems suitable for addressing the issues that might be included in the agenda of political interaction between Russia and the EU. Indeed, the first category would concern the organization of the European geopolitical space per se; the question arising here is whether the EU and Russia might find common interest in building such a space. The problems encompassed in the second group would touch upon Russia's and the EU's immediate (and perhaps partly overlapping) peripheries—problems that might constitute a considerable part of their political agenda. In addition, one more cluster could be singled out—'out-of-area' issues, i.e. those that might be a subject of cooperative interaction of Russia and the EU on the global scale and in the regions located far beyond Europe ant its immediate neighbourhood.

Problems of organizing Europe

Russia's thinking on possible interaction with the EU is deeply inscribed in reflections on the importance of Europe for Russia's international interests. In many respects, this region seems to be regarded as deserving very special attention on the part of Russia.

Indeed, it was in Europe that the overcoming of the cold war pattern had the most 'visible' and impressive character. It was in Europe that the elimination of East-West ideological, political and military confrontation allowed to reconsider Russia's security interests and concerns in the most radical way. It was in Europe that Russia might first of all see positive prospects of its constructive international involvement in the light of new circumstances in the world arena.

At the same time, Europe has become during the last decade an area of the most profound changes. The unification of Germany, the new activism of the integration processes, the foreign policy re-orientation of former socialist states, the dramatic conflict developments in the Balkans—all these elements of new European realities require the most serious attention on the part of Russia, objectively pushing it to reassess its interests and means of protecting them. In fact, Russia is facing a double challenge of enormous dimension: that of adapting itself to the emerging new European international landscape and that of affecting the process of its formation.

Russia has serious problems in meeting this challenge. The fundamental transformations of the last decade have significantly decreased Moscow's ability to affect developments in Europe. After having during half a century a direct access to the very centre of the continent, the country feels nowadays being its most remote territory. The center of gravity in Europe has moved westwards (at least as viewed from Moscow), and Russia experiences an uncomfortable feeling of being relegated to the sidelines of European developments. Worse, Russia finds itself in the painful position of having lost all the old allies and being unable to attract any new ones.

Against this background, Moscow seems to aim at consolidating the country's role in Europe and preventing (or, at least, mitigating) the development that might marginalize Russia. In principle, when defining Russia's interests in such a general way, they might look absolutely acceptable to the EU as well. In this respect, both sides can easily find a common language and to agree that Russia deserves a respectable place and role in Europe. The question is whether (and to what extent) they would find a common language in developing more specific assessments when considering the problems of organizing and consolidating the European international system in the making.

For a time, Russia manifested a considerable political and diplomatic activity to promote a 'pan-European security architecture' as an alternative to what was inherited from the cold war era. However, the EU could by no means reciprocate Moscow in the preference that the latter was ready to give to a new 'grand design' for Europe. This would mean abandoning those patterns that have proved their validity and were regarded as promising for the future. The EU itself was one of those structures—whereas Moscow apparently suggested 'to dissolve' them in a new political organization of the continent.

Due to similar reasons, there were no grounds to expect a positive echo from the EU with respect to Moscow's idea of establishing a hierarchy of European institutions. Indeed, the logic of upgrading the OSCE (CSCE) and putting all other multilateral structures under its umbrella looked very appealing to Russia. To the EU, it certainly did not—although there could be more sympathy towards less ambitious proposals aimed at making the role of the OSCE more efficient. But in this regard, it was Moscow who manifested more hesitations—not least because of its reluctance to provide this organization with more intrusive functions.

In fact, it is possible to see here a reflection of different approaches of Russia and the EU towards the principles of organizing the international system on the continent and the roles assigned to some of its components—in this case, to the OSCE. This structure—in terms of its genesis, composition and operational mode—is by far the most attractive multilateral institution for Russia. Indeed, the latter is one of its founders, it participates therein as a full-fledged member, the consensus rule provides Moscow with a veto right allowing to prevent decisions that it would consider damaging Russia's interests. For the EU, all these considerations are of no relevance; what matters is the role of the OSCE in maintaining and promoting some fundamental values adopted by the EU. Meanwhile, it is exactly this value-related aspect of the OSCE activity that provoked time and again Russia's exasperation. For the same reasons, the EU would welcome the OSCE 'expansion' onto the post-Soviet space, whereas Moscow often seemed to fear its excessive involvement therein that might limit Russia's freedom of action.

The differences in attitudes towards the Council of Europe seem to follow similar lines. When Russia became its member, this was viewed as an important political gain attesting to the quality of the changes in the country. The EU is certainly supportive with respect to such approach. But because the latter is mainly applied to 'newcomers' that fail to satisfy the Council's high standards on human rights and democracy, Russia finds itself vulnerable to severe criticism that might seriously damage its prestige. In this respect, it feels differently as compared to the EU. The latter is unfamiliar with the task that Russia faces within the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe—that of 'struggling' to alleviate condemnations addressed to Russia. In addition, the EU is genetically linked with the Council of Europe—meanwhile, as far as Russia is concerned, some politicians and analysts argue for its eventual withdrawal from this organization. This is fraught with a risk of pushing Russia to reconsider the very idea of becoming internationally accountable. Needless to say, that in the EU's perspective of Council of Europe, this 'dimension' is non-existent.

Russia does profit from participating in the Council of Europe and appreciate its contribution to democracy-building in the country. But Russia's attitudes towards this structure are considerably more vehement and politicized than those of the EU.

However, the OSCE and the Council of Europe are relatively marginal in the agenda of actual or potential 'pan-European' interaction between Russia and the EU. The key role therein is undoubtedly reserved to NATO. The reason is obvious: the very possibility of such interaction emerges at the cross-section of two extremely important—and controversial—dimensions of international politics, one concerning the EU—NATO relationship and another one regarding the Russia—NATO connection.

Through the whole decade after the end of the cold war, Russia's debate on the organization of the European international system has been focused upon NATO. This seems to be related to three basic factors.

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  First, during most of this period the alliance has been still perceived as a challenge to Russia's security interests, even if only a potential one.
  
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  Secondly, Moscow wanted to prevent the central security role in Europe being played by a structure to which Russia did not and would not have direct access.
  
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  Thirdly, Russia's over-excitement on the issue of NATO enlargement was (and still is) considerably promoted by purely domestic factors.
  

None of these arguments could provoke a responsive reaction on the part of the EU. With most of its member-states being simultaneously members of NATO, nothing allowed to expect them to share Russia's overall negativism towards the Alliance. What was a security challenge to Russia represented a reliable security guarantee to most of the EU members. Moscow's reluctance to accept the centrality of NATO tends to have an irrationally overwhelming character and is particularly exacerbated by Russia's non-participation in the Alliance. Yet, the EU looks at the NATO security role as a justifiable pattern, limited to the functional scope of the Alliance; those EU countries that are not members of NATO do not consider this fact as justifying any inferiority complex. The belligerence of some domestic forces in Russia over NATO is attributed to the inertia of cold war mentality that has to be overcome rather than cultivated.

By and large, Russia and the EU seemed to develop their assessments in entirely different systems of coordinates: what looked obvious to one side was absolutely inconceivable to another one, and vice versa. Thus, on the level of existential characteristics of NATO, both sides have very little chances to develop a common understanding. However, they could be more in tune with each other when regarding the dynamics of the developments in Europe and the role of NATO therein:

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  First, the consolidation and the increasing salience of NATO are promoted by new military tasks that are being ascribed to the Alliance in addition to the old ones. This contradicts to the vision of a new Europe where the political developments are less affected by purely military factors. However inconsistent this vision might be in the light of developments in the Balkans, it has its vociferous supporters both in Russia and in the EU.
  
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  Secondly, the Alliance, far from getting a lower profile, is carrying out a kind of a triple expansion—extending its functions, its membership and its zone of responsibility. Russia's resolute negativism with respect to this multidimensional expansion of NATO is by no means officially shared by the EU, but the latter may have serious reasons for certain reservations in this regard.
  
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  Thirdly, Russia's complaints about the challenging policy of NATO might also meet some understanding on the part of the EU. According to this line of thinking, instead of making the international law and the UN-based system the core elements of the post-bipolar world, NATO disregards them both and pretends to have an exclusive droit de regard with respect to what is going on in the world. The EU may be reluctant to endorse straight-forward accusations of this type, but their substance would not make some of its politicians and analysts indifferent.
  
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  Fourthly, Moscow's negativism towards NATO to a very considerable extent proceeded from Russia's political and psychological complexes regarding the USA. Yet, the EU is by no means immune of such kind of complexes, although they are rarely expressed in an open way and, as a rule, have only a latent character.
  

On the EU side, these broad considerations touch directly upon the CFSP developments. Indeed, the EU faces a challenge of promoting its own international identity, and NATO represents an extremely significant point of reference in the framework of this long-term process.

On Russia's side, the focus upon NATO is rationalized by arguments having a key importance for its own foreign policy self-identification. Among these arguments—those related to historic legacy (such as cold war mentality), status considerations (such as former superpower complex), fundamental orientations in external relations (first of all on would-be attitudes towards the West), approaches towards the emerging international order (in particular, towards the US leadership), and so on.

Not surprisingly, the EU—Russia interaction on NATO, touching upon extremely sensitive issues, has always had a very delicate character. As a rule, its 'material' component is almost invisible, with both sides often preferring to refrain from formalizing the debate. Moreover, the debate itself could be physically non-existent, with its implicit traces appearing only indirectly and in unofficial statements and comments.

This makes misunderstanding possible, and even more so miscalculations and inadequate assessments of each other's interests, intentions and readiness for practical actions. Moscow has more than once found itself in this trap when the EU was expected to prefer the engagement with Russia rather than with NATO/USA. In a broader sense, this touches upon the question that has been often raised through the last five decades, without ever getting a sufficiently unambiguous answer: are there grounds to anticipate a stronger Soviet/Russian-European connection as compared to the European-American one?

The CFSP fits directly into this thought pattern. Indeed, the CFSP has emerged as a trend towards developing the 'international personality' of the EU, and the self-identification of the latter is supposed to take place in juxtaposition to the already operating actors in the world scene. The USA and Russia are among those actors who are particularly visible on the radars of the EU, and the latter cannot avoid positioning itself with respect to them. The configuration of this positioning, as mentioned earlier, is expected to be significantly influenced by the objective closeness of Russia and the EU, both searching to diminish the US monocentrism by a strategy of promoting a more multipolar world.

The EU, in this perspective, has to feel uncomfortable about what it allegedly perceives as excessive US involvement in the European affairs. And on this ground, there could be a certain level of mutual understanding with Russia. It is true that Moscow's official policy line recognizes the essential role of the USA in the European developments; Europe is traditionally one of central issues discussed by Russians and Americans bilaterally. However, there is also a considerable amount of negativism in Russia's perceptions of, and reactions to the US actual and virtual presence in Europe. This negativism is partly a residual phenomenon inherited from the cold war era. But there is also a kind of neo-anti-Americanism emerging from the vision of the unipolar world in the making, with the only remaining superpower that pretends to be the centre of the Universe and operates in the international arena without paying any attention to legitimate interests of others (including the interests of the Europeans, both allied and not allied with the USA).

From this image comes a spontaneous suspicion that the consolidation of the trans-Atlantic relations might damage Russia's interests and push it further away from the main lines of European developments. This is coupled with sporadic attempts to play on what is perceived as contradictions between the USA and the EU and to promote 'pure European' approaches as a counterweight to excessive involvement of the Americans in the affairs of the continent. Russia, by the same logic, might be engaged in these approaches as a natural partner of the EU—in fact, 'more natural' (or more organic) in comparison to the United States.

All these trends were dramatically affected by the developments in and around Kosovo in 1998-1999. Even if nowadays this belongs to the past and President Putin seems to be concerned with this issue considerably less the Prime-Minister Primakov was, the importance of the Kosovo phenomenon for Russia's thinking about the current international developments should not be underestimated. Indeed, it influenced Russia's ideas on its relations with the outside world in a more fundamental way than most other events during the last decade did. This could not but have a considerable impact on Russia's attitudes towards, and policies in Europe—both in general and with respect to the EU in particular.

This 'European connection' of the Kosovo case for Russia might seem distressing if it is only regarded as inscribed into the overall context of Russia's relations with the West. Indeed, the military operation against Yugoslavia was assessed as a flagrant violation of the international law, as a heavy strike against the existing UN-based international system, as an attempt to establish a 'new world order' by force allowing the arbitrary interference into internal affairs of states (on 'humanitarian' or any other grounds). Also, Russia was strongly (and painfully) affected by the fact that the decision to use force was taken against its objection which was interpreted as an additional manifestation of insulting disregard towards Russia and as one more attempt to disassociate it from crucial European issues.

The air strikes against Yugoslavia, as viewed by Russia, were the most convincing justification for its negativism with respect to the prospect of establishing a NATO-centred Europe. Indeed, the Kosovo phenomenon has contributed to the consolidation of Russia's anti-NATO stand more than the whole vociferous campaign against the enlargement of NATO. For a while, the anti-NATO sentiments became so strong that major concern of the official Moscow, although it did play a role in promoting public indignation, seemed to consist in preventing the enthusiasts of a new cold war from taking the upper hand in domestic debates on how to respond to NATO's aggression.

At the same time, it is quite remarkable that Russia's indignation with respect to NATO military actions in Yugoslavia was oriented predominantly and almost exclusively against the USA—as if the Europeans did not participate at all. The fact that the EU supported the war against Yugoslavia and even contributed to it both politically and economically, passed almost unnoticed in Russia. By and large, the EU states involved in this campaign were basically viewed (and 'excused') as operating under American pressure.

This perception, even if coming to simplification or ignorance, redirected Russia's negativism away from the Europeans. Certainly, their record in Kosovo, as viewed by Russia, was very poor; their ability to operate independently from the USA turned out considerably lower than it had been expected. Moreover, the predominance of NATO in dealing with Kosovo was interpreted as undermining the process of building a strong 'European pole'⁴³.

At the same time, it was hoped that the Kosovo crisis would promote the self-identification of the Europeans and their energetic search for a more prominent (and more independent) international role⁴⁴. In particular, this role could be consolidated by promoting more active links between the EU and Russia. A parallel development could follow on Russia's side, with its increased attention towards the EU as a side-effect of the Kosovo crisis—the attention that was pushed forward by the anti-NATO rationale and directed towards Russia's engagement with Europe as an alternative to the predominance of NATO.

Actually, this highlights the core of this analytical and political trend suggesting that Russia has an option of promoting its relations with the EU at the expenses of NATO's role in Europe. Inherent in this logic is the vision of the EU facing a choice between USA/NATO and Russia. If Moscow plays skillfully on trans-Atlantic contradictions, and positions itself cooperatively and convincingly with respect to the EU, the latter might consider this offer irresistible.

Time and again, this logic has appeared through the whole history of Moscow's interaction with Western Europe and the USA since World War II. Russia's period of this history does not make an exception. Suffice it to refer to remarks that were done a couple of times by President Yeltsin⁴⁵ stressing with a astonishing straightforwardness that 'the Europeans should be dealing with their affairs themselves'—presumably, without annoying involvement of the Americans. If such theses find their way on the level of official statements, one could easily imagine how tempting they are for authors of unofficial analyses.

Both politically and analytically, this approach leads to a deadlock. It certainly proceeds from wrong premises that misunderstand the character of trans-Atlantic relations, develop inadequate interpretation of contradictions therein, advance a distorted assessment of NATO, underestimate the scope, the depth and the strength of links between the EU and the USA. Ironically, the anti-US zeal of this approach fails to adequately consider its implications in terms of Russia's interest if the latter is defined somehow differently. In particular, it completely overlooks the argument stipulating Russia's objective interest in maintaining a certain level of the American involvement in Europe.

Against this background, it is worth mentioning a different line of thinking promoted by some analysts. They expect that the 'anti-NATO' vector of Russia's European engagement might gradually fade away which would bring about an overall rapprochement between Russia and the West as a whole. Thus, a prominent Russian analyst believes that the military campaign against Yugoslavia permitted the USA 'to make the Europeans reconfirm the centrality of NATO with unambiguous American leadership in the system of European security'. But he also adds an important qualification: 'Paradoxically as it might be, the Yugoslav crisis can prospectively create a fertile ground for a positive reassessment of Russian-Western relations'⁴⁶.

This approach proceeds from the assumption that Russian-European connection should be considered not as a value in itself but as a means of re-establishing a normal track in Russian-Western relations. From the EU, Russia expects 'the manifestation of political will to balance Russia's relations with NATO (or to compensate their possible degradation as the result of the Yugoslav crisis) by developing its own ties with Russia'⁴⁷. From Russia, it is required not to highlight its grievances towards NATO and USA in the light of Russia's rapprochement with the EU—on the contrary, they could be mitigated and then eradicated by this process. Furthermore, the latter is impossible as a long-term trend if it is developed in opposition to NATO and the USA. A similar logic is applied to the 'western side' of this pattern: in case the attempts to eliminate barriers in relations between NATO and Russia fail, the importance of cooperation between the EU and Russia would only increase as a channel allowing the West 'to keep' Russia for constructive interaction.

With President Putin, Russia seems to follow this more balanced logic in its official course. While maintaining its focus upon the EU, Moscow has also 'de-frozen' its relations with NATO. This 'dual track' approach allows less space for temptation of playing the card of the EU against that of NATO. Furthermore, it stipulates that 'ensuring stable and meaningful Russian presence in Europe is only possible if the USA is present there'⁴⁸. In this sense, it better fits in the policy line of the EU itself, the one that stipulates the necessity of 'going hand by hand' with the USA and insists that 'more Europe' in the CFSP does not and should not mean 'less America'⁴⁹.