Russia's Attitudes towards the eu: Political Aspects

Zones of immediate contact

In a sense, the enlarging EU and Russia could be regarded as two influential power poles in Europe—whatever meaning the very notion of 'power pole' might have. This scheme suggests that there is a certain space in their immediate vicinities whereupon the political interaction of the EU and Russia is of particular importance.

Here again, the practice of such interaction is often (although not always) lagging behind the objective need thereof. Theorizing does not compensate for the non-existent policies but could be helpful for developing a certain intellectual foundation for them—even if only by pointing schematically both to concerns that the EU and Russia might address to each other and to the potential of their cooperation.

Zones of actual or potential direct interaction between the EU and Russia stretch from Europe's North to the Caucasus. The general trend, when moving southwards, consists in increasing substantive challenges to their interaction alongside its eroding structural distinctness.

Northern/Baltic Sea area

It is in the northern part of Europe that the EU and Russia have a direct territorial contact, along the Finnish-Russian border. This zone of contact has a clearly defined status, there are no overlapping ambiguities that might complicate their interaction, as it happens in many other areas. It is true that the accession of Finland to the EU introduced some changes in its economic relations with Russia⁵⁰. However, in political terms it had a very positive demonstrative effect for Russia's thinking about the future of its relations with the EU. Moreover, the evolving trans-border cooperation on the regional level, actively endorsed by the EU, is considered as a promising pattern indeed.

This said, one should also mention Russia's latent concerns as regards eventual claims to the territories that used to belong to Finland and were ceded to Russia in 1940 and 1944. On the one hand, the issue could be characterized as practically non-existent, if one takes into account both the unambiguous official position of Finland and the lack of support (and even interest) to it on the part of public opinion. On the other hand, if the very possibility of such claims is recognized theoretically, there might be an additional worry that they could become more convincing if supported by the EU. In practice, however, the very fact of Finland's EU membership makes a possibility of such claims politically irrelevant. In a sense, this also could be interpreted as one more example when the 'EU factor' has a beneficial influence in terms of alleviating Russia's phobia and anxieties.

Another problem might be considered less theoretical and more disturbing—the one touching upon the military-related aspects of Finland's participation in the EU. There are two possible concerns of Russia in this regard: that the participation in the EU might pave the way to NATO, and that the EU itself might evolve into a military-type structure thus undermining Finland's traditional stand in the international arena. However, this problem arises from Russia's controversial attitudes towards the CESDP (that are addressed in a separate chapter below) rather than from Moscow's political vision of the EU as a regional partner.

Finland played a crucial role in launching the Northern Dimension initiative and introducing it into the EU agenda. From the very beginning, a prominent place in this endeavor was envisaged for the interaction with Russia. Meanwhile, Moscow's initial reaction thereto seemed coloured with a certain political confusion and perhaps suspicions, even if indistinct and not specifically articulated. The reasons for such apprehensions could have been based on two considerations.

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  First, the initiative could encapsulate the interaction between Russia and the EU into a strictly regional framework. It would reduce the role of the PCA as a more comprehensive pattern of this interaction, or at least develop as a kind of competing machinery. As a result, Russia would be relegated to the sidelines of the EU priorities⁵¹.
  
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  Secondly, it would radically shift the functional center of gravity in interaction between Russia and the EU, focusing it upon 'low politics' and eliminating 'high politics' from the agenda. Indeed, comprehensive as it was, the Northern Dimension intended to cover almost every conceivable subject, except military security.
  

If the Northern Dimension is looked upon from this angle, Russia would have no reasons for excessive enthusiasm thereon. The proposed framework might be perceived as incommensurate with Russia's international status; however reduced and eroded, it still deserves more respect and has to be treated accordingly. Politicians and analysts with sharp inferiority complex (or, alternatively, with residual superpower mentality) might even perceive this as an insulting proposition. Suspicious-minded observers would suppose that this was exactly the deliberate intention behind the initiative, that is to remind Russia about the place it deserves, and put it thereto.

These vague instincts, however, turned out outweighed by the positive dynamics of the Northern Dimension⁵². Without addressing here all its vast programme (that is substantially analyzed elsewhere⁵³), it is worth underlining some politically relevant considerations.

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  The Northern Dimension has become one of the most important EU programmes. Apprehensions that it would be a small and almost indiscernible fraction in the overall spectrum of the EU external relations have proved wrong.
  
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  It has become sufficiently comprehensive for not considering it meaningless. In particular, it operates as a political umbrella for numerous other regional patterns (including, for instance the Council of Baltic Sea States).
  
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  Russia is interested in opening the 'Arctic window' which was agreed upon within the Northern Dimension. This allows to involve the EU in cooperative interaction with Russia in that area.
  
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  The political sponsorship of Finland and than Sweden have proved beneficial for the Northern Dimension. In Russia's eyes, the non-participation of these two countries in NATO makes their political sponsorship particularly valuable.
  
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  With Russia's sensitivity over its Kaliningrad exclave, it is appreciated that the Northern Dimension has been instrumental in promoting this issue into the EU—Russia political agenda.
  
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  Although an initiative of regional size and focus, it might be not as limited as it initially looked. Russia's North extends to the region of Chukotka at the shore of Bering Straight. The Northern Dimension could point to fascinating prospects of cooperation between the EU and Russia in exploring these vast territories. In particular, the exploration of Siberia could be a super-project of the 21^st century, with enormous economic, geopolitical, demographic and other implications.
  

Among the problems that Russia sees nowadays in the Northern Dimension, the most irritating for Moscow is what it believes to be an excessive focus upon ecology at the expenses of other aspects of regional cooperation. Ironically, when at the earlier stages Russia was arguing against its role as a gas supplier, it insisted on making environmental issues more prominent and seemed pleased when this was done on the initiative of Sweden. Also, when Russia request more progress in terms of insuring the financial basis of the Northern Dimension, these demands are only addressed to the EU participants in this programme—although they, in response, assess rather critically Russia's own contribution. By and large, it seems that in some respects there is a certain misunderstanding with respect to the very ideology of the Northern Dimension, with its focus upon promoting an overall infrastructure for economic and social developments.

As far as 'pure' politics is concerned, it remains an open question whether the exclusion of traditional security issues is beneficial or counterproductive. This removes the burden of the most contentious problems, but makes the Northern Dimension totally irrelevant for addressing them.

The most serious of such problems emerge in Russia's relations with three Baltic states with regard to (i) their intention to join NATO and (ii) the status of Russophone minorities therein. Paradoxically as it might be, there is no appropriate niche in the EU—Russia interaction for addressing the first of these two issues. The second one is mainly treated in the context of forthcoming accession of these states to the EU. Meanwhile, both aspects might deserve more attention on the level of the CFSP—Russia connection⁵⁴.

CIS western edge

However, if the current and forthcoming configuration in and around the Baltic Sea area seems more or less clear and in this sense does not seem conducive to overburdening the political agenda of Russia and the EU, the situation becomes more controversial when moving further southwards. The in-between political space is constituted by the western edge of the CIS, this fluid and politically unstructured entity with numerous unsettled problems, both in domestic politics and with respect to external interactions, and with controversial combination of Russia's influence and Russia's weakness therein.

Russia's objective role in the post-Soviet space is considerable; it is becoming even more so against the background of relatively more successful domestic developments in Russia in comparison to the erosion of economy and political structures in some of its CIS neighbours. At the same time, Russia proceeds from the assumption that the CIS is (or, in any case, should be) a zone of its predominant influence. Whether Moscow manages (or fails) to implement this approach into practice is another issue. But this will certainly be inscribed into broader international context and at the same time will have broader international implications. Russia's political relations with the EU should be considered, inter alia, against this background.

While Russia might realistically expect that its unique position within the CIS area will be recognized and respected, there may be three disturbing aspects for its relations with the EU.

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  First, the means which Russia considers necessary and legitimate for protecting and promoting its interests in the post-Soviet space could be viewed by the EU as inappropriate or unacceptable.
  
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  Second, building up of a Russia-dominated 'velvet empire' would most probably meet similar reaction.
  
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  Third, Russia's reluctance to let other international actors operate within its 'sphere of vital interests' may also have a discouraging effect on relations between Russia and the EU.
  

On the part of the EU, this might require a better understanding of Russian concerns and difficulties in forging satisfactory new patterns with other post-Soviet states—as well as a better understanding of emotional and psychological connotations of this problem. Indeed, there are no legal obstacles for an eventual political 'penetration' of the EU onto the territory of the former USSR. However, if such developments are not backed by appropriate political accommodation with Moscow, the latter might be inclined to perceive them as promoting further erosion of the post-Soviet space, this remaining symbol of what used to be one country.

Yet, this erosion has been politically and psychologically accepted only in the case of three Baltic republics, with their developing alienation from Russia (which means much more than just getting independent). However, even their eventual involvement in NATO is still a traumatic phenomenon, and this to a considerably higher degree than it was in the case of the three East Central European states. With respect to other post-Soviet territories in the western vicinity of Russia, similar effect might be produced by a prospect of their accession to the EU, however less challenging this might be seen in comparison to NATO membership. Indeed, Russia seems to apprehend that the political distance might turn out too short between outsiders' involvement and irreversible re-orientation of its western CIS neighbours.

In addition to emotional and psychological aspects of the problem, there is an obvious political dimension in it. Maintaining Russia's predominance in the CIS area is considered by Moscow as one of the 'pillars' of its positioning in the international arena. In a paradoxical way, Russia's apparent disillusionment regarding the CIS as a multilateral mechanism goes in parallel with increasing inclination to consolidate its influence within the CIS as a geopolitical space. Noteworthy, the new configuration of the international system, with the US predominant role therein, seems even to make this trend more explicit. A notorious Russian analyst believes that nowadays '[t]he struggle is going on for getting a place in the unipolar world. Russia's goal in the unipolar world consists in maintaining its positions over the CIS territory'⁵⁵.

Ukraine's political maneuverings seem to be viewed in Moscow as the most disturbing challenge in this regard. This is partly due to the fact that Kiev might consider the prospect of its rapprochement with, and eventual accession to the EU as quite realistic, whereas for Moscow developing coherent arguments against Ukraine's eventual participation in the EU would be more problematic than objecting to its rapprochement with NATO. However, Ukraine may be also dissatisfied with fact that the shadow of Russia seems always present in its relations with the EU⁵⁶.

At the same time, some Russian comments point to a paradoxical aberration that might be associated with concerns of both countries. Indeed, a case could be made that Ukraine's European orientation has chances only if supported by Russia. As a Russian observer put it, Ukraine 'has formally proclaimed its European choice, but—strange as it might be—it [the choice] is less European, than the non-European choice of Russia, with the latter definitely appearing as a more European country'⁵⁷. This logic seems appropriate even if there are some doubts on 'political correctness' of the issue as it is discussed here. In other words, Russia's involvement in Ukraine does not prevent the latter from getting closer to Europe; on the contrary, Russia could be instrumental (and perhaps even indispensable) in promoting Ukraine's rapprochement with the EU. For instance, more successful economic reforms in Russia make it relatively 'more compatible' with the EU, and Ukraine's opening towards Europe could bring better results if it is carried out together and in coordination with Russia. Similarly, the expansion of capitals from Russia to Ukraine paves the way for investors from Europe that otherwise could be more hesitant and reluctant to explore the unprepared economic space.

From this point of view, a political dialogue between Russia and the EU could be balanced (and reinforced) by the involvement of Ukraine therein. In a broader sense, such trilateral configuration could be applied to other CIS states in the area as well. This would promote their self-esteem and their repositioning vis-à-vis Russia from dependence to partnership—without, however, antagonizing Russia and provoking suspicions and nervousness on its part⁵⁸.

This said, it is clear that the range, the scope and the substance of bi- or trilateral interaction patterns will vary depending on size of different states and their specific circumstances. Thus, Belarus represents a special case. Although its domestic developments is an additional burden rather than an asset for Moscow, the latter pursues a patronizing policy line because of various considerations that are promoted by that cannot be disregarded. This will most probably push the Kremlin to take the side of President Lukashenko in any situation when he becomes an object of external pressure. It is true that Belarus is a small quantity in the priorities of the EU. However, the reputation of the current regime puts the country in the category of pariah states in the perceptions of the EU. In fact, Russia and the EU proceed from mutually opposing vectors—which in itself is a sufficient reason for paying a special attention to this problem in Russia's political interaction with the CFSP.

The case of Moldova brings into the pattern of Russia's relations with the West in general and with the EU in particular two problems. One concerns the country's political drift westwards, including its eventual re-unification with Romania; the political relevance of this issue seems to have become considerably lower than in the early post-Soviet years a decade ago. Another one touches upon the Trans-Dniester region with overwhelming Russian ethnic population claiming independence from Moldova. Although the prevailing mood in Russian political quarters seems to prefer downplaying this conflict in order to prevent it from turning into a new 'hot spot', warnings against eventual attempts to pressure Russia out of that area time and again re-emerge in Russian political debates and mass media. Competitive influences of western countries are often mentioned in this regard. Thus, the United States was reported to threaten deploying its military bases in Georgia and Azerbaijan in case Russian does not prompt its withdrawal from Trans-Dniester region⁵⁹. In fact, this alarmist approach does not differentiate between the USA and other western countries, including the EU members—they all are viewed as aiming to undermine the overall balance in the Black Sea region and 'encircle' Russia along its immediate periphery.

By and large, the problems of the CIS area, especially those in its western edge, are by no means irrelevant for the prospective political agenda in Russia's relations with the EU. They have to be addressed cautiously, with a clear understanding that this might touch upon some delicate or tough issues⁶⁰. But failure to address them could be even more counterproductive. The interests of both Russia and the EU in the post-Soviet space might be better served by their broader cooperative pattern of relations than by its absence—not to mention the alternative of confrontation in this area.

Black Sea area/Caucasus

In principle, this approach seems also relevant with respect to the areas further to the south—with three important qualifications.

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  The developments in these areas have been more chaotic and the situation nowadays is less structured than in other European vicinities of Russia.
  
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  Russia has a high level of sensitivity towards this part of its southern underbelly, generated both by domestic and by external factors.
  
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  The EU seems to have only embryonic policy with respect to these areas.
  

In fact, these three factors might constitute a serious rationale for both sides to engage in a more active political interaction. Two main lines of such development seem possible.

The first one would be focused upon the Black Sea area at large. Indeed, its importance for Russia is obvious and does not need any special clarification. As far as the EU is concerned, it will enter the area as a major actor in any mainstream scenario, since half of the coast line is accounted for by EU accession candidate states. Thus, Russia and the EU will be interacting in the area anyway. In addition, this interaction will have a strong political relevance to the CIS/Ukraine factor (as outlined briefly in the previous section), as well as to the prevailing paradigm of Russia's relations with Turkey in its various capacities (as a NATO member, a candidate to the EU accession and an influential actor in the Caucasus).

This said, it would be of utmost importance to ensure that the forthcoming political emergence of the EU in the Black Sea area does not exacerbate historical and political sensitivities of Russia. The latter should be convinced to consider this process in the context of a long-term mutually beneficial cooperative interaction rather than as a worrisome sign of forthcoming rivalry and competing strategies aimed at controlling lands, water spaces and transportation routes. Essential in this context would be an initiative line of the EU, coordinated with and supported by Russia.

A possible approach has been suggested as a model of the EU Black Sea Dimension⁶¹. It seems to have several advantages.

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  It is inspired by, and could profit from the already existing pattern of Northern Dimension.
  
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  It suggests to build upon the already existing structure, the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation, with the EU becoming its full-fledged participant.
  
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  There are realistic grounds to expect Russia's supportive attitude thereto.
  

In any case, this line deserves serious attention of both Russia and the EU and might be a valuable future-oriented element of their joint political agenda.

The situation in the South Caucasus (or in the Transcaucasus, according to Russia's political parlance) might constitute another important item of this agenda. It is true that the region, strictly speaking, is not nowadays in the zone of Russia EU immediate contact—but it could be considered as the immediate extension of that zone. Prospects for interaction between the EU and Russia are perhaps more controversial in this area because of its highly unstable situation.

Indeed, the Transcaucasus and its vicinities represent an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape. The area's immediate proximity to Russia's troublesome North Caucasus provinces is only one, albeit extremely important dimension of Moscow's concerns—in particular, about the external support of military separatist activities, like in Chechnya. Other dimensions include uncertainties about domestic developments in all three Transcaucasian post-Soviet states, the existence of unsettled armed conflicts there and the prospects of extracting energy resources from the Caspian oilfields.

Moscow is becoming extremely sensitive to what is perceived as the growing involvement of out-of-area actors in the region threatening Russia to be squeezed out of the Transcaucasus. The US activism in the area is an especially irritating factor: Moscow apprehends that the Transcaucasus is increasingly regarded by Washington in terms of its vital interests, the American investments there are rapidly developing, and the United States is obtaining powerful levers of influence over the region of growing strategic importance, both for Russia and in terms of broader geopolitical considerations. A dramatic reading of this phenomenon, that was becoming increasingly common in Moscow by the turn of centuries, suggested that the next twist of the spiral of Russian-U.S. rivalry for spheres of influence would be in the Transcaucasus and around the Caspian sea⁶².

It is against this background that prospects of Russia—EU political interaction in the region could be explored, with two main arguments substantiating this pattern:

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  Russia is interested in promoting stability in the Transcaucassus but cannot do it on its own—whereas the EU could significantly contribute to problem-solving both by its direct involvement (diplomatically and financially) and by its unique experience of organizing its own multi-state and poly-ethnical space.
  
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  At the same time, the EU's involvement might be perceived by Moscow as less challenging in comparison to those of NATO or the USA—especially in the light of Russia's political rapprochement with the EU.
  

These are certainly very general considerations. But they might lead to very concrete patterns that Russia and the EU might be interested in promoting—for instance, on the use of the emerging CESDP potential, in cooperation with Russia, as a conflict management tool in the case of Nogorno-Karabakh conflict. However problematic this approach might seem nowadays, it might be a matter of discussions within a joint Russia EU political pattern.