resource complexes and with the conditions and possibilities of
their speedy and effective use, so necessary in the extreme condi-
tions of wartime. In other words, in Fersman
’s view, geography was
now vital to the Soviet war effort.
According to L.S. Abramov of IGAN, a leading scholar of the ac-
tivities of the geographers during the war, an unfortunate effect of
the discipline
’s apparently low pre-war status was that many as-
pects of what might be termed
‘military geography’ were badly
neglected, certainly by comparison with the Axis powers.
28
Thus
the USSR had possessed no uni
fied military-geographical service
and contacts between the military and the geographers were
minimal. The teaching of military geography, including the making
and interpretation of maps, was a low priority in the military
academies. Modern topographical maps were available only for the
border regions west of a line between Moscow and Kiev. Indeed,
the prevailing military doctrine was that any war would largely be
fought on the territory of the enemy. Detailed territorial de-
scriptions of Soviet territory, designed for military use, were mainly
economic rather than physical in character and badly dated. Before
1940, when IGAN began work on detailed geographical descriptions
of the USSR
’s potential enemies in eastern and central Europe, the
Soviet authorities possessed no such materials. Only at a late stage
did SOPS (the Council for the Study of Productive Forces, successor
to KEPS) begin to investigate the possibilities of evacuating vital
industries and other activities to the east.
Inevitably, then, Soviet geographers emerged to play a signi
fi-
cant role during the war years in a number of areas of vital military
importance. However, to some degree this work was initially
hampered by the large-scale evacuation of academic institutions to
the east in 1941 and early 1942.
29
Indeed, soon after the Germans
launched their wholly unexpected invasion of the USSR on June 22,
1941, it became apparent that the cities of Moscow and Leningrad
were in grave danger of capture. In these circumstances, the Soviet
authorities quickly took the decision to move their more important
scientists to places of safety. Their reasoning was explained by
Berg
’s daughter, Raisa: ‘Every one of the cities where evacuated
academicians [had] lived turned out to be in a zone near the front. If
those cities had been captured by the Germans, the victors would
have acquired for their disposal enormous capital in the form of
scholars and scientists of all specialities. Evacuation, sometimes
forced, was supposed to avert that calamity
’.
30
Thus a major part of IGAN was evacuated to Alma Ata, capital of
Kazakhstan, by the late autumn of 1941, where it established itself
on the base of the Kazakh branch of the Academy of Sciences,
together with six other Academy of Sciences institutes.
31
Headed by
Grigor
’ev, the outpost continued to work closely with colleagues
from the Institutes of Soil and Botany and also forged links with
local academics.
32
Meanwhile, geographers working in institutions
located throughout the USSR, when not
fighting in the war or
finding themselves living in occupied territory, became engaged in
war work of various kinds. The rest of this section will focus on the
work of geographers in IGAN as emblematic of the kind of research
and military-related activity undertaken in these years.
Doskach and her colleagues have suggested that IGAN
’s early
war work developed in two main directions:
firstly, servicing the
needs of the front through the generation of military-geographical
information, and secondly assisting the extensive mobilization of
natural resources on the home front.
33
With regard to the second,
IGAN
’s role particularly related to work done in Kazakhstan and
more will be said about this in the section below on the wartime
activities of Grigor
’ev. But it is also important to mention the
involvement of geographers from IGAN, as well as those from
Moscow University (MGU) and elsewhere, in two special commis-
sions. The
first was the Commission for the Mobilization of the
Resources of the Urals, which began its activities in Sverdlovsk
(Ekaterinburg) in August 1941 on the basis of pre-war research. This
work was soon to be extended into West Siberia and northern
Kazakhstan (involving over 800 scientists and other specialists).
The second Commission was that for the Mobilization of the Re-
sources of the Volga and Kama regions, which was based on the city
of Kazan
’ and began work in June 1942.
34
The aims of both these
commissions were essentially similar: to survey the natural and
economic resources of these regions with a view to enhancing their
contribution to the war effort, to seek out possibilities for the
evacuation of populations and economic activities, and to substi-
tute for resources lost to the enemy in the west. In addition, and
also in regard to the home front, IGAN was involved elsewhere in
the search for minerals and other kinds of resources, and for
effective ways of using them, notably in the Komi Republic in the
north, in the Caucasus and Siberia.
With regard to the
first of IGAN’s early wartime activities,
namely the generation of military-geographical information, much
work was done in Alma Ata but a signi
ficant amount was also done
by the handful of scientists who remained in Moscow following the
evacuation of the main body, with numbers of personnel there
rising from a low of 12 to more than 20 by the summer of 1942.
35
These geographers worked in close cooperation with the Soviet
military and formed an integral element of the newly formed
Commission for Geological
eGeographical Services to the Red Army,
which was established in July 1941 under Fersman
’s leadership and
attached to the Division of Geological
eGeographical Sciences of the
Academy of Sciences. In addition to personnel from IGAN, this body
also integrated scientists from the Institute of Cryopedology and
the Commission for Aerial Photography and Engineering Geology.
36
More generally, IGAN responded to orders from a range of military
departments in order to produce an output which included hun-
dreds of specialist maps.
37
Kotliakov and Preobrazhenskii provide a
detailed breakdown of the activities of IGAN between 1941 and
1943 drawing from the institute
’s archives and other materials.
38
These included the production of handbooks for the air force as
28
Abramov, Geogra
fiia voiskam (note
27
), 72
e75. However, Smith and Black, and Troll, suggest that pre-war links between geographers and the military in Germany were
less close than Abramov suggests. See T.R. Smith and L.D. Black, German geography: war work and present status, Geographical Review 36 (1946) 398
e408; C. Troll,
Geographic science in Germany during the period 1933
e1945: a critique and justification, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 39 (1949) 99e137.
29
See B.V. Levshin, Rossiiskie nauchnye uchrezhdeniia i uchenye v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine 1941
e1945 godov, in: Nauka i uchenye (note
27
), 7
e23 (9).
30
R.L. Berg, Acquired Traits: Memoirs of a Geneticist from the Soviet Union, New York, 1990, 76.
31
B.V. Levshin, Sovetskaia nauka v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, Moscow, 1983, 42.
32
L.S. Abramov, Geogra
fiia e dlia pobedy, Voprosy Geografii 128 (1985) 13e24 (22).
33
A.G. Doskach, A.S. Kes
’, O.P. Nazarevskii and M.I. Pomus, Geografiia v uchrezhdeniiakh Akademii Nauk SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941e1945 gg.), Izvestiia
Akademii Nauk SSSR: seriia geogra
ficheskaia (1975) no. 3, 5e12 (6).
34
See Levshin, Rossiiskie (note
29
), 81; Abramov, Geogra
fiia e dlia pobedy (note
32
), 22.
35
V.M. Kotliakov (Ed), Institut Geogra
fii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk i ego liudi: k 90-letiiu so dnia obrazovaniia, Moscow, 2008, 19.
36
Abramov, Geogra
fiia voiskam (note
27
), 78.
37
Kotliakov, Institut (note
35
), 19
e20.
38
V.M. Kotliakov and V.S. Preobrazhenskii, Akademicheskaia geogra
fiia e vooruzhennym silam, Izvestiia Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk: seriia geograficheskaia (1995) no. 2, 9e21
(15).
D.J.B. Shaw, J.D. Old
field / Journal of Historical Geography xxx (2014) 1e10
5
Please cite this article in press as: Shaw DJB, Old
field JD, Soviet geographers and the Great Patriotic War, 1941e1945: Lev Berg and Andrei
Grigor
’ev, Journal of Historical Geography (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2014.06.002