Popular Government and Market Economy [241 ]
stood, no intervention was probably more disastrous in its results than
that of Geneva. Just because it always appeared to be almost successful,
it aggravated enormously the effects of the ultimate failure. Between
1923, when the German mark was pulverized within a few months, and
the beginning of 1930, when all the important currencies of the world
were back to gold, Geneva used the international credit mechanism to
shift the burden of the incompletely stabilized economies of Eastern
Europe, first, to the shoulders of the Western victors, second, from
there to the even broader shoulders of the United States of America.*
The collapse came in America in the course of the usual business cycle,
but by the time it came, the financial web created by Geneva and
Anglo-Saxon banking entangled the economy of the planet in that
awful capsize.
But even more was involved. During the 1920s, according to Ge-
neva, questions of social organization had to be wholly subordinated
to the needs of the restoration of the currency. Deflation was the pri-
mary need; domestic institutions had to adjust as best they might. For
the time being, even the restoration of free internal markets and of the
liberal state had to be postponed. For in the words of the Gold Delega-
tion, deflation had failed "to affect certain classes of goods and ser-
vices, and failed, therefore, to bring about a stable new equilibrium."
Governments had to intervene in order to reduce prices of monopoly
articles, to reduce agreed wage schedules, and to cut rents. The defla-
tionist's ideal came to be a "free economy under a strong govern-
ment"; but while the phrase on government meant what it said,
namely, emergency powers and suspension of public liberties, "free
economy" meant in practice the opposite of what it said, namely, gov-
ernmentally adjusted prices and wages (though the adjustment was
made with the express purpose of restoring the freedom of the ex-
changes and free internal markets). Primacy of exchanges involved no
less a sacrifice than that of free markets and free governments—the
two pillars of liberal capitalism. Geneva thus represented a change in
aim, but no change in method: while the inflationary governments
condemned by Geneva subordinated the stability of the currency to
stability of incomes and employment, the deflationary governments
put in power by Geneva used no fewer interventions in order to subor-
dinate the stability of incomes and employment to the stability of the
* Polanyi, K., "Der Mechanismus der Weltwirtschaftskrise,"
Der Osterreichische
Volkswirt, 1933 (Supplement).