V o L u m e I : a d

spending constituted interference in the internal affairs of the countries con-

cerned. The Soviet Union feared that economic aid to the satellite countries

might draw them to the West and for that reason did not permit them to

participate.

In December 1947, the U.S. Congress passed an Interim Act for $522

million in aid; the following April it approved the Foreign Assistance Act and

appropriated $6.8 billion for the first fifteen months of a program slated to

run for four years. This came just in time to influence crucial elections in

Italy, where the communists were making a bid for power; with American aid

a reality, on 18 April 1948 the Christian Democrats won an absolute majority

there.

Two days before this, on 16 April 1948, sixteen noncommunist European

states signed a convention establishing the Organization for European Eco-

nomic Cooperation (OEEC) in preparation for Marshall Plan assistance.

During the next four years, Congress appropriated $13.2 billion in aid plus

an additional sum for Asia, bringing the total to $14.2 billion. Marshall Plan

aid was almost completely nonmilitary. Through 1949 the United States

spent $20.5 billion on economic aid and only $1.2 billion in military aid. The

Korean War, however, proved to be a watershed. From 1950 through 1954 the

United States expended $14.1 billion on nonmilitary aid and $10.9 billion on

military assistance.

Whatever the motives behind these developments in U.S. policy, the

Marshall Plan made the recovery of Western Europe possible and began

the process of spectacular growth that characterized the West European

economies over the next two decades. It was also a strong impetus to eco-

nomic unification, creating the momentum for European economic coopera-

tion and leading to the European Common Market.

Both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were early manifesta-

tions of the containment policy against communist expansion. Writing in an

unsigned (“Mr. X”) article in the July 1947 issue of the influential Journal of

Foreign Affairs, Kennan stated that U.S. policy “must be that of a long-term,

patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”

However, even Kennan did not visualize as total an implementation as

occurred.

Communist reaction to the Marshall Plan went beyond rejecting it for

Eastern Europe. A wave of communist-inspired strikes hit West European

countries in protest against the plan and because communist ministers had

been dropped from both the French and Italian cabinets in May 1947. The

Soviet Union also began to rearm.

In October 1947 the Soviets established the nine-nation Communist

Information Bureau, also known as the Cominform. It took the place of the

old Communist International (Comintern), which had been abolished in 1943

in order to show solidarity with the Soviet Union’s allies. The new agency

had as its goal the propagation of communism throughout the world.

In January 1949 Moscow established the Council for Mutual Economic

Assistance, also known as Comecon. It was intended as an organization par-

allel to the OEEC for integrating the national economies of the satellite

Origins of the Cold War to 1950

23

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nations with that of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin also announced its own

program of economic assistance, known as the Molotov Plan, but under it the

Soviet Union received more than it gave, as raw materials were exchanged

for shoddy and unwanted Soviet products.

In late November and early December 1947, the Council of Foreign

Ministers (composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and

France) made a final attempt at resolving the deadlock over Germany. It

ended in total impasse. The lines had hardened, and the Soviets tightened

their control in the satellite states. One by one, surviving opposition leaders

were purged. In February 1948 Czechoslovakia fell to a communist coup

d’etat. This sent a shock wave through Western Europe but also marked the

zenith of communist expansion in Europe.

In early 1948 the three Western powers began discussing the establish-

ment of a German government for their combined zones. The Western zones

of Berlin seemed vulnerable, as they were an island deep within the Soviet

zone of Germany. The Kremlin reasoned that if it could seize West Berlin, this

might dishearten and intimidate the West. It might also discourage American

adventures on the European side of the Atlantic. Beginning on 1 April 1948,

little by little the Soviets cut off surface access to the city. A week later the

Western governments introduced new currency for their zones. This was the

signal for the blockade to begin in earnest. By early August it was complete.

Direction of this first major “battle” of the Cold War fell to the U.S. mil-

itary governor in Germany, Lieutenant General Lucius Clay. He informed

Washington that, were the United States to withdraw, “our position in Europe

is threatened, and Communism will run rampant.” Clay said that there were

three alternatives: to withdraw from Berlin, to attempt to push an armored

column up the autobahn, or to organize an airlift to try to supply the city by

air. Truman’s reaction was, “We shall stay, period.” He opted for the third

choice as least likely to lead to a shooting war with the Soviet Union.

While it would not be hard to supply Allied personnel by air, providing

for more than 2 million Germans in the Western zones of Berlin seemed

impossible. The airlift went on for 324 days. In it, the United States, Britain,

and France flew 278,118 flights and transported more than 2.326 million tons

of cargo.

The Russians expected to push the West out of Berlin without war and,

despite numerous threats, never did challenge the aerial supply system.

Both sides in effect drew back from a shooting war. By early 1949, however,

the Russians were forced to conclude that the blockade was a failure. A

counterblockade of East Germany by the West deprived the Soviet Zone of

essential goods, and this put pressure on the Russians. The Soviet represen-

tative on the UN Security Council, Jacob Malik, finally dropped a hint to his

American counterpart, Philip Jessup, that the Russians were prepared to end

the blockade. On 12 May 1949, land traffic to Berlin resumed. During the

blockade, however, a new Basic Law (an ersatz constitution) for the West

German Republic was approved.

By its pressure the USSR had forced the West Europeans to face up to

the necessity of greater unity. This led to a whole series of treaties and organ-

24

Origins of the Cold War to 1950

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