V o L u m e I : a d

References

Gray, William Glenn. Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Ger-

many, 1949–1969. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

Hallstein, Walter. Europe in the Making. New York: Norton, 1973.

Kilian, Werner. Hallstein Doktrin: Der Diplomatischen Krieg Zwischen der BRD und der

DDR, 1955–1973. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2001.

Loth, Wilfried, William Wallace, and Wolfgang Wessels, eds. Walter Hallstein: The

Forgotten European? New York: St. Martin’s, 1998.

The Hallstein Doctrine, named for Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West

Germany) official Walter Hallstein, stated that West Germany would not

establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that established or

maintained relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Ger-

many). The West German government took the position that any attempt by

a nation that already had relations with West Germany to establish ties with

East Germany would be viewed as an unfriendly act against the German

people. The sole exception to this policy was to be the Soviet Union, which,

as a victor in World War II, had the power to approve or deny any peace

treaty and any eventual German unification. This policy, which remained in

effect for fifteen years, was a key part of West Germany’s claim to be the sole

legitimate representative of the German nation (Alleinvertretungsanspruch).

The doctrine emerged as policy in the aftermath of West German Chan-

cellor Konrad Adenauer’s trip to the Soviet Union in September 1955. The

negotiations in Moscow brought the release of the last German prisoners of

war held by the Soviet Union and established normal diplomatic relations

between the two states. Adenauer, determined to build upon this success,

therefore adopted the idea developed in 1951 by Walter Hallstein, a member

of the German Foreign Office, to isolate East Germany diplomatically and

position West Germany as the only viable option for a German state. Ade-

nauer proclaimed this as policy during a conference of ambassadors in Bonn

during December 1955.

The Hallstein Doctrine did not sit well with either the Soviets or the

Allies, who viewed it as an attempt to impose conditions on Germany’s un-

conditional surrender after the fact. West Germany nonetheless clung to the

doctrine until the late 1960s. In 1957 when Yugoslavia recognized the East

German government, the West German government immediately cut its ties

to Belgrade; Cuba’s recognition of East Germany in 1963 brought similar

action. East Germany responded in kind. Under the so-called Ulbricht Doc-

trine, named for East German leader Walter Ulbricht, it cut relations with

nations that recognized West Germany but with limited success. Adenauer’s

successors, Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and Ludwig Erhard, were less insistent on

enforcing the Hallstein Doctrine as policy. Still, it was only in 1969, with the

accession to power of Willy Brandt and the German Social Democratic Party

Hallstein Doctrine

891

Hallstein Doctrine

(1955–1970)

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(SDC) that West Germany dropped its claim to be the sole legitimate state

of the German people.

Timothy Dowling

See also

Adenauer, Konrad; Brandt, Willy; Erhard, Ludwig; Hallstein, Walter; Kiesinger,

Kurt-Georg; Ulbricht, Walter

References

Gray, William Glenn. Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Ger-

many, 1949–1969. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

Kilian, Werner. Hallstein Doktrin: Der Diplomatischen Krieg Zwischen der BRD und der

DDR, 1955–1973. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2001.

Pulzer, Peter G. J. German Politics, 1945–1995. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Stent, Angela E. From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of German-Soviet

Relations, 1955–1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Troche, Alexander. Ulbricht und die Dritte Welt: Ost-Berlin’s “Kampf” Gegen die Bonner

“Alleinvertretungsanmassen.” Berlin: Palm and Enke, 1996.

Swedish economist, bureaucrat, and United Nations (UN) secretary-general

(1953–1961). Dag Hammarskjöld, the son of a Swedish prime minister, was

born on 29 July 1905 in Jönköping. He held degrees in law and economics

from the University of Uppsala and in 1933 earned a doctorate in econom-

ics from the University of Stockholm, where he became an adherent of the

so-called Stockholm School of Economics.

In 1935 Hammarskjöld became Sweden’s undersecretary of finance and

in 1945 was named economic advisor to the prime minister’s cabinet. Ham-

marskjöld joined the Swedish foreign ministry in 1949 and was appointed

deputy foreign minister in 1951, choosing to remain aloof from domestic

political affairs. He also served for some years as chairman of the National

Bank’s board, was a member of numerous delegations to international confer-

ences, and served as acting chairman of Sweden’s delegation to the seventh

General Assembly Conference in 1952–1953.

Hammarskjöld was elected UN secretary-general in April 1953 as a dark-

horse candidate known for his technical skills rather than his political prowess.

He was unanimously reelected in September 1957. He spent his first years

concentrating on strengthening and streamlining the UN’s administrative

staff and cultivating confidence among UN members. As such, he launched

his concept of quiet diplomacy as a complement to the General Assembly’s

parliamentary diplomacy. His 1955 Beijing mission, which led to the release

of fifteen U.S. airmen imprisoned for espionage, demonstrated the inherent

efficacy of his quiet diplomacy approach to international issues. His role in

defusing the 1956 Suez Crisis helped contribute to the growing prestige and

authority of the UN.

892

Hammarskjöld, Dag

Hammarskjöld, Dag

(1905–1961)

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