Testing Pareto’s Theory
193
liberalism (r=.18, p=.033). And of course, the conviction-relativism scale (which
seems to tap the Machiavellian’s ideological relativism and lack of affect)
correlated
strongly (r=.36, p=.000) with psychological liberalism. Taken together, these findings
do highlight links between liberalism and Machiavellianism, whose distributions
concentrate in such places as the higher echelons of the Labour and Conservative
Parliamentary Parties, and which deserve further consideration as features of elite
social personality.
In response to those asking why Pareto should be read today, perhaps the best
way to address this question is by returning once more to the enlightenment theme
of rational self-direction, and thinking it through from
the perspective of those who
contributed to this study. Our main consideration then becomes, how might decision-
makers such as these benefit from a greater awareness of the psychological and
cultural biases which work through the social personalities of their respective parties
to influence how they think about politics? More fully, if the MPs who contributed to
this study found time to read through this book, and if they tried to situate themselves
within the individual differences explored within it, and if they were to reflect upon
the possible conditioning influences
of social personality, and upon the psychological
correlates of different levels of eliteness within their parties, and indeed upon what
appear to be psychological differences between the parties, would this hold value for
them? It seems likely that it would. A familiarity with Pareto’s sociology, bolstered by
a knowledge of the political psychology which places Pareto on surer ground, might
help all political decision-makers,
be they voters, activists, elected representatives,
those who govern, those who take political decisions within executive capacities, or
even those who take ‘political’ decisions in contexts removed from politics itself,
such as business leaders, improve the quality of their decision-making. There may
be much value for future commentaries on Pareto, in adopting and deepening this
practitioner orientation.
Finally, it is important to add that Pareto is not the only classical sociologist who
we might return to in order to make sense of this chapter’s research findings. For
example, Weber’s work on protestant ethic deserves further
consideration alongside
Inglehart’s work on materialism, for their combined capacity to help us understand
the phenomenon of conservative individualism which has appeared. We might
also look back at how a range of sociologists mentioned in chapter three can help
us theorise the social personalities of the three parliamentary parties, or, as might
be said of Simmel in relation to his work on metropolitan individualism and the
‘blasé attitude’, at how they might help us understand several of the psychological
correlates of liberalism and eliteness which have appeared. Then there are Pareto’s
fellow classical elitists. We might well ask whether some of the traits identified as
perhaps existing more at the higher echelons of the political parties, support and
permit some further development of Michels’ warnings
concerning the potential for
political bureaucracies to be harnessed to serve the interests of party leaderships
rather than their followerships or wider constituencies. It would doubtless be possible
to show how this test of Pareto’s theory has generated further findings which might
now be related back to classical sociology. This book does not attempt this, but is
content to have used Pareto’s theory to develop and test new, thought provoking
hypotheses likely to be of interest to many political sociologists, psychologists, and
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