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to bear. Hence compulsives will tend to experience certain forms of heightened
anxiety. More fully, we can link compulsivity and low self-esteem to two of the
three major forms of anxiety which Freud identified. Leaving aside the affective
state of ‘reality anxiety’, which Freud described as a signal to the ego that it may
be overwhelmed by an external environment which is beyond its control, we can
say that compulsives will experience higher levels of ‘neurotic anxiety’ (which are
provoked when the demands of the ego-ideal are not easily met) and ‘moral anxiety’
(which are provoked when the demands of conscience are not easily met).
The affective state of neurotic anxiety appears in Freudian theory as something
experienced as ‘free-floating’ and hard to associate with particular objects.
Its function
is to signal to the ego that repressed id impulses, which will often be experienced as
alien to consciousness, threaten to over-rule the various reaction-formations which
compose the ego-ideal and which lend the ego its structure and identity. Freud’s
concept of ‘moral anxiety’, on the other hand, refers to guilt feelings which warn us
that circumstances have arisen where the superego threatens to utilise the reservoirs
of aggression which it has at its disposal for the purposes of self-punishment.
These punishments may be experienced as intensified guilt feelings,
as feelings of
depression, or as ascetic or masochistic urges. It seems reasonable to suppose, then,
that when compulsives experience low self-esteem and therefore come to place an
especially high premium on preventing further lowerings of self-esteem, they will
experience neurotic and moral anxieties both more acutely and across a wider range
of situations.
There are grounds for believing that these anxieties will, especially where self-
esteem is low, frequently trigger defensive strategies involving prejudice towards
others. The argument that prejudice can help defend the ego
ideal when it is threatened
has been made by Vamik Volkan, who claims in his (1994) ‘The Need for Enemies
and Allies’ that throughout their adult lives individuals require ‘suitable targets
for externalisation’ (STEs). These allow the sense of self to be reaffirmed through
contrasts made with unfavourable representations of others. What makes his theory
particularly controversial is that he regards the ‘need for enemies’ as essential:
My work with severely regressed patients gradually brought home to me that the patient
who has not as a child established suitable targets for externalisation lacks as an adult
an important component in the arsenal he needs to protect and regulate his sense of self
(Volkan 1994, 61, 63).
It can also be argued that prejudice helps protect against
guilt feelings and other
punishments by conscience (such as depression and sleeplessness) because, as we
will see in section 4.6.1 when the relationship between compulsivity and prejudice
is investigated, compulsives often project onto others aspects of themselves which
would otherwise invoke the wrath of conscience – aggressing outwardly where
otherwise they would aggress inwardly.
Interestingly, Sniderman’s investigation of the syndrome of low self-esteem
provides some original research evidence involving the use of a psychometric
instrument called the ‘inflexibility index’ (consisting of separate measures of
intolerance of ambiguity, obsessiveness and rigidity) which he used as a ‘rough
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gauge’ of compulsive personality. He concluded that there does indeed appear to
be a significant correlation between compulsivity and low self-esteem. He adds
that although, generally speaking, low self-esteem will tend to prohibit political
involvement, his own research evidence suggests that the low self-esteem driven
compulsive will often enter the world of politics as a form of ‘compensatory striving’
to overcome low estimates of the self (Sniderman 1975: ch. 7). One wonders,
therefore, just how often this might account for the involvement of Pareto’s ‘lion’
type in politics, and indeed just how often such types
might display that curious
combination of timidity and aggression associated with juxtaposed inferiority and
superiority complexes.
So far, then, psychoanalysis has helped us interpret risk aversion as part of a
broader syndrome involving low self-esteem, neurotic/moral anxiety and prejudice.
However, we have yet to consider how the ‘thrift’ which Pareto attributed to his
rentiers lends itself to psychoanalytic explanation. Looking at Wilhelm Reich’s
(1969, 193–200) account of the compulsive personality, we see that a key indicator
of compulsivity is ‘thriftiness, if not avarice’ (Reich 1969, 194). Erich Fromm has
very similarly described the compulsive as possessing a ‘hoarding orientation’.
Millon
et al. (1996, 523) point out that this trait remains central to contemporary
theories of compulsivity. They draw attention to the fact that
one major variant of the
compulsive personality is the ‘parsimonious compulsive’ whose ‘niggardly, tight-
fisted and penny-pinching’ disposition ‘reflects a wariness and a self-protective stance
against exposures that would permit the possibility of loss’. Following Freud (1925),
classical psychoanalytic theory understands the origins of parsimoniousness or thrift
with reference to the experiences of the child during the anal phase: the desire to
collect and accumulate money is considered, along with the trait of obstinacy, as ‘a
sublimation of the desire to retain faeces’ (Kline 1984, 26). It is certainly interesting
to speculate that this phenomenon may contribute to that emotive opposition
to ‘profligate spending’ which perennially distinguishes conservative political
campaigning.
Of course, individual differences in levels of willingness
to take risks can also
be viewed sociologically. From this perspective, Pareto’s foxes and speculators are
positively disposed towards risk because they possess material resources which
allow them to absorb losses incurred through risky ventures. Similarly, we can view
the hoarding orientation of the rentiers as resulting from the experience of scarcity.
One of Bertrand Russell’s aphorisms articulates this view of the rentier capitalist
especially well:
I once befriended two little girls from Esthonia, who had narrowly escaped death from
starvation in a famine. They
lived in my family, and of course had plenty to eat. But
they spent all their leisure visiting neighbouring farms and stealing potatoes, which they
hoarded. Rockefeller, who had in his infancy experienced great poverty, spent his adult
life in a similar manner (Russell 1985, 21).
This possibility can be developed using contemporary ‘postmaterialist’ theory which
argues that improvements to living standards throughout the industrialised world
render us substantially less threatened by concerns relating to material scarcity.