War of annihilation
Yüklə 5,63 Mb. Pdf görüntüsü
|
“WAR OF ANNIHILATION” DEVASTATING TOLL ON CIVILIANS, RAQQA – SYRIA
Amnesty International 63 PROPORTIONALITY The principle of proportionality, another fundamental tenet of IHL, also prohibits disproportionate attacks, which are those “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”. 155 Intentionally launching a disproportionate attack (that is, knowing that the attack will cause excessive incidental civilian loss, injury or damage) constitutes a war crime. 156
The Commentary on the Additional Protocols makes clear that the fact that the proportionality calculus requires an anticipated “concrete and direct” military advantage indicates that such advantage must be “substantial and relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded.” 157
PRECAUTIONS In order for parties to an armed conflict to respect the principles of distinction and proportionality they must take precautions in attack. “Constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects”; “all feasible precautions” must be taken to avoid and minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 158 The parties must choose means and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding or at least minimising to the maximum extent possible incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. 159 As well as verifying the military nature of targets and assessing the proportionality of attacks, the parties must also take all feasible steps to call off attacks which appear wrongly directed or disproportionate. 160 Parties must give effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit. 161
When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the parties must select the target the attack on which would be expected to pose the least danger to civilians and to civilian objects. 162
The limited information available on the precautions in attack taken by the Coalition suggests that they were not adequate or effective. The cases examined in detail indicate that there were serious shortcomings in verification that targets selected for attack were in fact military, with disastrous results for civilian life. Further, several attacks examined by Amnesty International suggest that the Coalition did not, at least in those instances, select weapons that would minimise harm to civilians. Also, the warnings that were given to civilians were not effective. They did not take into account the reality that civilians were blocked from leaving Raqqa, and did not include specific information (such as warning civilians to stay away from tall buildings).
JOINT AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF COALITION MEMBERS Although the US is estimated to have carried out the overwhelming majority of the air strikes in Raqqa as well as 100% of artillery strikes, British and French planes also carried out air strikes on the city. 163
Due, in part, to the deliberate vagueness with which the Coalition reports strikes, there is a lack of clarity about the responsibility of individual Coalition member states for the strikes. Amnesty International is concerned that this lack of clarity may enable individual Coalition members to evade responsibility for their actions.
The UK
Government, for example, maintained until May 2018 that it had not killed a single civilian in Syria or Iraq,
155 ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 14; Protocol I, Articles 51(5)(b) and 57. 156 ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 156, pp. 599-601. 157 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, Bruno Zimmermann, Commentary on the Additional Protocols, ICRC, 1987, para. 2,209. 158 ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 15. See also Protocol II, Article 13(1). 159 5 ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 17. 160 ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rules 16-19. 161 ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 20. 162 ICRC Customary IHL, Rule 21. 163 “Raqqa: a city destroyed then forgotten”, Samuel Oakford, Airwars.org, 12 March 2018, available at https://airwars.org/news/raqqa-a- city-destroyed-then-forgotten/
“WAR OF ANNIHILATION” DEVASTATING TOLL ON CIVILIANS, RAQQA – SYRIA
Amnesty International 64 despite carrying out thousands of air strikes across the two countries. 164 On 2 May 2018 it admitted for the first time that one of its drone strikes had caused one civilian casualty in Syria in March 2018. 165
The problem attributing responsibility to individual states acting in military coalitions is described in an article by the ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross, legal advisers: “… (Partnering) might also be a cloak against accountability for such crimes. With the opaque distribution of tasks, the diffusion of responsibility that is inherent to partnering, the international community is less readily able to identify the State, the group, and even less likely, the individual, that is responsible for unlawful conduct. This can create a climate in which stakeholders, political and military alike, perceive themselves to be free from the scrutiny of accountability processes and act beyond the parameters of their usual normative reference frameworks.” 166
an internationally wrongful” will be internationally responsible for doing so, provided it had knowledge of the circumstance and the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that state. 167 Furthermore, states will also be responsible for internationally wrongful acts for conduct consisting of an action or omission which is both attributable to the state and constitutes a breach of its international obligations (emphasis added). 168
169 , including their military units or by “persons or entities exercising elements of government authority”, 170
including military officers and politicians. IHL requires all states to “respect and ensure respect” for its provisions under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions. This includes both positive and negative obligations on states providing assistance to another state which is then used to commit a violation of international humanitarian law. 171 The negative obligation is not to encourage, aid or assist in violations of IHL by parties to a conflict. 172
The positive obligation includes the prevention of violations where there is a foreseeable risk they will be committed and prevention of further violations where they have already occurred. 173
The USA, UK, France, and other states involved in military operations as part of Operation Inherent Resolve therefore may be legally responsible for unlawful acts carried out by Coalition members. The involvement of senior military officers from Britain and France states in the upper echelons of the OIR’s command structure further underlines the potential for shared responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. By way of example, the Deputy Commander for Operational Inherent Resolve during the Raqqa operation – Major General Rupert Jones – was British. Military officers representing France and Australia also held senior positions within the Coalition. The orders and decisions of these officers engage the responsibility of their respective states for acts and omissions in relation to any unlawful acts committed by their own aircraft or military forces, or by others they control, direct or assist.
DUTY TO INVESTIGATE, PROSECUTE AND PROVIDE REPARATION States have an obligation to investigate allegations of war crimes by their forces or nationals, or committed on their territory and, if there is sufficient admissible evidence, prosecute the suspects. They must also investigate other war crimes over which they have jurisdiction, including through universal jurisdiction, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects. 174
164 See, for example, “Britain drops 3,400 bombs in Syria and Iraq – and says no civilians killed”, Middle East Eye, 26 October 2017, available at http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-uk-drops-3400-bombs-syria-and-iraq-and-says-no-civilians-killed-2032942935 165
See, for example, “Syria war: MoD admits civilian died in RAF strike on Islamic State”, BBC, 2 May 2018, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43977394 166 “Fighting together: Obligations and opportunities in partnered warfare”, Cordula Droege and David Tuck, Humanitarian Law & Policy, 28 March 2017, available at http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/03/28/fighting-together-obligations-opportunities-partnered-warfare/ 167
Article 16, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Articles on State Responsibility”), adopted by the International Law Commission in August 2001 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly in a number of Resolutions, and approved ad referendum, that is, without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other appropriate action. See UN General Assembly Resolution 71/133, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/133 168 Ibid, Article 2. 169 Ibid, Article 4. 170 Ibid, Article 5. 171 ICRC, 2016 Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, para. 154. 172 ICRC, 2016 Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, para. 158-161. 173 ICRC, 2016 Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, para. 164. 174 ICRC Customary IHL Study Rule 158. Yüklə 5,63 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
|