“WAR OF ANNIHILATION”
DEVASTATING TOLL ON CIVILIANS, RAQQA – SYRIA
Amnesty International
62
THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION
The principle of distinction is one of the cornerstones of international humanitarian law. This requires parties
to conflict to at all times, “distinguish between civilians and combatants” and to ensure that “attacks may
only be directed against combatants” and “must not be directed against civilians”.
143
Parties to conflict must
also distinguish between “civilian objects” and “military objectives”. Anyone who is not a member of the
armed forces of a party to the conflict is a civilian, and the civilian population comprises all persons who are
not combatants.
144
Civilians are protected against attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilities.
145
In cases of doubt, individuals should be presumed to be civilians and immune from direct
attack.
146
Making the civilian population, or individual civilians not taking a direct part in hostilities, the object
of attack (direct attacks on civilians) is a war crime.
147
Civilian objects are all objects which are not “military objectives”, and military objectives are “limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage”.
148
Civilian objects
are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they
become military objectives because all of the criteria for a military objective just described become
temporarily fulfilled.
149
In cases of doubt, parties to conflict are required to presume the building retains its
civilian nature.
150
Making civilian objects the object of attack is a war crime.
151
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.
152
Indiscriminate attacks may strike military objectives and civilians or
civilian objects without distinction, either because the attack is not directed at a specific military objective, or
because it employs a method or means of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military objective or
has effects that cannot be limited as required by IHL.
153
Launching an indiscriminate attack resulting in
death or injury to civilians is a war crime.
154
Most of the cases examined in this report involved attacks that struck civilian objects – homes or other
places in which civilians were seeking shelter from the fighting – killing and injuring civilians. Witnesses
reported that there were no fighters in the vicinity at the time of the attacks. Such attacks could be either
direct attacks on civilians or civilian objects or indiscriminate attacks.
In the case of air strikes that used precision-guided munitions, the objects struck were the ones that were
targeted. This raises questions about whether the intelligence used for selecting targets was unreliable or out
of date. It also raises questions about why those planning these attacks were not aware of the presence of
large numbers of civilians, or if they were, why they decided to proceed in the way they did. Given the fact
that IS had already been routinely preventing civilians in areas under their control from fleeing and were
even deliberately using them as human shields, the likelihood that large numbers of civilians were in the
area should have been evident to the Coalition. Using munitions with very large payloads, even when
precisely delivered, was guaranteed to kill and injure civilians in the immediate vicinity. And when civilian
homes were directly hit by such air strikes, the consequences were devastating.
In the case of deaths and injuries to civilians resulting from artillery strikes or mortar fire, these would appear
to be indiscriminate attacks. The repeated use of imprecise explosive weapons, such as these, in the vicinity
of civilians is a reckless tactic that violates the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. If at the outset the
Coalition was not aware that using artillery in this manner in Raqqa city would lead to needless deaths and
injuries to civilians (which in itself is implausible given the experience of fighting IS in Mosul), it should have
very quickly learned this lesson and changed its tactics.
143
ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 1. See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Article 48, and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Article 12(2).
144
ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 5; see also Protocol I, Article 50.
145
ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 6; see also Protocol I, Article 51(3); Protocol II, Article 13(3).
146
Protocol I, Article 50(1).
147
ICRC, Customary IHL, Rule 156, p. 591.
148
ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rules 8 and 9; Protocol I, Article 52.
149
ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 10.
150
Protocol I, Article 52(3). See also ICRC, Customary IHL Study, pp. 34-36.
151
ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 156, pp. 591, 593, 595-598. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles
8(2)(b)(i) and (ii) and 8(2)(e)(i)(ii)(iv) and (xii). See also discussion in ICRC, Customary IHL Study, p. 27.
152
ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 11; Protocol I, Article 51(4).
153
ICRC, Customary IHL Study, Rule 12; Protocol I, Article 51(4)(a).
154
ICRC, Customary IHL, rule 156, p. 599.