Plate 7.
A page from Eike von Repgow,
Sachsenspiegel
, including details of the granting of a castle as a
fief.
It is clear that, by 1500, Germany had evolved a rather different political
pattern from that of the more centralised monarchies of England and France.
Historians have devoted a considerable amount of time to attempting to explain
the weakness of the mediaeval German monarchy. Attention has been paid to
such factors as Germany’s relatively large size – posing problems for the
assertion of effective central control in the provinces in an age before modern
communications – and its lack of obvious geographical boundaries and clear
frontiers. These factors were probably less important than aspects of the
structure and distribution of power. This is not as tautological as it may sound.
Patterns of regional delegation of authority (essential in a pre-industrial society)
vary in their political consequences. Celibate clerics receiving fiefs which cannot
be passed to heirs are supposedly more loyal to the king than secular lords with
aspirations to dynastic greatness. But while in France clerics gained scattered
possessions ensuring commitment to the maintenance of strong central power, in
Germany prince-bishops soon gained considerable wealth and powers of their
own – and in any event control of the church was slipping away from monarchs.
Nor could kings simply appoint as dukes, and grant fiefs to, lords from other
localities who, as strangers in the province over which they ruled, would be
unable to develop local bases against the monarchy. For effective provincial
administration depended more on the possession of allodial land than on fiefs
held from the king. Also important are the characteristics of the different
aristocracies in mediaeval European states, as well as the elective nature of
German kingship, and the role of sheer bad luck for a number of monarchs at
key periods of crisis. It is clear that any explanation of Germany’s lack of
effective political centralisation in the middle ages will have to refer to a number
of factors, and not simply the traditional ones concerning involvement in Italy
and the consequences of the Investiture Contest. But in the context of these
debates it is also worth remembering that mediaeval Germany’s lack of
monarchical centralisation has posed more of a problem for nineteenth and
twentieth-century historians, to whom the nation state seemed the most natural
political unit, than it probably did for contemporaries, whose experiences of
politics were largely personal and local. A question in some ways more
interesting than Germany’s lack of mediaeval centralisation is almost the
obverse: why, in any case, should centralised states (later nation states) have
developed as the political framework of developing capitalist and eventually
industrial society? (And to what extent might they be superseded by new forms
of supra-national economic federalism under late capitalism?) Put this way,
Germany’s political pattern can be set in a wider interpretive context, and not
viewed purely as a succession of ‘failures’, ‘distortions’, and ‘belatedness’.
Moreover, if playing the game of determination of long-term consequences, the
dynamism and vitality of late mediaeval German urban and intellectual life, with
the contribution they made to subsequent patterns of western civilisation, should
not be underplayed.
3
The age of confessionalism, 1500–1648
◈
A cluster of changes occurring in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries
appear to render this period an important turning point in European history. The
(re)discovery of America in 1492 opened up a new world, with significant
effects on the economies and politics of the old world; the ‘late mediaeval crisis
of feudalism’ initiated the formation of a propertyless wage-labouring class, the
harbinger of developing capitalism; the emergence of an interacting system of
increasingly centralised European states began to displace the dispersed
sovereignty and more localised politics of feudalism; the invention of a
technique of printing with movable type by Gutenberg radically altered the
character of intellectual life; and the Reformation initiated by Martin Luther
shattered the religious and cultural unity of mediaeval Christendom, with a
process of territorial confessionalisation both sustained by and sustaining the
concomitant processes of territorial state-building.
These major changes in European history should not blind us to certain
continuities, particularly in relation to Germany. The period from the mid-
fourteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century was characterised by a
continued – and developing – territorial particularism within a relatively weak
wider Imperial framework. German society continued to be largely based on
feudal agrarian relations. While the economy of England expanded, that of
Germany grew less rapidly, or stagnated. And for all the elements of ‘modernity’
that historians have sought in the Reformation, there was much that was
essentially ‘mediaeval’ in sixteenth-century thought and beliefs.
THE GERMAN REFORMATION: THE EARLY YEARS
Politically, what was now regularly known as the ‘Holy Roman Empire of the
German Nation’ was in some respects consolidated in a series of reforms. The
Reichstag was now regularly summoned. It consisted of three chambers: the
seven electoral princes (Mainz, Cologne, Trier, Bohemia, Saxony, the Palatinate,
Brandenburg); the other princely rulers (four archbishops, forty-six bishops,
eighty-three other spiritual rulers such as abbots, twenty-four secular princes,
and 145 counts and lords); and approximately eighty-three imperial towns. A
second organ of the Empire, the
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