August 2013 Plutonium Mountain Inside the 17-year mission to secure a dangerous legacy of Soviet nuclear testing By Eben Harrell & David E. Hoffman Project on Managing the Atom
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- Bu səhifədəki naviqasiya:
- ‘You Left Some Stuff There.’
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 13 The scavengers were seeking copper cable, and when they found it, they burned off the insula- tion and wound it up for sale, reportedly in China. Hecker took photographs of the trenches, and wondered how close the scavengers had come to the plutonium that lay buried there. The Kazakh authorities had no idea how much of it was there, nor where it was located. As far as anyone knew, the scavengers were unaware as well. Hecker wrote in his notes, “People on the site—no way to keep them off.” In another location, Hecker was shown one of the Semipalatinsk test tun- nels which had been closed earlier in the decade by the U.S.-backed program. The front of the tunnel was plugged, but the scavengers—looking for steel rails which had been laid in the tun- nels—broke in by drilling down from above, bypassing the plugs. Hecker recalled he was “absolutely, totally alarmed by the size of the metal-scavenging operation. I really thought these were guys digging a little bit of copper out. Instead this was a major indus- trial enterprise. And the immediate concern I had is, where do the copper cables lead to? Well, they lead to where there were some tests. What the hell do we know is on the other side of that copper cable?” 35 In a trip report written upon his return in 1998, Hecker offered a possible answer: total plutonium in the area may approach 200 kilograms and “access is unimpaired; no gates are manned… we have a strong concern that a proliferation risk may exist—material in reasonably concentrated form, easily picked up, completely open to whomever wants to come.” 36 While Hecker was primarily worried about proliferation, the Kazakhs had other concerns as well. Contamination of the ground was potentially a huge environmental problem—one that might cost a fortune to clean up. The Kazakhs had plans to increase mining operations and introduce oil exploration at the site, which could grind to a halt if the fields turned out to be still laced with radioactive materials. 37 This
concern was already anchored in reality elsewhere in the country. Two areas in western Kazakh- stan where oil firms were eager to drill had been used by the So- viet Union for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, experiments to blast out huge caverns in the salt formations for oil stor- age and other purposes. No one knew how much radioactivity still remained in the caverns. 38 The Kazakhs had signed a bilat- eral agreement with Russia in 35 Interview with Hecker, November 29, 2012. 36 Hecker, trip report. 37 Through the early 1990s, local officials near Semipalatinsk encouraged mining through the easy access of mining permits. See, for example, “Russian-Kazakhstan Agreement on Semipalatinsk Test Site Criticized,” Zelenyy Mir, No. 28, 1993, p. 13. 38 These two sites were known as Azgir and Lyra. A total of 17 nuclear tests were conducted in salt domes at Azgir between 1966 and 1979 in an effort to make cavities for storage of wastes and gas condensates, but the tests did not work because the salt was unsuitable. Six detonations were conducted at Lyra, and some caverns were subsequently used for gas storage. From Hecker’s trip report. Source: Siegfried Hecker Gate at edge of testing site, 1998. Plutonium Mountain: Inside the 17-year mission to secure a dangerous legacy of Soviet nuclear testing 14 the early 1990s about Semipalatinsk under which Moscow was supposed to supply information about the test site, and the Kazakhs agreed to keep some aspects of the site secret. But the Ka- zakhs repeatedly complained to Hecker that Russia refused to share details of what had gone on in those desolate corners of the steppe. The Kazakhs, including Kadyrzhanov, chafed at Russia’s secrecy. They wanted no part of it, despite the bilateral agreement, which they hoped to change. 39
had the windows knocked out—a kind of eerie scene out of a ghost-town movie. This was espe- cially true when I jogged in town early in the morning. The streets were deserted, not a soul. All I saw was a herd of horses running loose through the outskirts of town and an enormous number of ravens…” 40 The trip to Kazakhstan had been a turning point for Hecker. ‘You Left Some Stuff There.’ A few months later, in July, 1998, Hecker headed for Moscow. It was a turbulent time in Russia. Within a month, the country’s fragile economy would collapse with a default and devaluation. From Moscow, Hecker took the overnight train to Sarov, the location of Arzamas-16. Hecker had developed personal relationships with his counterparts at the laboratory. Although Arzamas-16 was once among the most top-secret facilities in the Soviet Union, and was still isolated and con- sidered sensitive, Hecker was known and respected by the scientists, and his arrival was warmly welcomed. He carried an urgent request in his briefcase. He went to see Radi Ilkaev, the director, whom he had known from earlier projects. Hecker recalled that they met one evening at the House of Scientists, an informal setting where they could talk. Hecker brought up the subject of Semi- palatinsk and the legacy of testing there, particularly the process of hydronuclear testing. Hecker mentioned that Los Alamos performed hydronuclear tests in bore holes at Los Alamos in 1960 and 1961, and left the plutonium in the bore holes, while making sure the areas remained protect- ed. He added, “You guys must have done something like that at Semipalatinsk. And if you did, you left some stuff there.” As Hecker recalled it, Ilkaev responded cautiously, choosing his words. He said Russia was fin- ished at Semipalatinsk, forever, and never wanted to go back. Hecker recalled that when he asked why, Ilkayev responded by saying the overriding issue at Semipalatinsk was the environment and the Russians feared the Kazakhs would insist they clean up all the residue, which would be ex- pensive. Hecker pulled out the photos he had taken months earlier at Semipalatinsk. He showed Ilkayev the photograph of the trenches left by the huge earth-cutting machines. “Radi, that’s your test site. Those are the copper cable thieves,” he recalled saying to Ilkaev. “Radi was just silent. He just looked at me, and looked at the photos. And he said, ‘I’ll have someone to talk to you in the morning.’” 41
39 Hecker wrote in his notes of the Kazakhs, “They have no desire to keep anything secret.” 40 Hecker, trip report. 41 Interview with Hecker, November 29, 2012, Stanford University. Yüklə 333,26 Kb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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