 Ⅰ Conflict is likely to occur as members of quasi groups in ICAs can become aware of their objective interests and form a conflict group, which, in turn, are related to
A. The technical conditions of organization which, in turn, depend on
1, The formation of a leadership cadre among quasi groups,
2. The codification of an idea system, or charter.
B. The political conditions of organization, which are dependent on dominant groups permitting organization of opposed interests.
C. The social conditions of organization, which, in turn, are related to
1. Opportunities for members of quasi groups to communicate.
2. Opportunities for recruiting member.
Ⅱ. The less the technical, political, and social conditions of organization are met, the more~ intense the conflict will be.
Ⅲ The more the distribution of authority and other rewards are associated with each other (superimposed), the more intense the conflict will be.
Ⅳ. The less the mobility between super- and subordinate groups, the more intense the conflict will be.
Ⅴ, The less the technical, political, and social conditions or organizations are met, the more violent the conflict will be.
Ⅵ The more the deprivation of the subjugated in the distribution of rewards shifts from an absolute to a relative basis, the more violent the conflict will be.
Ⅶ The less is the ability of conflict groups to develop regulatory agreements, the more violent the conflict will be.
Ⅷ, The more intense is the conflict, the more will be the degree of structural change and reorganization,
Ⅸ The more intense is the conflict, the more will be the degree of structural change and reorganization.
L ewis Coser's Conflict Functionalism
Lewis Coser published a major work on conflict before Ralf Dahrendorf did.Yet, because this work had a functional flavor and borrowed from Simmel more than Marx, it was not initially seen as a devastating critique of functionalism in quite the same way as Dahrendofli's early polemic. Still, in his more functional version of conflict theory, Coser launched what became the standard polemic against functionalism: Conflict is not given sufficient attention, and related phenomena such as deviance and dissent are too easily viewed "pathological" for the equilibrium of the social system. Although Coser consistently maintained that functional theorizing "has too often neglected the dimensions of power and interest," he did not follow either Marx's or Dahrendorf's emphasis on the disruptive consequences of violent conflict.
Table 10.6 Coser's propositions on the Causes of Conflict
Ⅰ Subordinate members in a system of inequality are more likely to initiate con filet as they question the legitimacy of the existing distribution of scarce resources, which, in turn, is caused by
A. Few channels for redressing grievances.
B. Low rates of mobility to more privileged positions.
Ⅱ Subordinates are most likely to initiate conflict with superordinates as their sense of relative deprivation and, hence, injustice increases, which, in turn, is related to
A. The extent to which socialization experiences of subordinates do not generate internal ego constraints.
B. The failure of superordinates to apply external constraints on subordinates.
Rather, Coser sought to correct Dahrendorf's analytical excesses by emphasizing the integrative and "adaptability" functions of conflict for social systems, Thus, Coser justified his efforts by criticizing functionalism for ignoring conflict and by criticizing conflict theory for underemphasizing the functions of conflict. In so doing, he turned to Georg Simmel's view of conflict as promoting social integration of the social systems, or at least of some of its critical parts.
Coser's analysis then proceeded as follows: (1) Imbalances in the integration of system parts lead to (2) the outbreak of varying types of conflict among these parts, which in turn causes (3) temporary reintegration of the system. which leads to (4) increased flexibility in the system's structure, increased capability to resolve future imbalances though conflict, and increased capacity to adapt to changing conditions. Coser executed this approach by developing, at least implicitly in Iris discursive argument, a variety of propositions that are extracted and presented in Tables 10.6 through 10.10. He began with the causes of conflict (Table 10.6), turned to the issue of violence in conflict (Table 10.7), moved next to the duration of conflict (Table 10.8), and finally explored the functions of conflict (Tables 10.9 and 10.10).
Much like Weber, Coser emphasized (shown in proposition I of Table 10.6) that the withdrawal of legitimacy from an existing system of inequality is a critical precondition for conflict.19 In contrast, dialectical theorists such as Dahrendoff tended to view the causes of conflict as residing in "contradictions" or "conflicts of interest)' In such dialectical theories, as subordinates become aware of their interests, they pursue conflict; hence, the major theoretical task is to specify the conditions raising levels of awareness. But Coser argued that conflicts of interest are likely to be exposed only after the deprived withdraw legitimacy. Coser emphasized that the social order is maintained by some degree of consensus over existing sociocultural arrangements and that "disorder" through conflict occurs only when conditions decrease tiffs consensus. Two such conditions are specified in Propositions ⅠA and Ⅰ-B of Table 10.6, both of which owe their inspiration more to Weber than to Marx. When channels for expressing grievances do not exist and when the deprived's desire for membership in higher ranks is thwarted, the withdrawal of legitimacy becomes more likely.
Table 10.7 Coser's Propositions on the Violence of Conflict
Ⅰ. When groups engage in conflict over realistic issues (obtainable goals), they are more likely to seek compromises over the means to realize their interests, and hence, the less violent the conflict will be.
Ⅱ, When groups engage in conflict over nonrealistic issues, the greater is the level of emotional arousal and involvement in the conflict, and hence, the more violent the conflict will he, especially when
A, Conflict occurs over core values,
B. Conflict endures over time.
Ⅲ. When functional interdependence among social units is low. the less available are the institutional means for absorbing conflicts and tensions, and hence, the more violent the conflict will be.
As Proposition Ⅱin Table 10.6 indicates, the withdrawal of legitimacy, in itself, is not likely to result in conflict. People must first become emotionally amused. The theoretical task then becomes one of specifying the conditions that translate the withdrawal of legitimacy into emotional arousal, instead of some other emotional state such as apathy and resignation. Here Coser drew inspiration from Marx's notion of relative deprivation. For. as Marx observed and as several empirical studies have documented, absolute deprivation does not always foster revolt, When people's expectations for a better future suddenly begin to exceed perceived avenues for realizing these expectations, only then do they become sufficiently aroused to pursue conflict. The level of arousal will, in turn, he influenced by their commitments to the existing sys tem, by the degree to which they have developed strong internal constraints, and by the nature and amount of social control in a system. Such proposition, for example, lead to predictions that, in systems with absolute dictators who ruthlessly repress the masses, revolt by the masses is less likely than in systems where some freedoms have been granted and where the deprived have been led to believe that things will be getting better. Under these conditions the withdrawal of legitimacy can be accompanied by released passions and emotions.
Coser's most important propositions on the level of violence in a conflict are presented in Table 10.7. As most functional theorists emphasized. Coser's Proposition I in Table10.7 is directed at specifying the conditions under which conflict will be less violent. In contrast, dialectical theorists, such as Marx, often pursued just the opposite: specifying the conditions under which conflict will be more violent. Yet, the inverse of Coser's first proposition can indicate a condition under which conflict will be violent. The key concept in this proposition is "realistic issues." Coser reasoned that realistic conflict involves the pursuit of specific aims against real sources of hostility, with some estimation of the costs to be incurred in such pursuit. As noted earlier, Simmel recognized that, when clear goals are sought, compromise and conciliation are likely alternatives to violence. Coser restated this proposition (shown in PropositionⅡ in Table 10.7) on conflict over "nonrealistic issues," such as ultimate values, beliefs, ideology, and vaguely defined class interests. When non-realistic, the conflict will be violent. Such non-realism is particularly likely when conflict is about core values, which emotionally mobilize participants and make them unwilling to compromise (Proposition Ⅱ-A). Moreover, if conflict endures for a long time, it becomes increasingly nonrealistic as parties become emotionally involved, as ideologies become codified, and as "the enemy" is portrayed in increasingly negative terms (Proposition Ⅱ-B). Proposition Ⅲshows a more structural variable to the analysis of conflict violence. In systems in which there are high degrees of functional interdependence among actor--that is, where there are mutual exchanges and cooperation--conflict is less likely to be violent.
Table 10.8 Coser's Propositions on the Duration of Conflict
Ⅰ. Conflict will be prolonged when
A. The goals of the opposing parties to a conflict are expansive.
B. The degree of consensus over the goals of conflict is low.
C. The parties in a conflict cannot easily interpret their adversary's symbolic points of victory and defeat.
Ⅱ. Conflict will be shortened when
A. Leaders of conflicting parties perceive that complete attainment of goals is possible only at very high costs, which, in turn, is related to
1. The equality of the power between conflicting groups.
2. The clarity of indexes of defeat or victory in a conflict,
B. Leaders' capacity to persuade followers to terminate conflict which, in turn, is related to
1. Centralization of power in conflict parties.
2. Integration within conflict parties.
As shown in the propositions of Table 10.8, Coser underscored that conflicts with a broad range of goals or with vague goals will be prolonged, When goals are bruited and articulated, it is possible to know when they have been attained. With perception of attainment, the conflict can be terminated. Conversely, with a wide variety or long list of goals, a sense of attainment is less likely to occur-thus prolonging the conflict. Coser also emphasized that knowledge of what would symbolically constitute victory and defeat will influence the length of conflict. If the parties do not have the ability to recognize defeat or victory, conflict is likely to lie prolonged to a point where one party destroys the other. Leadership has important effects on conflict processes; the more leaders can perceive that complete attainment of goals is not possible and the greater their ability is to convince followers to terminate conflict, the less prolonged the conflict will be.
Table 10.9 Coser's Propositions on the Functions of Conflict for the Respective Parties
Ⅰ The more violent or intense is the conflict, the more the conflict will generate
A. clear-cut boundaries for each conflict party,
B. Centralized decision-making structures for each conflict party, especially when these parties are structurally differentiated.
C. Structural and ideological solidarity among members of each conflict party, especially when the conflict is perceived to affect the welfare of all segments of the conflict parties.
D. Suppression of dissent and deviance within each conflict party as well as forced conformity to norms and values.
Ⅱ. The more conflict between parties leads centers of power to force conformity within conflict groups, the greater is the accumulation of hostilities and the more likely is internal group conflict to surface in the long run.
Coser divided his analysis of the functions of conflict along lines similar to those by Simmel: the functions of conflict for (1) the respective parties to the conflict, and (2) the systemic whole in which the conflict occurs. In the propositions listed in Table 10.9, the intensity of conflict--that is, people's involvement in and commitment to pursue the conflict--and its level of violence increase the demarcation of boundaries (PropositionⅠ-A), centralization of authority (Proposition Ⅰ-B), structural and ideological solidarity (Proposition Ⅰ-C), and suppression of dissent and deviance (Proposition Ⅰ-D) within each of the conflict parties. Conflict intensity is presumably functional because it increases integration, although centralization of power as well the suppression of deviance and dissent create malintegrative pressures in the long run (see PropositionⅡ). Thus, there appears to be an inherent dialectic in conflict-group unification-one that creates pressures toward disunification. Unfortunately, Coser did not specify the conditions under which these malintegrative pressures are likely to surface. In focusing on positive functions—that is, forces promoting integration--the analysis ignored a promising area of inquiry. This bias becomes even more evident when Coser shifts attention to the functions of conflict for the systemic whole within which the conflict occurs. These propositions are listed in Table 10.10.
Table 10.10 Coser's propositions on the Functions of Conflict for the Social Whole
Ⅰ. The more differentiated and functionally interdependent are the units in a system. the more likely is conflict to be frequent but of low degrees of intensity and violence.
Ⅱ. The lower are the intensity and violence of conflicts, the more likely are conflicts to
A, Increase the level of innovation and creativity of system units.
B. Release hostilities before they polarize system units.
C. Promote normative regulation of conflict relations.
D. Increase awareness of realistic issues.
E. increase the number of associative coalitions among social units
Ⅲ The more conf ct promotes Ⅱ-A throughⅡ-E the greater will he the level of internal social integration of the system who ~ and the greater will be its capacity to adapt to its external environment.
Coser's propositions are not presented in their full complexity in Table 10.10, but the essentials of his analysis are clear. In PropositionⅠ, complex systems that have a large number of interdependencies and exchanges are more likely to have frequent conflicts that are less emotionally involving and violent than conflicts in those systems that are less complex and in which tensions accumulate. The nature of interdependence, Coser argued, causes conflicts to erupt frequently, but, because they emerge periodically, emotions do not build to the point that violence is inevitable. Conversely, systems in which there are low degrees of functional interdependence will often polarize into hostile camps; when conflict does erupt, it wig be intense and violent, In Proposition Ⅱ, frequent conflicts of low intensity and violence are seen to have certain positive functions, First, such frequent and low-intensity conflicts will force those in conflict to reassess and reorganize their actions (Proposition Ⅱ-A). Second, these conflicts will release tensions and hostilities before they build to a point where adversaries become polarized around nonrealistic issues (proposition Ⅱ-B). Third, frequent conflicts of low intensity and violence encourage the development of normative procedures--laws, courts, mediating agencies, and the like to regulate tensions (Proposition Ⅱ-C). Fourth, these kinds of conflicts also increase a sense of realism over what the conflict is about. That is, frequent conflicts in which intensity and violence are kept under control allow conflict parties to articulate their interests and goals, thereby allowing them to bargain and compromise (PropositionⅡ-D). Fifth, conflicts promote coalitions among units that are threatened by the action of one party or another. If conflicts are frequent and have low intensity and violence, such coalitions come and go, thereby promoting flexible alliances (Proposition Ⅱ-E). If conflicts are infrequent and emotions accumulate, however, coalitions often polarize threatened parties into ever more hostile camps, with the result that, when conflict does occur, it is violent. And Proposition Ⅲ simply states Coser's functional conclusion that, when conflicts are frequent and when violence and intensity are reduced, conflict will promote flexible coordination within the system and increased capacity to adjust and adapt to environmental circumstances. This increase in flexibility and adaptation is possible because of the processes listed in PropositionⅡ-A throughⅡ-E.
Coser borrowed and extended Georg Simmel's initial insights. In its time, Coser's functionalism represented an important corrective to more Marxian inspired dialectical approaches. None of Coser's ideas needed to be expressed in the language of functionalism, but the tactic was successful and enabled Coser to postulate an alternative to Marxian sociology. Today, Coser's and Simmel's ideas are incorporated into views of conflict processes that have abandoned the language of functionalism, and it is difficult to see an explicitly functional emphasis in any contemporary conflict theory.
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