Cjss second Issue: cjss second Issue qxd

itary threats and the decline of liberal democracy in ethnically divided soci-
eties (Midlarsky, 2003); the negative impact of major regional security threats
on the level of political tolerance in small states such as Taiwan (Wang and
Chang, 2006) and Israel (Peffley et al, 2008); and a similarly negative effect of
external threats to territorial integrity on prospects for democratization
(Gibler and Thies, 2006) and recognition of dissident groups (Gibler and
Hutchinson, 2007).
Lastly, since the 1990s, Georgian analysts have suggested that the na-
tion’s situation is characterized by a weak tradition of statehood and a sig-
nificant connection between internal and external threats (Nodia, 1998, 2005:
65-68; Rondeli, 1998). Yet, while the official National Security Concept prom-
ulgated in July 2005 emphasizes the dangers posed by internal conflicts sup-
ported from outside the country, infringement of territorial integrity and
spillover of conflicts from neighboring states (i.e., “the Russian Federation’s
military presence on the territory of Georgia would be a risk factor to the sta-
bility of the country in certain circumstances”), it does not make specific ref-
erence to the sponsorship of anti-government activities by foreign agencies
(National Security Concept of the Republic of Georgia, 2005. pp.  3-5). Further,
despite its emphasis on these conditions, the document states that “the like-
lihood of open military aggression against Georgia is low”, and that, pending
their final withdrawal, “[M]ilitary bases of the Russian Federation located in
Georgia are no longer a direct threat to [its] sovereignty” (2005. p. 4).
Thus, in order to address the problem of indirect threats, it is useful to
interpret elite security perceptions in terms of the difference between “objec-
tive” and “subjective” challenges (Nodia, 2005.p. 41). The first are based on
pre-existing conditions that cannot be directly controlled, such as a state’s
geography, size and resources, while the second involves the policies chosen
in response to threats and the ability of decision-makers to implement them.
In turn, each of these factors plays a role in defining the “national project”, or
the concept of public order and its supporting institutions held by a govern-
ment. In the Georgian context, the combination of ethnic and territorial divi-
sions, economic and administrative incapacity and unresolved questions of
national identity have made it imperative for leaders to consolidate and main-
tain their control of the polity. This linkage between the definition of the na-
tional interest and the resort by elites to whatever actions deemed necessary
to remain in office is expressed in the following quotation:
“Politicians, especially when in government, like to frame many issues as
security threats, because it is easier to mobilize people on matters said to en-
danger core national interests (and to enhance the incumbent government’s
standing or influence in the process).” (Nodia, 2005. p. 42).
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Model of Post-2003 Georgian State-Society Relations
The resulting theoretical synthesis is specified as follows: the schematic
displayed in Figure 1 below presents a conceptual model of post-Rose Revo-
lution Georgian politics containing three essential elements: the independent
variable (IV), or the characteristics of political opposition groups, including
structure (organization and leadership), size (number of participants in pub-
lic actions), strategies (political objective), tactics (methods), and foreign ori-
entation (policy toward Russia); the intervening variable (IV), or the level of
threats or challenges to domestic interests that have emanated from the in-
ternational system; and the dependent variable (DV), or elite behavior, which
is composed of two factors: the definition of vital national interests by the
governing elite, and the policing practices administered to protect and pre-
serve those interests. Together, these represent the situational context of
Georgian perceptions of national security. In turn, the upper right-hand block
arrow indicates a positive association between the presence of external chal-
lenges and the security perceptions and practices of the incumbent govern-
ment. Finally, the central arrow represents the bi-directional process of
challenge and response between opposition and authority structures. The
definition of primary indicators and sources of empirical data for each of
these variables are discussed in the following section. 
Figure 1. Internal/external threats and state responses in post-2003
Georgia.
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Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences
IV
INTV
DV
(+)
(+/-)
Opposition
Characteristics
Elite Behavior
Tactics
Strategy
Size
Structure
D
e
fin
it
ion
of
Na
ti
o
n
a
l
Pr
o
je
c
t
Policing
Practices
Policing
Practices
External Threats
(Foreign military
presence, economic
sanctions, trade/travel
/communication bans)
(+/-)
Action-Reaction
Process
Foreign
Orientation

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Data and Measures
Opposition Characteristics
The post-2003 Georgian political opposition can be classified according
to three main categories: 1), those groups and entities which have represen-
tation in the Parliament and embody the institutionalized momentum of the
Rose Revolution, 2), pre-2003 groupings which advocate pragmatism or have
maintained separation from the broader public protest movement, and 3),
those which were established by former members of the country’s adminis-
trative and business elite who have become political opponents or personal
foes of the incumbent president. The trajectory that these groups have fol-
lowed during the post-Revolution period is also affected by broader condi-
tions of popular unrest generated by economic hardship, perceptions of
unaccountability or indifference by the national leadership, and undesirable
government policies. In the present instance, a further significant factor in
identifying their influence on elite reactions is their policy orientation toward
Georgian bilateral relations with Russia, which can be discerned from the pro-
grammes or manifestos of the individual parties. Table 1 presents a basic
summary of data on eight major opposition groups active in Georgia during
the period between the presidential elections of January 2004 and January
2008. This information is drawn from a range of public media sources, includ-
ing Civil Georgia, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and the Georgian Young
Lawyers’ Association. The columns indicate whether opposition groups and
actions are initiated by individuals (elite-led) or are broadly-based (popular),
small (less than 5,000 participants) or large (greater than 10,000 partici-
pants) in size, whether strategic goals are limited (e.g., constitutional reforms)
or maximalist (e.g., resignation demands), whether tactics used are non-vio-
lent (e.g., negotiations, hunger strikes, “tent cities”) or violent (e.g., riots, at-
tacks on police, property damage), and foreign orientation (cooperation with
or opposition toward Russia). For each group that falls into a respective cate-
gory, the matrix cell is marked by an X. Finally, each marked category in which
a change occurred in a particular characteristic over time is indicated by a sub-
script denoting its first (X1) and second (X2) position. 
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