Cjss second Issue: cjss second Issue qxd

External Threats
In the post-Soviet era, Russia has been identified as the only state from
which Georgia has received serious external threats. Even prior to the August
War, post-independence relations had ranged from poor to tense, verging pe-
riodically on military confrontation (Nodia, 2005. pp. 39-40). Yet, it is impor-
tant to note that despite some popular characterizations of the August events
(as well as primordialist understandings of identity-based conflict), Georgian
resistance to Russian influence in the Caucasus has not followed a singular
pattern of historical precedents. During the late 18
th
century, the kings of
Kartli-Kakheti sought direct intervention by the Romanovs and subsequent
integration into the imperium of Catherine II in order to resist the advancing
forces of the Ottoman and Qajar empires (Polyevktov, 1930. p. 368; Jones,
1987. pp. 53-54). Similarly, although the Russian annexation of the Georgian
territories in the early 19
h 
century and the resultant consolidation of the na-
133
Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences
Opposition
Group
E
l
i
t
e-
l
e
d
Popular
Small
<
5000
Large
>
10000
Limited
Maximalist
Non-
Violent
V
i
o
l
e
n
t
Foreign
Orientation
Democratic
Front
X
X
X
X
Normalization
of relations with
Russia
Conservative
Party
X
X
X
X
No stated
position
Industry Will
Save Georgia
X
X
X
X
Ties to Russian
business, anti-
IMF and World
Bank
Republican
Party of
Georgia
X
X
X
X
No stated
position
Georgian
Labour Party
X
X
X
1
X
2
X
1
X
2
Partnership with
Russia
Movement
for a United
Georgia
X
1
X
2
X
X
No stated
position
New
Conservatives
/New Rights
X
X
X
1
X
2
X
Improved
relationship
with Russian
Federation;
withdrawal
from CIS and
removal of
peacekeepers
from Abkhazia
National
Council of
Unified
Public
Movement
X
X
X
X
No stated
position

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tionalist movement was analogous with the manner in which the later estab-
lishment of the Czarist gubiernas of Baku and Elizavetpol galvanized the Azer-
baijani bourgeoisie to campaign for Transcaucasian independence, the 1832
revolt of Georgian nobles sought the restoration of the royal oligarchy rather
than the ideal of popular sovereignty (Jones, 1987; Çağla, 2003. pp. 119, 122-
123). Instead, it was the Georgian Mensheviks/Social Democrats during the
1920s that expressed the most intense rejection of Russian/Soviet central-
ization of control (Jones, 1988).
In addition, Moscow and Tbilisi have maintained intimate economic and
infrastructural ties in the post-Soviet period, and domestic producers have
remained highly dependent on Russian consumer markets as a primary
source of revenue, while until recent years Russia had remained Georgia’s
largest trading partner, at a total volume of $637.4 million in 2006 (AmCham,
2009)
Thus, Russian-Georgian relations should be examined as a series of com-
plex historical interactions rather than as a continual struggle against impe-
rial ambitions. The involvement of the Russian Federation on Georgian
territory and its indirect influence within national society continued in both
accommodative and coercive forms after the consolidation of the Rose Revo-
lution. These have included the presence of Russian troops in the military
bases at Gudauta (Abkhazia), Batumi (Ajaria), and Akhalkalaki (Javakheti),
all but one of which were officially closed ahead of the three-year deadline
set in the May 2005 withdrawal agreement, which generated resistance from
local businesses dependent on their patronage (Niklas Nilsson and Johanna
Popjanevski, 2009: 30-31); and conversely, a combination of import bans on
agricultural and trade goods (e.g., “wine wars”), broad economic sanctions, in-
cluding restrictions on air, land and sea transit (e.g., closure of the Kazbegi-
Zemo Larsi customs checkpoint) and postal and banking communications,
and visa cancellations and deportation of remittance laborers, all which were
imposed from March-October 2006 (Anjaparidze, 2006). 
Elite Behavior 
One of the primary indicators of how political leaders in a transitional
country perceive national security is the practices through which they police
society. A central concern in reforming domestic security agencies in the for-
mer Soviet countries has been the reorientation of their function and opera-
tions from the safeguarding of elites to the protection of the rights and safety
of citizens. Recent studies on the political economy of institutions posit that
the longevity of an authoritarian government is dependent on its continued
134
Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences

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ability to provide private goods or patronage to a small “winning coalition” of
regime supporters, while public goods such as welfare subsidies and social
guarantees are distributed broadly to rest of society (Bueno de Mesquita,
1999, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003). Yet, while monarchies and mili-
tary juntas completely exclude their subject populations from politics, Soviet-
style or Leninist systems purposively expand the “selectorate”, or that
proportion of the society that chooses its leaders by introducing membership
in an official party and establishing universal voting rights. Therefore, citizens
of post-socialist states have historically enjoyed a limited degree of inclusion
in the political process, despite the fact that elections and candidates were
formerly the sole purview of the Communist elite.       
Yet, as the size of the winning coalition gradually increases during the
initial stages of democratization, it becomes progressively more difficult for
leaders to maintain their incumbency, as supporters receive greater incen-
tives to defect from the elite, while potential challengers gain greater access
to resources for seeking to replace the leadership. Further, there is a possible
corollary relationship between increased popular mobilization and social in-
stability. Because they offer a greater chance that citizens might gain access
to exclusive benefits, efforts to expand the selectorate may eventually increase
popular pressures to introduce further reforms. If formal institutions or elec-
toral systems are weak or insufficiently representative, expressions of dis-
content or conflicts of interest will occur outside of the political system in the
form of strikes, riots or antigovernment demonstrations (Zak, 2000). 
These conditions are in turn linked to policing patterns and the suppres-
sion of conflict as symbolized by public opposition to central authorities. For
the military/defense establishment and security services additionally con-
stitute the immediate supporters of an incumbent leadership in authoritarian
and newly democratizing polities. As such, the basic structure of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MOIA) and police forces remained virtually unchanged
from their Soviet-era format during the period from independence in 1991
until after the Rose Revolution (Transparency International Georgia, 2005:
1-2). Security and law enforcement agencies are especially difficult and costly
to reform, as they have historically served as the guarantors of state power
and protection of elite interests. This concerns not simply the ordained roles
and functions of individual ministries and police forces, but their actual em-
ployment and conduct, particularly during periods of transition or crisis.
135
Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences

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