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of the Free Economic Zone, as well as veto power for vital decisions and con-
stitutional changes, and a post of the vice-president. Nevertheless, this plan
was rejected by Sukhumi. In July 2008, the government of South Ossetia also
rejected to accept proposition of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany
Mr. F. Steinmeier to widen the international presence in negotiation process.
As a matter of fact all this was a slowdown of the negotiation process and re-
soluthion of the conflicts in Georgia. 
In July 2008 the Russian Federation started the full-scale military exer-
cises „Caucasus 2008“,  which should be ended by the August 2, 2008, howe-
ver troops were not returned to their home stations but stayed in North
Ossetia. Begining of the August 2008 characterized by the shootings on the
border between Georgia and South Ossetia, origin of which hasn’t been dis-
covered, and as a result of which President of Georgia M. Saakashvili made a
decision  to bring troops to South Ossetia. 
On August 8, 2008 Russia availed herself of the motive – security of the
Russian citizens – brought troops to the territory of South Ossetia. However,
by some evidence Russia brought her troops there yet on August 7, 2008
(Латынина, 2008), that afford ground for dispute who had been the first one
to start military actions – Russia or Georgia. In several days Russian troops en-
tered territory of Abkhazia. 
The week of the military actions and mediation of the European Union
headed by the President of France N. Sarkozy led to the signing of the Agree-
ment of Six points, violated for several times, which led to the cease-fire and
deployment of the European observers on the territory of Georgia and Russ-
ian military bases on the territory of two separatist regions, proclamation of
their independence and recognition of these independences by the Russian
Federation on August 26, 2008. 
From the very beginning of the conflict, the Russian Federation accused
Ukraine in the military support of Georgia, in particular in “illegal transfer of
arms”, not providing any official evidences. This thesis was a provocation and
an attempt to spoil the image of Ukraine at the international arms market,
because Georgia has not been under any sanctions prohibited arms trade, and
cooperation with Ukraine took place in the framework of the earlier signed
contracts. 
In fact, there are three main versions of the conflict’s reasons:
Desire of the Russian Federation to prevent NATO enlargement to the
East and to retain influence over the post-soviet space. 
Attempt to spoil image of Georgia as a transit state for oil and gas supply
from the Caspian region, and to undermine attempts of the alternative energy
routes to Europe (oil pipeline Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan, Baku – Tbilisi – Supsa
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and gas pipeline Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum and “White Stream” project). In this
case, Russia de facto would be the only one to have control over the energy
supply to Europe. 
Desire of Georgia to attract attention of the international community,
first of all of the NATO and the EU, to the problem of unresolved conflicts at
its territory and inadequate actions of Russia, aiming quick NATO joining.  
Analysis of the main threats and risks resulted from the Russian-Georgian
crisis of 2008.
Today we can define threats and risks both for the whole Black Sea re-
gion and for separate states, especially for Ukraine. For the Black Sea region,
it is stepping up of the situation in the separatist regions of Moldova and Azer-
baijan, threat to the security of the transport routes, pipelines and temporary
stop of energy supply from the Caspian basin. For Ukraine, this list is added
by aggravation in the relation with the Russian Federation, exacerbation of
the Russian Black Sea Fleet status problem, possibility to use South Ossetian
scenario in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, etc. 
The Russian – Georgian conflict clearly demonstrated level of the deci-
sion-making in Russia, namely the leading role of the Prime Minister V. Putin,
and level of his personal position influence on the internal and external pol-
icy-making. De-facto during the whole military campaign the statements were
made against the President of Georgia Mr. Saakashvili personally, whom Russ-
ian leadership negatively perceived after the Rose Revolution of 2003, but
not against the Georgian state or its people. So in the beginning of September
2008 Mr. Medvedev states in the interview to the Italian TV channel RAI that
for Russia “the current regime is bankrupt. President Mikhail Saakashvili no
longer exists for us. He is a ‘political corpse” (as cited in Barry, 2008).
The Russian-Georgian conflict has the following consequences for the
energy security in the Black Sea region. Russian army operations, in particu-
larly bombing of the oil terminal in Poti and Azerbaijan oil cisterns on the
railway line Baku –Tbilisi – Kars, as well as bombing around the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline demonstrated vulnerability of the infrastructure and trans-
portation routes. Moreover, the conflict had a psychological effect, when some
investors rejected to participate in the projects for alternative energy re-
sources transportation from the Caspian region, including slowdown of the
Nabucco project realization. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the long-term
perspective can redirect their export from Europe to China, and dependence
of the European states from the Russian energy resources will increase. 
It is necessary to mention that the United States and Georgia are going
to  advance security of the energy transit via territory of Georgia to the Euro-
pean markets about which is said in the Charter on strategic partnership USA
– Georgia signed on January 9, 2009. 
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