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when Russian troops destroyed railway-bridge in Georgia, Armenia sent its
materials and engineers to restore it, and in autumn 2008 rejected to recog-
nize Abkhazia and South Ossetia so not to spoil relations with Georgia
(Avoyan, 2008).
De-facto spoiled its image as a mediator after the events in Georgia; Rus-
sia boosted its “peaceful” initiatives towards other “frozen” conflicts in the
Black Sea region. On November 2, 2008, the meeting of the Presidents of Ar-
menia and Azerbaijan in Moscow was organized in Moscow, at which Decla-
ration on peace ways of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was
signed. On March 18, 2009, the meeting of the President of Moldova and the
Head of the Transnistria was also organized in Moscow. Any compromises
were not reached at this meeting but was decided to revive negotiation in
“5+2” format. These two meeting demonstrated that the Russian Federation
is not going to decrease its role in the settlement of the conflicts at the terri-
tory of the former USSR states, and relies on unilateral leadership in this
process, not inviting to negotiations other participants, including the OSCE
Minsk Group, Ukraine, etc. At the same time, it is necessary to underline the
“show”-nature of these meetings, as in reality any concrete results were
reached. Even the Moscow Declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh just confirmed
those principles, which were on repeated occasions pointed at different ne-
gotiations on this conflict. However, these two meetings were accompanied by
a serious media campaign where the leading role of Russia, its success as a
mediator and peacekeeper were stressed, having the goal – to polish image at
the international arena. 
It is noteworthy position of the European Union. Actually, it was a first
time when Brussels step as a mediator and openly intervene in the process of
the conflict settlement in the Black Sea region. Only in 2007, the EU paid at-
tention to the region adopting the Black Sea Synergy, a document, which paid
a little attention to the ”frozen conflicts” considering confidence building
measures enough to enhance cooperation in the region. However, events of
August 2008 demonstrated that “melting” conflicts pose a threat not only to
the security of Georgia and other Black Sea states but also a threat to the Eu-
ropean security and stability. Active mediation efforts of the French President
Mr. Sarkozy, presiding in the EU, demonstrated two important facts. For the
first time, the EU stood together in expressing the position on a foreign policy
issue towards the Black Sea region. And at the same time big concessions to
Russia, inability to impose sanctions and de-facto disregard of provisions of
the peace agreement from the Russian side proved dependence and caution
of the EU in relationship with Moscow due to the fear that she will use energy
factor as a lever of influence. 
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Forecasts on further situation development.
As for today, there are two possible variants of the event trends for South
Ossetia: 
South Ossetia will merge into the Russian Federation by uniting with
North Ossetia;
Start of the situation destabilization in North Ossetia aiming to separate
from Russia, to unite with South Ossetia and found a new independent state.
This variant is less probable in the short-term perspective because of the
strong power concentration in the Russian Federation, low level of the socio-
economic development of the region and therefore inability to finance the de-
velopment of the Ossetian state by itself. 
The most realistic is a variant for the conflict settlement in Georgia when
South Ossetia will join Russia uniting with North Ossetia, and Abkhazia will
return to Georgia with great autonomy rights. This variant has a chance for
success because:
South Ossetia ethnically is different from Georgia but identical to North
Ossetia. 
South Ossetian elite is totally under control of Moscow, and Russian Fed-
eration finance the “state” budget
South Ossetia always proclaimed its desire to join with Russia. 
South Ossetia does not have developed infrastructure, own resources
and economic perspectives for independent existence. 
Abkhazia does not express its wish to join with Russia. 
Because of close location of Abkhazia to Sochi, Russia will avoid desta-
bilization in the region. 
Previous years of negotiations showed that Abkhazian leadership leaned
towards the idea of broad autonomy until Russia involved. 
At the territory of Abkhazia ethnic Abkhaz are not the ethnic majority,
and in case refugees return to Gali region, Georgian population will prevail. 
Further recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by other states is an
important question. As for today, only the Russian Federation, Venezuela and
Nicaragua (partly) have recognized these two republics. Moreover, after the
CSTO meeting in Moscow in September 2008, one cannot witness any work
of Russia for promoting idea of recognition of these newly created states. It is
an opinion that Russia does not insist on their recognition by the international
community because in case this will happen, Russia can lose its levers of in-
fluence and monopolistic position and special relations with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia (Николай Злобин, 2008). 
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Conclusions
Russian-Georgian conflict set the real parties to conflict, switched over
negotiations from Georgia-South Ossetia and Georgia – Abkhazia to Georgia
– Russia format. As a confirmation to this is a fact that the EU conducted all
negotiations with Moscow, but not with governments of the unrecognized re-
publics. In addition, deployment of the regular army of the Russian Federa-
tion, which did not have resolution of any international organization and was
not as a peacekeeper, made Russia a direct part to the conflict, yet one time,
confirmed its impossibility to be a mediator. Event of August 2008 demon-
strated which mechanisms the Russian Federation is ready to use to prevent
post-soviet states from the Euroatlantic integration. If in March-April 2008
Moscow confined to strong statements, so events of August 2008 dramatically
demonstrated these “any means” by which it is ready to confront this process. 
Events of August 2008 and their consequence should push Ukrainian
government towards prevention of the “Georgian scenario” reoccurrence on
its territory; first of all, it is necessary to activate check process of double cit-
izenship among the Crimean population, especially among the former Russian
military men, and to enhance Ukrainian legislation on termination of citizen-
ship. Moreover, it is necessary to elaborate clear mechanism of control over
the Russian Black Sea Fleet activities in the Crimea to prevent its reuse in mil-
itary acts against third states. Yet one consequence for Ukraine was an at-
tempt to spoil its image of the arms trader at the world market. That is why
it is necessary to inform about Ukrainian-Georgian military-technical cooper-
ation, arms trade, and fact-finding on illegal trade in Georgia before and dur-
ing the Russian-Georgian crisis. 
The European Union in its turn tries to play a more active role in the
Black Sea region, including being a mediator; however, internal collisions and
unwillingness to confront with the Russian Federation limit its activity. Not at
least it was demonstrated by very quick return to negotiations on a new
agreement between the EU and Russia, which had been suspended in August
2008 and inability to gain point on deployment of the EU observers in Abk-
hazia and South Ossetia and strict respect of the “Six points” Agreement. 
In addition, it is necessary to mention that August events demonstrated
that struggle for routes of energy supply to Europe from Central Asia and
Caspian region can be not only in economic sphere, but also in political and
military one, what should be taken into account while planning alternative
energy routes. 
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