fact that the phoneme is the
unimaginable itself, and no
visibility can resemble it, it suffices to
take into account what Saussure says about the difference between the symbol and the sign (p.
ioi) [pp. 68–69] in order to be completely baffled as to how he can at the same time say of
writing that it is an “image” or “figuration” of language and define language and writing
elsewhere as “two distinct systems of signs” (p. 45) [p. 23]. For the property of the sign is not
to be an image. By a process exposed by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams, Saussure
thus accumulates contradictory arguments to bring about a satis-factory decision: the
exclusion of writing. In fact, even within so-called phonetic writing, the “graphic” signifier
refers to the phoneme through a web of many dimensions which binds it, like all signifiers, to
other written and oral signifiers, within a “total” system open, let us say, to all possible
investments of sense. We must begin with the possibility of that total system.
Saussure was thus never able to think that writing was truly an “image,” a “figuration,” a
“representation” of the spoken language, a symbol. If one considers that he nonetheless
needed these inadequate notions to decide upon the exteriority of writing, one must conclude
that an entire stratum of his discourse, the intention of Chapter VI (“Graphic Representation
of Language”), was not at all scientific. When I say this, my quarry is not
((46))
primarily Ferdinand de Saussure’s intention or motivation, but rather the entire uncritical
tradition which he inherits. To what zone of discourse does this strange functioning of
argumentation belong, this coherence of desire producing itself in a near-oneiric way—
although it clarifies the dream rather than allow itself to be clarified by it—through
a•contradictory logic? How is this functioning articulated with the entirety of theoretical
discourse, throughout the history of science? Better yet, how does it work from within the
concept of science itself? It is only when this question is elaborated—if it is some day—when
the concepts required by this functioning are de-fined outside of all psychology (as of all
sciences of man), outside meta-physics (which can now be “Marxist” or “structuralist”); when
one is able to respect all its levels of generality and articulation—it is only then that one will
be able to state rigorously the problem of the articulated appurtenance of a text (theoretical or
otherwise) to an entire set: I obviously treat the Saussurian text at the moment only as a telling
example within a given situation, without professing to use the concepts required by the
functioning of which I have just spoken. My justification would be as fol-lows: this and some
other indices (in a general way the treatment of the concept of writing) already give us the
assured means of broaching the de-construction of the greatest totality—the concept of the
epistémè and logocentric metaphysics—within which are produced, without ever posing the
radical question of writing, all the Western methods of analysis, explication, reading, or
interpretation.
Now we must think that writing is at the same time more exterior to speech, not being its
“image” or its “symbol,” and more interior to speech, which is already in itself a writing.
Even before it is linked to incision, en-graving, drawing, or the letter, to a signifier referring in
general to a signifier signified by it, the concept of the graphie [unit of a possible graphic
system] implies the framework of the instituted trace, as the possibility common to all
systems of signification. My efforts will now be directed toward slowly detaching these two
concepts from the classical discourse from which I necessarily borrow them. The effort will
be laborious and we know a priori that its effectiveness will never be pure and absolute.
The instituted trace is “unmotivated” but not capricious. Like the word “arbitrary” according
to Saussure, it “should not imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker”
(p. ioi) [pp. 68-69]. Simply, it has no “natural attachment” to the signified within reality. For
us, the rupture of that “natural attachment” puts in question the idea of naturalness rather than
that of attachment. That is why the word “institution” should not be too quickly interpreted
within the classical system of oppositions.
The instituted trace cannot be thought without thinking the retention of difference within a
structure of reference where difference appears as
((47))
such and thus permits a certain liberty of variations among the full terms. The absence of
another here-and-now, of another transcendental present, of another origin of the world
appearing as such, presenting itself as ir-reducible absence within the presence of the trace, is
not a metaphysical formula substituted for a scientific concept of writing. This formula,
beside the fact that it is the questioning of metaphysics itself, describes the structure implied
by the “arbitrariness of the sign,” from the moment that one thinks of its possibility short of
the derived opposition between nature and convention, symbol and sign, etc. These
oppositions have meaning only after the possibility of the trace. The “unmotivatedness” of the
sign re-quires a synthesis in which the completely other is announced as such—without any
simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or continuity—within what is not it. Is announced as
such: there we have all history, from what metaphysics has defined as “non-living” up to
“consciousness,” passing through all levels of animal organization. The trace, where the
relationship with the other is marked, articulates its possibility in the entire field of the entity
[étant], which metaphysics has defined as the being-present starting from the occulted
movement of the trace. The trace must be thought before the entity. But the movement of the
trace is necessarily occulted, it produces itself as self-occultation. When the other announces
itself as such, it presents itsef in the dissimulation of itself. This formulation is not
theological, as one might believe somewhat hastily. The “theological” is a determined
moment in the total movement of the trace. The field of the entity, before being determined as
the field of presence, is structured ac-cording to the diverse possibilities—genetic and
structural—of the trace. The presentation of the other as such, that is to say the dissimulation
of its “as such,” has always already begun and no structure of the entity escapes it.
That is why the movement of “unmotivatedness” passes from one structure to the other when
the “sign” crosses the stage of the “symbol.” It is in a certain sense and according to a certain
determined structure of the “as such” that one is authorized to say that there is yet no
immotivation in ,what Saussure calls “symbol” and which, according to him, does not—at
least provisionally—interest semiology. The general structure of the un-motivated trace
connects within the same possibility, and they cannot be separated except by abstraction, the
structure of the relationship with the other, the movement of temporalization, and language as
writing. Without referring back to a “nature,” the immotivation of the trace has always
become. In fact, there is no unmotivated trace: the trace is indefinitely its own becoming-
unmotivated. In Saussurian language, what Saus-sure does not say would have to be said:
there is neither symbol nor sign but a becoming-sign of the symbol.
Thus, as it goes without saying, the trace whereof I speak is not more
((48))