system of writing in general is not exterior to the system of language in general, unless it is
granted that the division between exterior and interior passes through the interior of the
interior or the exterior of the exterior, to the point where the immanence of language is
essentially exposed to the intervention of forces that are apparently alien to its system. For the
same reason, writing in general is not “image” or “figuration” of language in general, except
if the nature, the logic, and the functioning of the image within the system from which one
wishes to exclude it be reconsidered. Writing is not a sign of a sign, except if one says it of all
signs, which would be more profoundly true. If every sign refers to a sign, and if “sign of a
sign” signifies writing, certain conclusions—which I shall consider at the appropriate moment
—will become inevitable. What Saussure saw without seeing, knew without being able to
take into account, following in that the entire metaphysical tradition, is that a certain model of
writing was necessarily but provisionally imposed (but for the inaccuracy in principle,
insufficiency of fact, and the permanent usurpation) as instrument and technique of
representation of a system of language. And that this movement, unique in style, was so pro-
found that it permitted the thinking, within language, of concepts like those of the sign,
technique, representation, language. The system of language associated with phonetic-
alphabetic writing is that within which logocentric metaphysics, determining the sense of
being as presence, has been produced. This logocentrism, this epoch of the full speech, has
always placed in parenthesis, suspended, and suppressed for essential reasons, all free
reflection on the origin and status of writing, all science of writing which was not technology
and the history of a technique, itself leaning upon a mythology and a metaphor of a natural
writing.* It is this logocentrism which, limiting the internal system of language in general by
a bad abstraction, prevents Saussure and the majority of his successors 7 from determining
fully and explicitly that which is called “the integral and concrete object of linguistics” (p. 23)
[p. 7].
But conversely, as I announced above, it is when he is not expressly dealing with writing,
when he feels he has closed the parentheses on that subject, that Saussure opens the field of a
general grammatology. Which
xxx fotnote start xxx
*A play on “époque” (epoch) and “epochè,” the Husserlian term for the “bracketting” or
“putting out of play” that constitutes phenomenological reduction.
xxx fotnote slutt xxx
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would not only no longer be excluded from general linguistics, but would dominate it and
contain it within itself. Then one realizes that what was chased off limits, the wandering
outcast of linguistics, has indeed never ceased to haunt language as its primary and most
intimate possibility. Then something which was never spoken and which is nothing other’
than writing itself as the origin of language writes itself within Saussure’s discourse. Then we
glimpse the germ of a profound but indirect explanation of the usurpation and the traps
condemned in Chapter VI. This explanation will overthrow even the form of the question to
which it was a premature reply.
The Outside [Is med kryss] the Inside
The thesis of the
arbitrariness of the sign (so grossly misnamed, and not only for the reasons
Saussure himself recognizes) 8 must forbid a radical distinction between the linguistic and the
graphic sign. No doubt this thesis concerns only the necessity of relationships between
specific signifiers and signifieds within an allegedly natural relationship between the voice
and sense in general, between the order of phonic signifiers and the content of the signifieds
(“the only natural bond, the only true bond, the bond of sound”). Only these relationships
between specific signifiers and signifieds would be regulated by arbitrariness. Within the
“natural” relationship between phonic signifiers and their signifieds in general, the rela-
tionship between each determined signifier and its determined signified would be “arbitrary.”
Now from the moment that one considers the totality of determined signs, spoken, and a
fortiori written, as unmotivated institutions, one must exclude any relationship of natural
subordination, any natural hierarchy among signifiers or orders of signifiers. If “writing”
signifies inscription and especially the durable institution of a sign (and that is the only
irreducible kernel of the concept of writing), writing in general covers the entire field of
linguistic signs. In that field a certain sort of instituted signifiers may then appear, “graphic”
in the narrow and derivative sense of the word, ordered by a certain relationship with other
instituted—hence “written,” even if they are “phonic”—signifiers. The very idea of institution
—hence of the arbitrariness of the sign—is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and
outside of its horizon. Quite simply, that is, outside of the horizon itself, outside the world as
space of inscription, as the opening to the emission and to the spatial distribution of signs, to
the regulated play of their differences, even if they are “phonic.”
Let us now persist in using this opposition of nature and institution, of physis and nomos
(which also means, of course, a distribution and division regulated in fact by law) which a
meditation on writing should disturb al-
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though it functions everywhere as self-evident, particularly in the discourse of linguistics. We
must then conclude that only the signs called
natural, those that Hegel and Saussure call
“symbols,” escape semiology as grammatology. But they fall a fortiori outside the field of
linguistics as the region of general semiology. The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign thus
indirectly but irrevocably contests Saussure’s declared proposition when he chases writing to
the outer darkness of language. This thesis successfully accounts for a conventional
relationship between the phoneme and the grapheme (in phonetic writing, between the
phoneme, signifier-signified, and the grapheme, pure signifier), but by the same token it
forbids that the latter be an “image” of the former. Now it was indispensable to the exclusion
of writing as “external system,” that it come to impose an “image,” a “representaton,” or a
“figuration,” an exterior reflection of the reality of language.
It matters little, here at least, that there is in fact an ideographic filiation of the alphabet. This
important question is much debated by historians of writing. What matters here is that in the
synchronic structure and systematic principle of alphabetic writing—and phonetic writing in
general—no relationship of “natural” representation, none of resemblance or participation, no
“symbolic” relationship in the Hegelian–Saussurian sense, no “iconographic” relationship in
the Peircian sense, be implied.
One must therefore challenge, in the very name of the arbitrariness of the sign, the Saussurian
definition of writing as “image”—hence as natural symbol—of language. Not to mention the